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IN DEFENSE OF OUR LAW OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ALFRED HILL*
Abstract: Professor Hill maintains that the Constitution was grounded
on an understanding that the states would not be suable without their
consent, either in the federal or state courts; the Eleventh Amendment,
within its purview, is declaratory of this understanding. The Supreme
Court has consistently treated sovereign immunity as of constitutional
dimension. As such, the immunity has been deemed exempt from
congressional modification under the Commerce Clause. However,
without overt challenge to the immunity's constitutional status, it has
been held subject to congressional modification under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court's decision in this regard
does not withstand critical analysis. Sovereign immunity is not the
malign doctrine it is commonly thought to be. In general, it has not
served as a bar to effective relief for lawless conduct by government
officers. For the most part, it has operated to defeat claims arising from
consensual relations with the government—and here the immunity has
been almost completely eliminated by the federal and state legislatures
within their respective areas of competeiice.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is not written in defense of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as such, but rather in defense of our law of sovereign im-
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munity, which is under continual attack. Academic opinion has been
overwhelmingly hostile. 1 In addition, for some fifteen years a substan-
tial number of the justices, usually not less than four, has stood poised
to eliminate the doctrine root and branch, 2 The Supreme Court has
I So far as this writer has been able to discover, Professor Currie is the only other aca-
demic who believes sovereign immunity, like it or not, to be of constitutional dimension.
David P. Currie, Ex parte Young after Seminole, 72 N.Y.U. LAW REV. 547, 547-48 (1997).
A partial list of academics who argue that sovereign immunity has no sound basis in
law follows. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987); AIM A1/110/ISC, When to Believe a
Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1123 (1989);
Akita Reed Amar, Of Sovereignly and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425 (1987); Edwin M. Bor-
chard, Government Liability 'in Tort (pis. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); William
Burnham, Taming the Eleventh Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 931 (1989-90); Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers
for Relief Other Than Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3 (1954-55); David E. Engdahl, Immunity
and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. Cow. L. REV. 1 (1972); Martha A.
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition
of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Part II]; Martha A.
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 515 (1977) [hereinafter Field; Part A; William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Constraction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather
Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983) [hereinafter Fletcher,
Historical Interpretation]; William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1261 (1989) [hereinafter Fletcher, Reply to Critics];
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Herbert Hovenkamp,fitdicial Restraint and Constitutional Fed-
eralism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 Commt. L. REV. 2213
(1996); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Im-
munity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); Daniell Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign
Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception,"
110 HARv, L. REV. 102 (1996); John V. Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Pourer, 1983 U. ILL L. REV. 423; James E. Pfander, History
and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1269 (1998) [hereinafter Pfander, State Suability]; James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme
Court's. Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. Rev. 555 (1994) [hereinafter
Pfander, State-Party Cases]; James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:
Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nis?. U. L.
REV. 899 (1997) [hereinafter Pfander, Right to Petition]; David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The
Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); Suzanna Sherry,
The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Ilans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1260 (1990); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683 (1997).
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (5-4 decision) (Sower, J., dissenting);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (5-4 decision) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 788 (1991) (64 decision) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987)
(5-4 decision) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadeio State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
247 (1985) (5-4 decision) (Brennan,J., dissenting); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Hal-
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created a potentially large hole in the structure of state sovereign
immunity by its holding that Congress, under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, can provide for suits against the states without
their consents It will be argued that the Court erred in construing
Section 5 as conferring such power on Congress. To be sure, the
Court is not likely to change its course in this regard. Assuming the
authority to exist, it will be argued that, in invalidating virtually every
congressional attempt to exercise this authority, the Court has unduly
narrowed the scope both of the Fourteenth Amendment and of Sec-
tion 5. Thus, congressional diminution of state sovereign immunity
exists largely as a potential.
Currently, sovereign immunity stands as an absolute bar to suit
against the federal government, and against state governments as
well, subject only to such power as Congress may have to override the
immunity of the states under Section 5. There may of course be con-
sent to suit on both levels, but only if consent is given by the legisla-
tures of the respective jurisdictions.
In brief, the opponents of sovereign immunity argue: (1) that
there is error in allowing the doctrine to defeat claims founded on
the Constitution, especially when it is considered that the Constitu-
tion makes no provision for sovereign immunity in the first place; (2)
that sovereign immunity came to us from England, where it was
founded on the notion that the king can do no wrong, and as such it
has no place in a regime of written constitutions that set limits on the
powers of government; (3) that in any event sovereign immunity is at
most an aspect of the common law and is subject to modification or
elimination by judges and legislators, as in the case of common law
generally; and (4) that while the Supreme Court does in fact, through
the fiction of Ex parte Young,4 override sovereign immunity to vindi-
cate constitutional rights, it has, without meaningful explanation, left
large gaps where constitutional rights go unprotected, and its opin-
ions on the point are in utter confusion. It will be argued that all but
the last of these objections are without merit. As to the last objection,
the opinions of the Court are indeed confusing, but if we look, not to
what the Court has said, but to what it has done, it will be seen that a
defensible pattern emerges from the confusion.
derman, 465 U.S. 89, 125 (1984) (5-4 decision) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 126 (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting).
3 See infra notes 205-229 and accompanying text.
4 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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So far as concerns the provenance of sovereign immunity, 5 our
conception of the doctrine is seriously skewed if we conceive of it as
deriving from English laws We derived it independently, in the same
way as did England—and Italy and Japan. The immunity is an inher-
ent attribute of sovereignty, without regard to the form of government
prevailing within the borders of the particular sovereign. There is
probably not a country in the world that permits itself to be sued ex-
cept on terms satisfactory to it. Conversely, if we except countries
where there is little if any law to speak of, there is probably not a sin-
gle one that disallows suit against itself in all circumstances. The ques-
tion is which governmental organs have authority to consent to such
suit. In the United States, on both the federal7 and state8 levels, it has
been assumed from the start that exclusive competence in this regard
is vested in the legislative branch.
It will be argued that, when adopted, the Constitution was under-
stood as embodying an understanding that the federal and state gov-
ernments were free to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity for
themselves, even if this meant that rights given by the federal Consti-
tution would go unenforced.8 It will be further argued that the Elev-
enth Amendment, in the cases to which it applies, is merely an em-
5 111 England, suit against the sovereign was possible if certain conditions were met—
principally by obtaining permission from the Privy Council, the Chancery or the
Exchequer. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1963). With these institutions absent in the United States, consent to
suit devolved upon the legislatures, which initially gave consent to suit in special statutes
for particular cases, and later, increasingly, by general statutes.
0 For the contention that it was so derived, see Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-15
(1979); Engdahl, supra note 1, at 2-5; Jackson, supra note 1, at 79-80. In United States v, Lee,
the Court, in the course of an elaborate dictum, assumed that the sovereign immunity of
the United States derived from English practice, and gave reasons why, as it said, trans-
planting that practice to the United States made no sense because of our different political
institutions. See 106 U.S. 196, 204-10 (1882). In any event, the Court did not reject the
immunity. The holding turned on the Court's conclusion that the suit was permissible as
one against federal officers in their personal capacities. See id. at 210-16; see also Employees
of Dept of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 311, 323 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing sovereign immunity as "a doctrine premised upon kingships" and "born of
systems of divine right").
7 E.g., United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 443-44 (1834).
8 See, e.g., Attorney-General v. Turpin, 13 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 548 (1809); Common-
wealth v. Matlack, 4 Dall. 303, 303 (Pa. 1804). Litigants were often reminded that only the
legislature could waive the immunity. Not for over a century was this exclusive legislative
role challenged, when a significant number of states modified or eliminated sovereign
immunity, in the belief that it was only common-law doctrine. See infra notes 186-190 and
accompanying text.
9 See discussion infra Part IA.1.
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bodiment of the original understanding underlying the Constitution,
adopted only because the decision in Chisholm v. Georgial° was thought
to have ignored the original understanding." Judicial and academic
critics dispute both points. They see sovereign immunity as a corn-
mon-law doctrine. They maintain that if the federal courts are.obliged
to honor the sovereign immunity of the states, this is only because of
the ouster of their jurisdiction in such cases by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. They maintain further that the champions of state sovereign
immunity were not concerned with protecting the states from claims
founded on federal law, but only from claims founded on state law.
They construe the Eleventh Amendment as embodying a similar limi-
tation, contrary to its express language. 12
Part of the confusion arises from the frequent assertion that sov-
ereign immunity is common law. The confusion is compounded by
failure to distinguish the two distinct dimensions in which the prob-
lems arise. One of these is the internal law of a particular jurisdiction,
such as Georgia or the United States. It will be argued that even in
this dimension, sovereign immunity is not common-law doctrine. The
other dimension is a vertical one. In this dimension, the question is
one of federal power, legislative or judicial, to set aside the immunity
of the states. This is part of the larger question of federal power to
override state law. Discussing this power as an aspect of common-law
doctrine is absurd. 13
Although academic critics and minority Justices have ignored the
distinctions between these two dimensions, the Court as a whole has
not. The Court has denied congressional power to set aside state sov-
ereign immunity under Article I and sustained such power under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It will be argued that the Arti-
cle I Supreme Court decisions are correct, and, as earlier observed,
that the Section 5 decisions are dubious.
While the federal and state governments have been immune
from suits not consented to, their officers in general have not. The
doctrine of Ex parte Young has been employed to permit suits against
government officers acting contrary to law. Such relief is founded on
the theory that the suit is not against the government but against the
officer personally. The problem is that, in what seem to be the over-
1° 2 U.S. (2 Dalt.) 419 (1793).
II See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
is See infra notes 49-107, 127-142 and accompanying text
13 See infra notes 177-190 and accompanying text
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whelming majority of such cases, the officer is essentially a nominal
party, with the government, though not named, the real party in in-
terest. Thus, the doctrine of Ex parte Young is an obvious fiction.
Acceptance of the views of the Supreme Court minority and of
virtually all scholars would in effect transform the fiction into law. But
that is not the only way of dealing with what is thought to be a blatant
fiction. It can be argued that sovereign immunity should be recognized
as constituting the basic rule and that what is wrong is the undermin-
ing of this rule by an obvious sham. Not long ago, a majority of the
Supreme Court justices inclined to just this view, expressing doubt
that there is a "principled basis" for the "fiction of the [Ex parte] Young
opinion," and stating that it should be kept as "a very narrow excep-
tion" to the sovereign immunity doctline. 14 The Court added: "For
present purposes, however, we do no more than question the contin-
ued vitality of the . . . doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment con-
text." 15 This challenge to the Ex parte Young doctrine has not borne
fruit so far.
The Ex parte Young suit against the officer has presented the
Court with a serious dilemma. There must be limits to the redress af-
forded against the officer, or else nothing would be left of the gov-
ernment's immunity. The Court's attempts to devise a formula for
dealing with this dilemma have been unsuccessful. For a long time the
Court maintained that a judgment against the officer would be disal-
lowed if it resulted in interference with the govermnent's administra-
tion of its laws. Consistent application of such a test would have
barred most Ex parte Young suits, and this did not happen. This test
was succeeded by the one now in force—relief may be granted if it
operates prospectively, but not if it operates retroactively. The test is
simple but unworkable, and in fact the Court does not follow it.
It is submitted that the problem is solved if we look, not to the
rationalizations attempted by the Court, but rather to its actual hold-
ings. These form a pattern. It appears that in the suit against the
officer, a plea of sovereign immunity is disallowed when the immunity
would operate offensively, but not when it would operate defensively.
If the claimant is seeking only to be left alone and charges that past or
14 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 114 11.25.
15 Id. The Court's concern was with "relief [that] would operate against the State." Id.
Presumably, the Court thought that constitutional rights would be amply protected by
relief against the officer that does not have that effect. But the opinion reveals a readiness
to go far beyond previous decisions in finding that a decree addressed to the officers
would in fact operate against the state. See infra notes 312-323 and accompanying text.
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prospective conduct of government officers is unlawfully intrusive,
judicial inquiry into the validity of such conduct would be precluded
if a plea of sovereign immunity would be sustained. This would consti-
tute what is here called offensive use of the immunity, and such use is
disallowed. On the other hand, when the claimant is seeking some
affirmative advantage from the government, like payment of its debt,
a plea of sovereign immunity is sustained, in what is here called de-
fensive use of the immunity. 16
Apart from recognition of this pattern, our understanding of the
law pertaining to officer liability will be enhanced by recognition that
not every suit against an officer that also affects the government calls
for exercise of the Ex parte Young fiction. If the pertinent statute is not
under attack, and the claim is based only on the officer's failure to
perform a nondiscretionary duty, the officer is routinely held to per-
formance of this duty. Such a suit is not deemed to be one against the
government. When this is not recognized, as in the notorious Su-
preme Court decision in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-
man, 17
 mischief can result.
There will be some discussion of topics bearing on obtaining
money front the government itself, apart from legislation expressly
consenting to such suit. One of these involves judicial use of the writ
of mandamus for access to funds from the general treasury, with the
unexplained assertion that sovereign immunity is no bar to such re-
lief. An explanation will be ventured. Of special interest are recent
Supreme Court decisions in a tax refund case and in all inverse con-
demnation case, which can be read to herald the demise of sovereign
immunity in a broad number of contexts. The question is whether
such a reading is justified. 18
One of the concluding points to be discussed will be the question
of how far federal jurisdiction may be exercised on the basis of a
state's consent to be sued in its own courts—a troublesome area
where the Court has been accused of inconsistency in answering this
question differently on the appellate and trial levels. 19 In another
concluding point, it will be argued that the Court erred when it ruled
generally in Nevada v. Hall 20 that a state need not recognize the sover-
16 See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
17 465 U.S. at 121.
18 See infra notes 958-488 accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 489-992 and accompanying text.
" 440 U.S. 410,426-27 (1979).
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eign immunity of a sister state, althOugh the writer belieVes the result
was proper under the circumstances of that case. 21
I. THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE STATES
A. The Constitution's Formative Period
1. The Case for the Original Understanding
When ratification of the proposed Constitution was being con-
sidered in New York, Alexander Hamilton made the following Much-
quoted statement:
It has been suggested that an assignment of the public secu-
rities of one State to the citizens of another would enable
them to prosecute that State in the federal courts for the
amount of those securities; a suggestion which the following
considerations prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be ame-
nable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is
the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Un-
less, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the
plan of the convention, it will remain with the State, and the
danger intimated must be merely ideal. . . [T] here is no
color to pretend that the State governments would, by the
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying
their own debt in their own way, free from every constraint
but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. . . .
[T]o ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and
in destruction of a pre-existing right of the State govern-
ments, a power which would involve such a consequence,
would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.22
Hamilton's contemporaries did not express disagreement con-
cerning the universality of sovereign hninunity, apart from possible
questions arising from adoption of the Constitution. James Wilson,
who had been a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, was strongly
21 See discussion infra Pant VLC.
22 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 455-56 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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of the view that the immunity had no place in a polity which lacked a
king, and in which a written constitution prescribed the limits of gov-
ernment—from which it followed that the immunity would be denied
to the federal as well as the state governments. These views were ex-
pounded in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, which was decided in
1793 shortly after adoption of the Constitution.23 Chief Justice John
Jay, in his own opinion in Chisholm, expressed somewhat similar views,
save as to the suability of the United States. 24 No evidence exists, how-
ever, that these views were shared to any significant extent. In general,
the sovereign immunity of the United States was not questioned. Fur-
ther, it was assumed that the states were free to bar suits against them-
selves in their own courts. 25
 The debate among the leading statesmen
of the time centered almost exclusively on whether the states, without
their consent, were suable in the federal courts, in light of the provi-
sion in Article III extending the federal judicial power to controver-
sies "between a State and Citizens of another State . . . and between a
State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." 26
Some argued that by reason of this grant of jurisdiction a state
was suable despite a plea of sovereign immunity. Among those so con-
tending were George Mason, 27 Edmund Randolph28 and Patrick
Henry. 29
 Alexander Hamilton, as has been seen, argued differently, as
" See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,453-66 (1793).
24 See id. at 469-79. His argument concerning the suability of the United States, how-
ever, was cramped. He said that when federal judges rendered judgments against states,
they could count on the support of the federal executive branch in the matter of enforce-
ment, but could not expect the same support when judgments were rendered against the
federal government, and that arguably judicial power under Article III should be con-
suved in the light of this distitittion." Id. at 478; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
25 Such assumption is evident from the remarks of leading statesmen at various state
ratification conventions. See infra notes 27,39-31.
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
27 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526-27 (J. Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2d ed. 1996)
(1891) [hereinafter Enuo-r's DEBATES) ('To controversies between a state and the citizens
of another state.... claims respecting ... every liquidated account, or other claim against
this state will be tried before the federal court. Is this not disgraceful? Is this state to be
brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent individual?").
28 Id. at 573 (1 think ... that any doubt respecting the construction that a state may be
plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away by the words where a stale shall be a party.").
" Id. at 543 ("[Madison] says that the state may be plaintiff only. If gentlemen pervert
the most clear expressions ... there is an end of all argument. What says the paper? That it
shall have cognizance of controversies between a state and citizens of another state, with-
out discriminating between plaintiff and defendant.").
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did James Madison" and John Marshal1. 31 In accordance with their
view, the states could be plaintiffs in litigation under the Article III
clauses indicated above, but could rely on sovereign immunity if
sued."If sovereign immunity could not be interposed, the states.faced
large claims by reason of their heavy indebtedness and by reason of
their violations of the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1783 with Great
Britain through confiscations and escheats."
In ratifying the Constitution, several of the states proposed
amendments to preserve the sovereign immunity in whole or in part.
It has been argued that this shows an understanding that, absent
amendment, the states were suable. 34 But two of the amendments, .
proposed by Rhode Island and 'New York respectively, cannot be so
described. Rhode Island proposed an amendment that would have
eliminated any suit by any person against a state in federal court. But
the drafters was apparently assumed that the states would not lose
3° Id. at 533 ("It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only
operation the [Clause] can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citi-
zen, it must be brought before the federal court.").
51 Id. at 555 ("I hope no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the
federal court.... It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power shall be dragged
before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in
other states.").
32 There was no anomaly in this. Absent access to a federal court as plaintiff, state A,
suing a citizen of state B, would normally have been obliged to sue in the courts of state B.
Allowing state A to bring such a suit in a federal court placed the state on a par with a citi-
zen of state A suing a citizen of state B because in both instances, access to a federal court
avoided the need to face a possibly hostile tribunal in state B. This was a reasonable ar-
rangement, regardless of whether state A as defendant could claim sovereign immunity.
55 See Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3,1783,8 Stat. 80 (formally ending the United States War
for Independence); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
99 (1922); Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1899,1902.
From time to time the Court has adverted to sovereign immunity as serving to protect
the "dignity" of the states. It should not be assumed that such rhetoric is the basis of the
immunity. If, say, the legislature of a state is considering waiver of the immunity generally,
or more likely, in a specified class of cases, opposition to the measure on the ground of
affront to the state's dignity is hardly likely to affect the outcome in any degree, assuming
that opposition on this basis is even voiced. On the other hand, if a member of the inter-
national community rejects a claim of sovereign immunity by another member, such rejec-
tion might be characterized as an affront to the "dignity" of the latter because nations still
talk in terms of constraint of the person of the sovereign or the latter's ambassador. More
realistically, the conduct complained of is a kind that provokes resentment and possible
retaliation, on a basis more substantial than loss of "dignity." Sovereign immunity is based
upon raw power, which in the case of the United States is distributed by the Constitution;
"dignity" has nothing , to do with it. The 'Founding Fathers were not beguiled by such a
notion. See infra notes 22,30-33 and accompanying text.
34 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 278 ti.28 ,(Brennan, J., dissenting); Gibbons, supra note 1,
at 1908,1912-14.
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their sovereign immunity under the Constitution, inasmuch as the
purpose of the amendment was said to be "to remove all doubts or
controversies respecting the [issue]."36
 In New York, the proposed
amendment itself announced an understanding that the federal judi-
cial power did not "authorize any suit by any person against a state," 36
and the ratifying convention declared that the Constitution was being
ratified "[u]nder these impressions." 37 Thus, it seems that the
amendments proposed by Rhode Island and New York had only a
clarifying purpose.
On the other hand, Virginia and North Carolina advanced
amendments that were far-reaching. 38 It may be doubted, however,
that any of the proposed amendments reflected serious apprehension
that state sovereignty would be lost by adoption of the Constitution.
The fact is that virtually no attempt was made to protect the immunity
of the states when the First Congress was considering what became
the first ten Amendments, 39 and also the Judiciary Act of 1789 40--in
sharp contrast to the alacrity with which the Eleventh Amendment
was adopted after the decision in Chisholm v. Georgie showed that the
states were indeed vulnerable to suit.
The general understanding regarding sovereign immunity was
manifested by the reaction to Chisholm. In this case a citizen of South
Carolina invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in an
assumpsit action against Georgia, for non-payment under a contract
to furnish supplies to the state during the Revolutionary War. The
35 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 336.
36
 Id. at 329.
37 Id.
36 The amendments proposed by each of these states would have eliminated the Arti-
cle III provisions vesting the federal judiciary with jurisdiction over controversies between
a state and citizens of another state. See 3 id. at 660-61 (Virginia); 4 id. at 246 (North Caro-
lina).
" When the amendments were under consideration, Thomas Tudor Tucker of South
Carolina proposed an amendment that would have stricken from Article III, Section 2, the
clause conferring jurisdiction of controversies between a state and a citizen of another
state. The amendment was not reported to the full House of Representatives, and thus
failed. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 438-39 (1971); Fletcher, Historical Intetpreta,
lion, supra note 1, at 1052 & 11.81.
4° One commentator related that section 13 of the Judiciary Act, which conferred
original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in controversies between states and nonciti-
zens, went through Congress unchallenged, and indeed that it was not even discussed.
Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 1, at 1053-54; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 13,1 Stat. 73,80.
41 2 U.S. at 419.
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Court, by a vote of four to one, held that under Article III the state
could be sued without its consent by a citizen of another state. 42
 The
reaction was speedy and angry. Georgia's House of Representatives
adopted a bill making it a capital offense to attempt to levy a judg-
ment in the case.45 The Massachusetts and Virginia legislatures called
for a constitutional convention to reverse the decision; and such a call
was soon under consideration by the legislatures of eight additional
states, where it had "strong support."44 But the Eleventh Amendment
quickly went through Congress, and the requisite number of state
ratifications was achieved within two years of the Chisholm decision. 45
In sum, at the time of adoption of the Constitution, it was gener-
ally assumed that the states were protected by sovereign immunity if
sued in their own courts. Hamilton and those of like views insisted
that the states would be similarly protected if sued in the federal
courts, and that the state-noncitizen clauses of Article III did not con-
template a contrary result. Others said they were unconvinced. But
subsequent to ratification there was virtually a total lack of effort to
secure such protection for the states, despite ample opportunity to do
so—which supports the conclusion that no significant doubt existed
that sovereign immunity was expected to survive the Constitution. So
too does the speedy adoption of the Eleventh Amendment following
Chisholm, and the silence on the sovereign immunity issue when provi-
sion was briefly made for federal„question jurisdiction in the Judiciary
Act of 1787. Therefore, the writer is persuaded that the case for an
original understanding on state sovereign immunity is a strong one.
As will be shown; the Court has given effect to this understanding
42 Id. at 480. All the Justices wrote opinions. Blair and Cushing wrote narrowly and
briefly, relying on the language of Article III, and on indications elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion, that in their view showed that the exercise of jurisdiction over the states as defendants
was contemplated. See id. at 450-53 (Blair, J.); id. at 466-69 (Cushing, J.). Justices Wilson
and Jay made the same points, but also wrote broadly to the effect that sovereign immunity
was incompatible with the American system of constitutional government. See id. at 453-66
(Wilson, J.); id. at 469-79 ( Jay, J.). Concerning Jay's views on the suability of the United
States, see supra note 24 and accompanying text. Iredell was the sole dissenter. Id. at 429-
50 (Iredell, J., dissenting). He maintained that, as the law then stood, the controlling prin-
ciple was sovereign immunity, as an aspect of the common law that, he said, derived from
England. Id. at 437,449. He expressed doubt whether the Constitution permitted invasion
of the sovereign immunity of the states, but said that this was an open question. Id. at 449.
50. Congress had made no intervention along this line, and that for him concluded the
matter. Id. at 449.
43 This bill was not enacted into law. 1 WARREN, supra note 33, at 100-01.
44 Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1931.
45 Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 1, at 1059.
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from the start, save in one decision which was soon overruled. The
essentials of the argument set forth above were advanced recently in
Alden v. Maine.46 Clear holdings along the same line were Hans v. Lou-
isianan and Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi. 48
2. The Case Against the Original Understanding
a. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, in ]985, was the first full-scale judicial assault on the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. 49 It remains a principal basis for the continu-
ing attack on sovereign immunity by a minority of the justices, usually
not less than four in number.3° Further, in its basic approach it
reflects the dominant view of academic writers.'"
Justice Brennan emphasized the inconclusive character of the
discussion of sovereign immunity at the ratification debates. 52 He
maintained that the amendments suggested by some of the ratifying
states to preserve state immunity in whole or in part were indicative of
a "felt need" on this point, 53 yet he failed to explain, or even discuss,
the fact that subsequently these states, through their legislative repre-
sentatives, made virtually no effort to act in accordance with this "felt
need," despite ample opportunity to do so.
But in major part, he purported to show that the proponents of
sovereign immunity were not concerned with loss of the immunity
when claims were founded on federal law but only when founded on
state law. He said that "virtually" all the discussion during the
ratification debates was centered on suits against the states on their
debts.54 Such suits, he maintained, would be based on state law and
46 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
47 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
45 292 U.S. 313 (1934); see also infra notes 85-100, 143-159, 167-174 and accompany-
ing text (discussing these cases).
49
 473 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50 See cases cited, supra note 2.
51 See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text. The views of scholars regarding the
Eleventh Amendment also reveal a basic affinity with the account set forth in the Atascadero
dissent. See infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
52 473 U.S. at 263-64, 278-79.
53 Id. at 278 n.28. Justice Bilennan also failed to note that in two of the four states the
proposals assumed survival of the immunity of the states and sought only clarification of
that point. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
54 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 264.
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would be brought in federal court under one of the diversity clauses. 55
On the other hand, he said, "[t]he debates do not directly address the
question of suits against States in . . . federal-question cases, where
federal law and not state law would govern."88 From this he inferred
that the debates disclosed a willingness to surrender state sovereign
immunity in regard to federal claims. 57
This conclusion is wildly implausible. Consider Charles Warren's
'statement of some of the problems facing the newly independent
colonies immediately prior to adoption of the Constitution:
In the crucial condition of the finances of most of the States
at that time, only disaster was to be expected if suits could be
successfully maintained by holders of State issues of paper
and other credits, or by Loyalist refugees to recover property
confiscated or sequestered by the States; and that this was no
theoretical danger was shown by the immediate institution of
such suits against the States in South Carolina, Georgia, Vir-
ginia and Massachusetts. 58
This state of affairs suggested that the states would be beset by claims
founded on the Contracts Clause, and on Peace Treaty violations, un-
less they had the protection of sovereign immunity. It should take
weighty arguments to persuade us that the states were content to give
up such protection. The arguments advanced by Justice Brennan are
singularly unpersuasive. . .
Thus, Justice Brennan was wrong in insisting that when jurisdic-
tion rested on diversity of citizenship the claimant would necessarily
55 Id.
56 Id. Article III provided for two basic heads of jurisdiction—the party-based head of
jurisdiction, which included the state-citizen diversity clause, and the subject matter-based
head of jurisdiction, which included any claim arising under federal law. U.S. Coml . . art.
III, § 2, ci. 1; Alascadero, 473 U.S. at 263 (Brennand., dissenting).
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 264. One commentator drew the opposite inference from the
silence during the ratification debates on the federal question and admiralty heads of ju-
risdiction. He believed that standing alone, such silence was the "strongest evidence that
the Constitution was not understood by its adopters to provide for private causes of action
against the states" under either of those heads of jurisdiction. Fletcher, Historical Interprrta-
lion, note 1, at 1071 (emphasis supplied). He also discussed three factors that "sug-
gest the opposite conclusion." Id. at 1072. These were: (1) the fact that Supreme Court
jurisdiction was established for controversies between states; (2) the fact that the Constitu-
tion contained provisions designed to protect individuals from states; and (3) the potential
for statutorily created private causes against states, which the federal courts would then be
competent to hear. Id. at 1072-74.
58 1 WARREN, supra note 33, at 99.
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be "asserting a cause of action based on state law."59 More importantly,
even if correct in this regard, he was wrong in his assumption that
such a case would be "governed," presumably in its entirety, by state
law.° Take, for example, a suit founded on violation of the Contracts
Clause. Justice Brennan remarked that "it was certainly not clear at
the time ... that the Contracts Clause provided a plaintiff with a pri-
vate right of action for daniages."61 This was indeed true. 62 But if suit
could not be brought "on" the Contracts Clause, 65 it did not follow
that the Clause was a dead letter. It could always have been invoked
(as could the Peace Treaty) to challenge the constitutional adequacy
of a state defense.
The system of common-law pleading then universally in force
provided ample opportunity for vindication of federal rights. The
plaintiff had to choose the particular form of action appropriate un-
der the circumstances, and the permissible Contents of the several
pleadings under that form of action were rigidly prescribed. If, say, a
plaintiff wanted to recover land seized by a state in violation of the
Peace Treaty and now in the possession of a third person under deed
from the state, an appropriate form would be the one for ejectment.
The declaration, as the initial pleading was called, would allege only
59 I n Atascadero, Brennan stated:
A plaintiff seeking federal jurisdiction against a State under the state-citizen
or state-alien diversity clauses would be asserting a cause of action based on
state law, since a federal question or admiralty claim would provide an hide-
pendent basis for jurisdiction that did not depend on the identity of the par-
ties.
473 U.S. at 262. That availability of the federal question and admiralty jurisdictions pro-
vided a basis for bringing a federal claim did not preclude resort to the diversity jurisdic-
tion to pursue that claim. The availability of one head of jurisdiction does not bar resort to
others. That choice is for the plaintiff, not the court.
60 Id. at 268 ("Of course, where the cause of action is based on state law, as it would be
in a suit under the state-citizen diversity clause, the 'sovereign power' whose law governed
would be the state.").
61 Id. at 282 n.33.
°It was the Bivens decision, discussed infra notes 280-284 and accompanying text, that
introduced the notion of a cause of action deriving directly from the Constitution itself.
Justice Brennan remarked that prior to Fletcher EP. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), It
was not at all clear that the Contracts Clause applied to contracts to which the state was a
party. " Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 283 n.33. But the possibility that the Contracts Clause would
be applied to such contracts was not so remote that it would have been dismissed out of
hand. Further, at the relevant time some key figures thought it would apply. Thus, Ed-
mund Randolph was pleased that the states, as he saw it, would be obliged to pay their
debts; and Patrick Henry expressed apprehension that this would indeed be the effect of
ratification. See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 1, at 1050 n.70.
63 U.S. CorrsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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that the plaintiff was entitled to possession and that the defendant was
wrongfully in possession; possible federal issues determinative of the
outcome could not be anticipated. 64 In the answer, under the rules
applicable to that plea, the defendant would claim entitlement under
a deed from the state. In the replication, which was the plaintiff's re-
sponsive plea, the claim would be made that the deed was void be-
cause the state's seizure of the land was in violation of the Peace
Treaty.65 In form, the suit was instituted as one for vindication of a
state-created right. In substance, the suit was "on" the Peace Treaty.66
This, essentially, is what happened in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
where an action in ejectment ended with a holding that Virginia's es-
cheat of British-owned property was in violation of the Peace Treaty.°
The suit was instituted in a Virginia state court. In Sturgis v. Crownin-
shield, an action in assumpsit brought in a federal circuit court, re-
sulted in a decision vindicating the plaintiffs claim that the State had
impaired a contractual right under the Contract Clause.65 There was a
similar holding in Fletcher v. Peck.69 There the action was in covenant
61 Cf. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 903 (1824) (John-
son, J., dissenting) ("But how the act of Congress is to be introduced into an action of
trespass, ejectment, or slander, before the defendant is called to plead, I cannot imag-
ine.").
0 These pleading conventions are discussed in Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
Commt. L. REV. 1109, 1128-29 (1969) [hereinafter Hill, Constitutional Remedies]. For fuller
treatment, See 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS *235-
60; *390-414, *486-90, *518-42, *603-06, *617-24 (16th Am. ed. 1876); BENJAMINJ. SHIP-
MAN, HANDBOOK or COMMON LAW PLEADING 208-13, 298-301, 366-81 (Henry W. Bal-
!amine ed., West Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1923) (1894). In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in reversing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held for the first time that a suit for damages occasioned by a violation of
constitutional rights could be brought "on" the constitutional provisions allegedly violated.
See 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); see also infra notes 280-281 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Bivens in more detail). In Bivens, the defendants were federal law-enforcement officers
charged with such violations. Id. at 389. Prior to Bivens it was thought that such an action
could be brought only for trespassory conduct violative of state law, although it was ac-
knowledged that federal law would ordinarily control the outcome. For instance, see the
opinion of the Second Circuit in Bivens, 409 F.2d 718, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1969); see also infra
note 71 (discussing the well-pleaded complaint rule in the federal courts).
66 Issues of state law might be also be present in such a case. Whether the plaintiff had
a right to possession in the first place might turn on the validity of the instrument under
which the entitlement was claimed. Such a case would be governed by both federal and
state law. The case was not primarily one under state law except in the sense that whether
the plaintiff had any right at all was an antecedent question—and then only if that issue
was raised.
G7 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 306-07, 360-62 (1816).
68 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197-200 (1819).
64 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-39 (1810).
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and was also instituted in a federal circuit court. So too, the Dartmouth
College Case, enforcing a claim under the Contract Clause, was com-
menced in a New Hampshire state court as an action in trover. 70
These were all suits against private persons. The system of common-
law pleading prevailed in actions at law in the federal courts irrespec-
tive of the source of jurisdiction. Even after the advent of general fed-
eral question jurisdiction in 1875, with the passage of the Judiciary
Act of 1875, that jurisdiction could not properly be invoked if a decla-
ration in an action at common law would not have disclosed the fed-
eral character of the claim. 71 The states themselves were protected
against such suits only by their sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, underlying Justice Brennan's analysis was a funda-
mental error concerning the nature of jurisdiction. The source of a
court's jurisdiction is immaterial to the legal issues that come before
it. Having jurisdiction, a court administers justice in accordance with
the law applicable to the particular controversy, whether it be federal
law, state law or "the laws of the most distant part of the globe."72
 This,
Hamilton said, is "the nature of judiciary power . . . the general genius
of the system."73 The point is obvious. A court's jurisdiction may be
solidly founded, but it would be the grossest injustice if, in the exer-
cise of that jurisdiction, judgment were rendered on a basis other
than the applicable law. There can be no doubt that the Founding
Fathers, or the lawyers among them, were aware that in any litigation,
whether in federal or state court, federal law would be considered if
presented to the court. Whether preservation of sovereign immunity
was contemplated by the Framers was a separate question; and, in-
deed, the history recounted above affords solid basis for the under-
standing that the sovereign immunity of the states would be pre-
served, 74
Justice Brennan was aware that claims might be made for vindica-
tion of rights claimed under federal law, but he thought this could be
done only be invoking the federal question jurisdiction. Since the
First Congress did not provide for such jurisdiction, he thought it evi-
" Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518,654 (1819).
7l
	
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,152-54 (1908). This prac-
tice persists to the present day, under the doctrine of the well-pleaded complaint rule,
even though common-law pleading has long been superseded by code pleading. See RICH-
ARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 909-13 (4th ed. 1996) [hereitiafter HART & WECHSLER].
72 THE FEDERALIST, No. 82, supra note 22, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton).
73 Id.
74 See supra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
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dent that "Congress had deckled that [such] cases, even those arising
under the Treaty of Paris, should be heard in the first instance only in
state courts."75 He did not recognize that such cases could "in the first
instance" be heard in general courts on the basis of diversity of citi-
zenship.
In sum, Justice Brennan's basic position in his Atascadero dissent
was that the stated fears of the Framers concerning the loss of state
sovereign immunity related only to cases arising under the diversity
clauses, which were the only clauses they talked about, and which he
thought were governed in their entirety by state law. On the other
hand, he argued that the absence of similar stated apprehensions re-
garding the federal question clause shows that the Framers acqui-
esced in the overriding of state immunity in regard to federal claims.
He did not consider the possibility that issues of controlling federal
law might arise in cases brought under the diversity jurisdiction.
Why was there relative silence on the issue of federal question
jurisdiction during the ratification debates? Justice Brennan's answer
was convoluted and unpersuasive. It is submitted that there is a more
plausible explanation—namely, that Article III's provision for federal
question jurisdiction was not perceived to be a threat to state sover-
eign immunity, in contrast to the diversity clauses, which expressly
spoke of the state as a party. Madison and Marshall argued that, de-
spite the generality of the diversity clauses, the state could be a party
only as plaintiff. 76 Their opponents argued that the language of Arti-
cle III did not warrant such a limitation. 77 That was the only issue de-
bated. It is impossible to find in the ratification debates or elsewhere
any suggestion, direct or indirect, that the states would lose their sov-
ereign immunity by virtue of the constitutional provision for federal
question jurisdiction.
b. Seminole Tribe v. Florida
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Court, in reliance upon what it
took to be the original understanding, invalidated a federal statute
overriding state sovereign immunity. 78 Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion—joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer—rested primarily
on Justice Brennan's dissenting views in Atascadero. But Justice Souter
75 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 287 n.40.
76 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
78 517 U.S. 44, 72-73, 76 (1996).
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made some additional points. Declaring that sovereign immunity is a
common-law rule, "derived from the laws and practices of our English
ancestors,"79 he emphasized that the reception of the English com-
mon law by the states did not have a counterpart on the federal
leve1.88
 He noted that the Framers had "an aversion to a general federal
reception of the common law."81 Justice Souter concluded that, given
these circumstances, "the Court today cannot reasonably argue that
something like the old immunity doctrine somehow slipped in as a
tacit but unenforceable background principle. "82
But a strong policy against a general reception of the common
law did not preclude use of aspects of the common law compatible
with the basic federal scheme. Justice Souter noted that the Constitu-
tion itself in effect incorporated aspects of the common law, including
its provision for habeas corpus and its distinction between law and
equity.83 To state that the rule of sovereign immunity is not compara-
ble and that it was "slipped in" is to ignore the fact that the issue was
extensively debated in the state ratification conventions. This of
course assumes that sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine. If,
as is argued below, it is not, Justice Souter's argument becomes irrele-
vant. 84
c. Alden v. Maine
In Alden 7.4 Maine, in 1999, the Court held that Congress could
not, under its Article I powers, subject a state to suit in a state court
without state consent. 85 Justice Souter's dissenting opinion incorpo-
rated by reference the arguments advanced in the dissenting opinions
in Atascadero and Seminole Tribe, and then presented at great length an
argument never advanced in any prior opinion, nor, so far as the
writer is aware, in any academic commentary. Justice Souter argued
that the holding in Alden, and the Court's prior holdings to the same
effect, are supportable only if sovereign immunity is a natural law doc-
79 Id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205
(1882)).
80 Id. at 137-38.
81 Id. at 140 (emphasis supplied). This aversion is understandable, since, as Madison
explained, such a reception would largely have obliterated such powers as were left to the
states by the Constitution. See id. at 141.
" Id. at 142.
88
 517  U.S. at 137-38.
84 See discussion infra Part 1.F.1.
n 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
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trine.86 Justice Souter saw only two possibilities: either sovereign im-
munity is a common-law principle, in which case it is defensible by leg-
islative action," or it is an aspect of "natural law,' a universally applica-
ble proposition discoverable by reason." 88 Conceived as natural law,
sovereign immunity is "unalterable,"" "indefeasible,"" "untouchable
and -.untouched by the Constitution."91 Justice Souter declared that
the majority in Alden relied on sovereign immunity as a natural law
doctrine in rejecting congressional power to override state sovereign
immunity. 92
The dissent understood Justice Holmes's opinion in Kawanana-
koa v. Polyblank 95 as "embodying . . . [the] natural law theory of sover-
eign imtnunity."94 The relevant passage in Holmes's opinion was as
follows: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends."95 This passage was not a
statement that the immunity is immutable. 96 If the legislature, which is
86 M. at 763.
87 Id. at 761.
M at 763.
99 Id. at 764.
9° Alden, 527 U.S. at 770 n.9.
91 Id. at 791.
92 Id. at 795,799. The dissent said that one of the problems with the Court's "absolut-
ist" natural law doctrine was that the history discussed by the Court showed that only Ham-
ilton had subscribed to this doctrine. Id. at 773. This was said to be evidenced by Hamil-
ton's statement that the immunity is "'inherent in the nature of sovereignty.'" Id. at 773
(quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 81, supra note 22, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton)). Hamil-
ton, according to the dissenting opinion, "chose his words carefully." Id. at 2275. On the
other baud, Madison and Marshall were thought not to be adherents of the natural law
view, id. at 778, although Madison had said, It is not in the power of individuals to call any
state into court," and Marshall had said, "It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign
power should be dragged before a court." See notes 30-31 and accompanying text. This
characterization of the views of Madison and Marshall was necessary to support the dis-
sent's conclusion that, at the ratification debates, in which both men participated, 'lido
one was espousing an indefeasible, natural law view of sovereign immunity." Id. at 778.
Hamilton's statement, on the other hand, was made not at a ratification convention, but
had appeared in the pages of The Federalist. See supra note 22.
93 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
94 Alden, 527 U.S. at 797.
95 Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353.
" In College Savings Bank st Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Board, Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion spoke of the Court's view of sovereign immunity as "an immutable con-
stitutional principle more akin to the thought of James I than of James Madison." 527 U.S.
666,704 (1999). This comparison is inapt because James Madison was a strong proponent
of sovereign immunity. See supra note 30. In this connection, it may be observed that the
506	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:485
the "authority that makes the law," abolishes the immunity, a suit
thereafter instituted is not the assertion of a right against this "author-
ity." What is more to our purpose is that, as emphasized by the dissent,
under the above formulation, "sovereign immunity may be invoked
only by the sovereign that is the source of the right upon which suit is
brought."97 The dissent .did not understand that it was undermining
its own position. Since the right in issue in Alden was federally created,
only the federal government—and not the states—could make a claim
of sovereign immunity under the natural law formulation of Justice
Holmes. Hence, in upholding a state claim of sovereign immunity, the
Court was not applying natural law doctrine. On the other hand, it was
the dissenting opinion that comported with natural law doctrine, in
its insistence that the state could not interpose sovereign immunity in
regard to a federal claim. 98
In the course of their discussion, the dissenters said that ulti-
mately their position rested on their conception of sovereign immu-
nity as a common-law rule, defeasible by statute." But here, we find
the minority laboring under another misconception. Whether or not
the sovereign immunity of the federal govermnent is common-law
doctrine, it is defeasible by Congress. Similarly, the sovereign immu-
nity of, say, the state of Illinois, whether or not resting on common
law, is defeasible by the Illinois legislature. However it does not follow
that Congress can override the sovereign immunity of Illinois. The
question of federal power in this regard is subsumed in a larger ques-
tion—federal power to override state law. The answer must be found
in the Constitution. 100
d. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, in 2000, the Supreme Court
invalidated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
Alden dissenters relied on Blackstone's connnent that the —general and indisputable rule
fisl, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy .. ..'" See 527 U.S. at 812
(Sower, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23). The dis-
senters also cited Chief Justice Marshall to the saute effect; Marshall asked the rhetorical
question: —If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country
afford him a remedy?'" See id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803)). But both Blackstone and Marshall were proponents of sovereign immunity. See 3
BLACKSTONE, supra, at *244-45; supra note 31.
97 Alden, 527 U.S. at 796.
98 See id. at 761
" Id. at 762.
00 See infra notes 192-248 and accompanying text.
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("ADEA") insofar as it abrogated state Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity from suit by private individuals. 101 The dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Stevens advanced yet another argument against the constitutional
status of sovereign immunity as it pertains to the states. 102 His view was
that the subject was entirely within the province of Congress. Drawing
on a well-known article by Herbert Wechsler,'" Justice Stevens de-
clared that "the normal operation of the legislative process itself
would adequately, ,defend state interests from undue infringetnent." 104
Wechsler had concluded that the Supreme Court should move
slowly in invalidating congressional legislation affecting the states. 105
Wechsler wrote broadly, without mention of sovereign immunity. In
any event, his insistence that the ,states could be counted upon to pro-
tect themselves overlooked the reality that state interests often clash,
and often on a regional basis. These clashes have occurred through-
out our history as a nation. One need only recount the pre-Civil War
disputes over tariffs; federal spending on internal improvements; the
Bank of the United States; and the struggles between North and
South over the status of African-Americans that culminated in the
Civil War, and continued after that war. There have been continual
regional clashes over water rights. Moreover, it has long been evident
that,state interests vary widely in such matters as labor and regulatory
legislation generally. The list is endless. Indeed, the recent federal
statutes adopted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provided for suit against states in a variety of situations, were
presumably the work of pressure groups not equally potent in all
states. 106 Accordingly, Justice Stevens was unpersuasive in his Kimel dis-
101 528 U.S. 62,92 (2000).
102 See id. at 92 (Stevens, J., dissentiiig).
103 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 County. L. REV. 543 (1954).
1°4 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93 (citing Wechsler, supra note 103, at 543).
105 Wechsler said:
This is not to say that the Court can decline to measure national enactments
by the Constitution when it is called upon to face the question in the course
of ordinary litigation.... It is rather to say that the Court is on weakest
ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Con-
gress in the interest of the states, whose representatives control the legislative
process and, by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the chal-
lenged Act of Congress.
Wechsler, supra note 103, at 559.
100 It is not difficult to discern in these statutes a response to the demands of govern-
ment employees' unions, women's groups and lobbies for senior citizens. See infra notes
227-233 and accompanying text (discussing these statutes).
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sent when he said that "once Congress has made its policy choice, the
sovereignty concerns of the several States are satisfied." 107
3. Academic Commentators
Academic critics are for the most part in agreement regarding
the basic point made by Justice Brennan in his Atascadero dissent—the
Framers contemplated that claims founded on federal law would not
be barred by sovereign immunity.m They commonly argue that dele-
gates to the state ratification conventions who feared loss of the im-
munity were actually in the majority of those who spoke on the sub-
ject. Often, however, these critics do not go beyond the debates,
ignoring the subsequent events that tended to show that such fears
were not entertained seriously. 109 Others do not discuss the question
of an original understanding at all, in reliance on the work of earlier
critics, or on the apparent assumption that parts of the problem can
be analyzed adequately without regard to what this writer believes to
be the overarching principle of an original understanding. 11° The
commentators who have examined the problem in depth are rela-
tively few in number, and they are predominantly hostile to the con-
ception of an original understanding protective of state sovereign
immunity)"
1°7 528 U.S. at 96.
108 See commentators listed infra note 111; see also Engdahl, supra note 1, at 8-9.
109 See, e.g., Engdahl supra note 1, at 7; Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 527-38.
110 See generally, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 1; Shapiro, supra note 1; Sherry, supra note 1.
111 Judge Gibbons asserted that sovereign immunity was a foreign notion not native to
American shores in the colonial period. See Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1895-97. He relied
for the most part on the absence at that time of express references to the immunity, but
failed to consider the absence of litigation against the Grown because the English doctrine
of sovereign immunity shielded only the King, not his officers, nor the government as
such. See id. The break with England changed the fundamental basis of sovereign immu-
nity in the new sovereign territories, with the state replacing the King. Gibbons found it
noteworthy that few of the early state constitutions expressly provided for sovereign im-
munity. Id. at 1897-99. But federal and state courts, without regard to provision therefor in
the constitutions of their respective jurisdictions, have from the start assumed sovereign
immunity to be in force as governing law, unless abolished or modified by the legislature.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Gibbons also maintained that state-noncitizen jurisdiction in the federal courts was
understood and generally accepted as an important device for redress against state viola-
tions of the Peace Treaty of 1783. He argued that with the states suable for their violations,
the United States would have been in a position to deal snore effectively with the British in
the ongoing controversy over the Peace Treaty. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1899-1902,1916
20. In this connection, he referred to a memorandum from Jefferson as Secretary of State
to the British Minister Plenipotentiary, George Hammond, declaring that the Peace Treaty
could be in enforced in the federal courts. Id. at 1919-20. Gibbons conceded that the
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memo did not expressly refer to suits against the states themselves, as distinguished from
suits against private citizens. Id. at 1920. On the other hand, in regard to the trio of major
statesmen who had declared their understanding that the Constitution preserved the im-
munity of the states, he accused Madison of "dissembling," id. at 1906; Hamilton of writing
"political propaganda," id. at 1912 11.112; and stated that Marshall, "contrary to his state-
ment during the Virginia ratification conVention ... did not believe that an original un-
derstanding on sovereign immunity existed." Id. at 194811.319.
Professor Orth stated: 'The search for the original understanding on state sovereign
immunity bears this much resemblance to the quest for the Holy Grail: there is enough to
be found so that the faithful of whatever persuasion can find their heart's desire." ORM,
supra note 1, at 28. He was of a different view in commenting on Hans u Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890), which he maintained was egregiously wrong in rejecting Chishohn. In his
view Chisholm was correct in its disregard of the original understanding. See Otrrn, supra
note 1, at 74-76.
Professor Pfander has written extensively on sovereign immunity, but this writer has
found his arguments unpersuasive. See Pfander's articles listed supra note 1. For example,
he stated that a "close reading" of The Federalist No. 81, where Hainilton declared that the
immunity of a state from being sued without its consent "is inherent in the nature of sov-
ereignty," THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 22, at 455, showed that Hamilton was really
"affirm[ing] the surrender of state sovereign innnunity." Pfander, State-Party Cases, supra
note 1, at 629 (emphasis added). The basis of Pfander's reading is essentially no more than
that Hamilton was writing in the context of a suit against a state on its indebtedness.
Pfander, State-Party Cases, supra note 1, at 629-32. Madison's statement that "[i] t is not in
the power of individuals to call any state into court" is discounted on similar grounds. Id. at
634. Moreover, says Pfander, Madison did not "deny that states were subject to suit in ac-
tions that arose under federal law." Id. (emphasis supplied). In a later article, he declared
that suits against states on federal claims were "regarded as regrettably necessary" by the
Framers. Pfander, State Suability, supra note 1, at 1368. But this sense of regrettable neces-
sity is not established, in the opinion of this writer.
In another article, Pfander contended that the Petition Clause of the First Amend-
ment should be understood as supporting judicial override of federal sovereign immunity.
See Pfander, Right to Petition, supra note 1, at 953-55; 980-89. He noted that, in adaptation
of English practice, a substantial number of states, from an early time, had essentially a
petition procedure for suits against states in their courts. Id. at 934-37; 991-1014. He con-
ceded, however; that in all instances this was the product of legislative action. Id. at 937,
1013-14. Such legislative action has never abated; today, as a result of such action, the
immunity of the government from suit is very much the exception rather than the rule.
The question is whether the judiciary may initiate such a practice by itself.
Professor Amar declared that sovereign immunity can "conflict[] with the Constitu-
tion's structural principle of full remedies for violations of legal rights against govern-
ment." Amar, supra note 1, at 1489. He derived this principle from: (1) the system of sepa-
ration of powers, and the related system of checks and balances, id. at 1492-1506; (2) his
view that sovereign immunity resides in the people rather than in governments, id. at
1429-41, 1485; (3) his view that "[t]he legal rights against government enshrined in the
Constitution strongly imply corresponding governmental obligations to ensure full redress
whenever these rights are violated;" and (4) his view that full remedies for constitutional
wrongs committed by governments will often require government liability. Id. at 1485. He
rejected the notion that the "structural principle of full remedies is somehow .. , limited
by an equally valid structural postulate [of sovereign immunity]." Id. at 1489-90. 'The
latter principle," he strys, "is simply not part of our Constitution's structure. Its sole basis is
the British idea [of sovereign immunity]." Id. at 1490. He made these points while main-
taining silence concerning the history that supports the argument for an original misun-
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Some of the critics who reject the notion of an original under-
standing112
 rely on general language employed by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Cohens v. Virginia.'" In this case, the state of Virginia imposed
derstanding. Thus, he does not even mention the pro-immunity positions of Madison,
Hamilton and Marshall. •
Professor (as he then was) Fletcher stated his belief that federal legislative and judicial
power exist to override state sovereign immunity, but failed to consider whether this may
be precluded by an understanding underlying adoption of the Constitution. See Fletcher,
Historical Interpretation, supra note I, at 1127-30. To be sure, he observed that if there was
serious apprehension that the state-citizen diversity clauses would result in loss of state
sovereign immunity, the discussion of that issue would have occupied a more "prominent
place ... in the debates over the Constitution or the deliberations on the [first] Judiciary
Act." Id. at 1054. But he doubted that there was any sentiment for protection of states
against federal claims. In common with other commentators, he assumed that the basis of
a court's jurisdiction is determinative of the issues that the court will be called upon to
decide. Id. at 1070-71. Hence, he believed that claims under federal law could be pressed
only under the federal question or admiralty jurisdictions. Id. at 1071. Apparently, these
considerations accounted for his conclusion that the suability of states on federal claims
"was probably an open question, in part, because it was not fully visible when the Constitu-
tion was adopted and probably also in part because, to the extent that it was visible, it pre-
sented too many difficult political and theoretical issues to permit explicit resolution." Id.
at 1078. In a subsequent article, he conceded error on this point, stating the bringing of
federal-question suits was foreseeable. See Fletcher, Reply to Critics, supra note 1, at 1271-74;
1291-92. But he related this only to construction of the Eleventh Amendment, and not to
the existence of an original understanding pertinent to the question of immunity.
Unlike Fletcher, Jacobs was aware of the extensive private litigation in which claims
founded on federal law were redressed by the federal courts at an early time in litigation
between private parties. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 72-73 (1972). As to whether states would be suable on such claims, he stated
that no general understanding existed either way, but in context it is clear that he was
speaking only of the ratification debates. Id. at 39-40, 68. His account of the near-
contemporaneous reaction to Chisholm is more illuminating. He contended that there was
no great concern with the problem of suits against states on their debts, since by the time
of Chisholm the extent of such debt had been greatly reduced, owing, inter alia, to assump-
tion of much of that debt by the federal government. Id. at 69-70. On the other hand,
claims founded on Peace Treaty violations constituted a pressing problem. He stated:
Mit Congress, as well as in the state legislatures, there was strong opposition
to recognition of any liability to reimburse British creditors or to make resti-
tution of seizures of Loyalist property. In fact, this was the transcendent po-
litical issue of 1794 and 1795, when the Eleventh Amendment was under ac-
tive consideration, as provisions of the Jay Treaty clarifying the rights of
Loyalists came under attack in Congress and throughout the country.
Id. at 70-71. But the threat posed by the Peace Treaty was no less a problem when the
Constitution was adopted and ratified by the states, and is thus pertinent to the general
understanding at the time. See also infra notes 179-180 (discussing the views of Professor
Field).
112 See, e.g., Eugdahl, supra note 1, at 5-7, 10, 22, 28; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation,
supra note 1, at 1054, 1084-87; Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 2238, 2241.
"3 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). The Court considered the issue of state sovereign
immunity in two principal parts. The first, discussed here, dealt with whether sovereign
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a criminal sentence on two of its residents for violation of a state stat-
ute forbidding the sale of lottery tickets, in the face of a defense that
federal law permitted such sale)" When the defendants sought review
in the Supreme Court, the State contended that the judgments of its
courts were not federally reviewable on the ground of sovereign lin-
munity." 5 The Supreme Court said flatly: "We think a case arising un-
der the constitution or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the
Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case." 116 But the
opinion as a whole belied the generality of the quoted language, a
point commonly ignored by critics)" In the first place, the opinion
makes plain that this remark concerned the Constitution as it "origi-
nally stood," prior to adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. 115 What is
more important, the Court limited the scope of the quoted language
by suggesting that judicial disregard of state sovereign immunity was
not contemplated." 9
immunity barred Supreme Court review of state judgments, apart from the Eleventh
Amendment. See id. at 378-405. Having fOund no bar, the Supreme Court, in the second
part, reached the same conclusion in regard to the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 405-
12. This part of the opinion is considered infra notes 493-497 and accompanying text.
114 Cohens, 19 U.S. at 289.
119 Id. at 302,380.
110 Id. at 383 (emphasis supplied).
117 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 1, at 10, 22, 28, 63-64; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation,
supra note 1, at 1084-85; Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1953; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 69 &
n.48. To like effect, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 112-13 (Sower, J., dissenting). But see
Owns, supra note 1, at 39-40 (recognizing that the Court dealt more narrowly with the
issues than the quoted language would suggest).
"9 Cohens, 19 U.S. at 405.
119 Thus the Court stated:
Were a state to lay a duty on exports, to collect the money and place it in her
treasury, could the citizen who paid it ... maintain a suit in this Court against
such State, to recover back the money?
Perhaps not. Without, however, deciding such supposed case, we may say,
that it is entirely unlike that under consideration....
But let us vary the supposed case as to give it a real resemblance to that
under consideration. Suppose a citizen to refuse to pay this export duty, and a
suit to be instituted for the purpose of compelling him to pay it. He pleads
the constitution of the United States in bar of the action, notwithstanding
which the Court gives judgment against him. That would be a case arising
under the constitution, and would be the very case before the Court.
The case of a State which pays off its own debts with paper money, no
more resembles this than do those to which we have already adverted. The
courts have no jurisdiction over the contract. ... ant ... suppose a State to prose-
cute one of its citizens for refusing paperinoney, who should plead the con-
stitution in bar of such prosecution. If his plea should be overruled, and
judgment rendered against him, hiS case would resemble this ....
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Some commentators, who assume that there is legislative power
to abolish sovereign immunity, claim the same power for the judiciary,
in reliance on the maxim that the judicial power is coextensive with
the legislative. 120 The problem, as with maxims generally, is that the
law refuses to conform with what the maxim prescribes. Under the
American constitutional system, the legislature of each component—
the nation and the states—has authority to waive sovereign immunity
for that component. It does not follow that Congress (let alone the
federal judiciary) has power to override the immunity of the states.
The writer has found no indication that this distinction is recognized
by the critics. Apart from that, judicial power is not necessarily coter-
minous with legislative power even within a particular jurisdiction. For
example, in the case of the federal government, Congress has power,
under the Commerce Clause, to establish a regulatory regime for rail-
roads and other utilities, or a law of labor relations—in both instances
with a scope unknown to the common law. There is no basis in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence for the view that the federal courts
are free to make like rules, on the theory that they are acting in areas
within the potential reach of Congress. 121
It has been argued in effect that even if sovereign immunity had
been contemplated by the Founders, the subsequent expansion of
federal power and the corresponding contraction of state compe-
tence—most notably in consequence of the Civil War Amendments--
warrant elimination of the doctrine. 122 In an earlier article, the writer
advanced the following thesis: (1) that the Constitution should always
be construed in accordance with the intent of the Framers, or at least
their probable intent, as best that can be ascertained; (2) that when
the provisions of the Constitution permit of only one interpretation,
like those establishing the two houses of Congress, the intent is
sufficiently clear, and such provisions should be modifiable only
through the amendment route; (3) that when the language of a pro-
vision is open-ended in that it is fairly susceptible to more than a sin-
gle interpretation, the provision should be construed as the Framers
most probably would have wanted it construed at the time of decision,
assuming foreknowledge on their part of conditions existing at that
Id. at 402-03 (emphasis added).
120 Amar, supra note 1, at 1477-78; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 1, at
1074, 1108, 1127-30; Vazquez, supra note 1, at 1689.
121 E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 738 (1999); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58.
In See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 974 (2000).
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time; and (4) that the greater the public consensus on a particular
issue at such time, the greater the likelihood that the Framers would
have wanted the provision to be construed in accordance with that
consensus.ns
Where the structural provisions of the Constitution are con-
cerned, modification in light of later developments is singularly inap-
propriate, for the structural provisions are not open-ended. A state-
ment in the Constitution that the states are not suable, as in the case
of the Eleventh Amendment, does not lend itself to more than one
construction. So too, whether deemed structural or not, is the general
understanding on state sovereign immunity, which the Court later
referred to as a controlling "postulate" 124—as part of "the understood
background against which the Constitution was adopted." 125 At least
so much seems clear when the construction is one that in effect
eliminates sovereign immunity altogether. It is arguable, however, that
the immunity is accorded its intended scope when implemented in
accordance with a current consensus on its meaning. On this basis,
governmental liabilities arising out of their commercial activities
could be deemed unprotected by sovereign immunity. 126
B. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment provides as follows: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
123 Alfred Hill, The Political Dimension of Constitutional Adjudication, 63 S. CAL. L. Rev.
1237, 1245, 1302 (1990). The thesis was the outcome of an attempt to find a principled
rationalization for the Court's persistence in developing what its critics called a "current"
Constitution, in the face of argument by many of the same critics that the Court's duty is to
construe the Constitution in accordance with the original intent of the Framers. See id. at
1239-40. The principal focus of the Article was on the problem of women's rights under
the Equal Protection Clause. It was clear that the purpose of the Clause was to benefit the
newly-emancipated slaves, and not at all to end the subordination of women. A decision
that applied the clause to give equal rights to women, a year or two after the Clause be-
came law, would have been greeted as an outrage, if not an act of lunacy. When, in Reed v.
Reed, 4 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court first applied the Clause in that manner, the public reac-
tion was muted, for equal rights for women was a concept that was then largely taken for
granted. The decision was at odds with the original intent of the framers, but to insist that
the framers, assuming foreknowledge of conditions in 1971, would have wanted the case
decided on the basis of their intent in 1868 would be essentially arbitrary.
124 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934); see also supra
note 168-174 and accompanying text.
125 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 32 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
126 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 451 & CI IR. a (1986).
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United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."I 27 By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment ap-
plies to "any" suit brought against a state by a noncitizen, regardless of
the source of jurisdiction. Further, read literally, it would embrace a
suit founded on federal law as well as state law. It is submitted that the
literal reading should prevail, and others have also taken this view. 128
The overwhelming majority of academic commentators, however,
claim that the Eleventh,Amendment should not be deemed to apply
in cases founded on federal question jurisdiction. 129 Rather, they con-
strue the Amendment as if it read: "Any suit in which jurisdiction is
founded on diversity of citizenship."
For this construction, the commentators observed that the Fram-
ers of the Eleventh Amendment took no action on an earlier version
of the Amendment under which the states would have been protected
from suit by "any person or persons, citizens or foreigners."'" Virtu-
ally without exception, they maintain that a suit against a state by one
of its own citizens could have been brought only under the federal
question jurisdiction.I 5I In the circumstances they stress what seems to
' 27 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
128 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARV. L. REY. 1342, 1371 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1395-96 (1989); Calvin R.
Massey, State Sovereign Immunity and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Cm. L. REV.
61, 65-66 (1989); Gene R. Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND. L.J. 601,
608-12 (1989). But see Fletcher, Reply to Critics, supra note 1, at 1276-79 (contending that
the meaning of the Amendment's language to contemporaries was otherwise); see also
Lawrence C. Marshall, Correspondence, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. Cm. L.
REV. 127, 128-M (1996) (rebutting Fletcher's contention).
129 This is now known as the diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment. Its propo-
nents include AMU, supra note 1, at 1473-76, 1981; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra
note 1, at 1060-63; Meltzer, supra note 1, at 10-13; Pfander, State Suability, supra note 1, at
1351; Shapiro, supra note I, at 67-69; Sherry, supra note 128, at 1265-72. Professor Shreve,
however, has referred to the diversity theory as a "fiction." Shreve, supra note 1, at 610. The
diversity theory has also been adopted by the minority justices. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.. at 114 (Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 289-
91, 294 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139 This version provided in pertinent part "that no State shall be liable to be made a
party defendant in any of the Judicial Courts established or to be established under the
authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners
...." 1 WARREN, supra note 33, at 101. It is not clear that a resolution to this effect was
formally introduced. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1926 11.186; but see Fletcher, Ref.4, to Critics,
supra note 1, at 1269-70 n.95 ("I have little doubt that Sedgwick introduced the proposed
amendment.").
131 At least this writer has experienced great difficulty in finding any recognition in
their writings that federal claims were cognizable under the diversity jurisdiction. Here too
we see the fallacy that the source of a court's jurisdiction determines the nature of the
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them to be the pointed omission of any reference to federal question
jurisdiction in the final form of the Eleventh Amendment, which they
say simply tracks the diversity language of Article 111. 132 Finally, they
contend that if the drafters wanted to protect the states from federal
claims, the Eleventh Amendment was poorly drafted to that end be-
cause it applied only to suits by noncitizens. Since the drafters could
easily have protected the states from suits by their own citizens as well,
but failed to do so, the argument goes, it is reasonable to read the
Amendment as not protecting against federal claims at all.'"
Even. if the critics are correct in contending that the Eleventh
Amendment should be read otherwise than in accordance with its
express language—that it should be taken to apply only when jurisdic-
tion was founded on diversity of citizenship—the Eleventh Amend-
ment has an effect opposite to the one for which they contend. Critics
assume that the source of jurisdiction is determinative of the issues,
federal or state, that the court is called upon to determine. Justice
Brennan made this assumption in his dissenting opinion in Atascadero,
and this was no accident, for he credited his views to academic coin-
mentators. 134
Whatever the source of jurisdiction, as has been seen, the system
of common-law pleading universally in effect at the time, allowed am-
ple scope for the injection of issues of controlling federal law into the
case. 135 As it happened, the only relevant head of jurisdiction at the
Cline was the diversity jurisdiction."6 If, as the critics contend, the only
jurisdiction to which the Eleventh Amendment applies is the diversity
jurisdiction, the federal courts were stripped of power to hear any
claims that might be presented by those invoking that jurisdiction,
including claims founded on federal law.
issues the court will be called to decide. This fallacy is discussed supra notes 53-77 and
accompanying text.
132 E.g., Seminole Pik 517 U.S. at 114 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, ci. 1 (The judicial Power shall extend to ... Controversies ... between a State and
Citizens of another State.").
133 E.g. Amar, supra note 1, at 1475; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 1, at
1060-61, Meltzer, supra note 1, at 10-11.
134 He credited eight academic critics for their "critical look at the historic record."
473 U.S. at 258-59 11.11 (citing critics). His dissenting opinion is interlarded with refer-
ences to these and other critics.
133 See supra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
136 Except for a very brief period after adoption of the Constitution, the federal circuit
courts were not granted original federal-question jurisdiction until 1875. See  HART Sc
WECHSLER, 5/7/7ra note 71, at 879-82.
516	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:485
Moreover, it is evident that the Amendment's drafters under-
stood this. problem. Thus, when the Eleventh Amendment was under
consideration by Congress, Senator Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania
proposed that the Amendment should not apply "in cases arising un-
der treaties made under authority of the United States."'" The pro-
posal was not adopted. 138 The reason should be apparent. As has been
observed, the "states . . . most ardent in advocating the amendment—
Massachusetts, Virginia, and Georgia—all faced pending claims in the
Supreme Court that posed issues turning upon interpretation of the
Constitution or federal treaties."'" It is plain that the Amendment as
drafted was expected to protect the states from treaty claims.
The absence in the Eleventh Amendment of any protection for
the states against suits by their own citizens should not be taken to
indicate acquiescence in such suits. It had been the general under-
standing that, absent consent, the states were immune from suit by
citizens and noncitizens alike. 1413 Chisholm disputed this understand-
ing, and the Eleventh Amendment should be read as no more than a
repudiation of Chisho/m. 141 As has already been remarked, during the
Constitution's formative' period, those who expressed apprehension
of possible overriding of state sovereign immunity by virtue of Article
III made the point that the Article's diversity clauses expressly spoke
of states as parties. 192 Since they did not express similar apprehension
of the federal question jurisdiction, and indeed scarcely mentioned it
at all, this bespeaks confidence on their part that the states would not
be suable under that jurisdiction, and sufficiently explains why there
was no mention of the jurisdiction in the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. Filially, even if it is assumed that the Eleventh Amend-
ment is not applicable to federal claims, it is submitted that the states
are protected against such claims by virtue of the original understand-
137 4 ANNALS  OF CONG. 30 (1794).
158 Justice Brennan argued that "Congress may well have rejected Gallatin's proposal
precisely because to adopt that proposal would have implied some limitation on the ability
of the federal courts to hear nontreaty based federal-question claims." Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 286 11.40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Fletcher's explanation, as he puts it, "parallels" that
of Justice Brennan. William C. Fletcher, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L.
FtEv. 118, 131, 135 (1990). The subject is more fully discussed in Fletcher, Reply to Critics,
supra note 1, at 1185-87.
159 Massey, supra note 128, at 114.
'4° See supra Part IA.
141 2 U.S. at 480; see also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing
Chisholm).
142 See supra text accompanying note 76.
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ing that their sovereign immunity survived adoption of the Constitu-
tion.
C. Hans v. Louisiana
In Hans u. Louisiana, the State of Louisiana defaulted on state-
issued bonds, and one of its own citizens sued the state in a federal
circuit court on coupons attached to the bonds, claiming that the
State's default violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. 143
The claimant maintained that, under Article III of the Constitution
and the implementing jurisdictional legislation, a state was suable by
its own citizens on cases arising under the Constitution, laws and trea-
ties of the United States. The Court acknowledged that the Eleventh
Amendment was inapplicable by its terms because no diversity of citi-
zenship existed,'" but sustained the defense of sovereign immunity. 145
The Court observed that in earlier cases, where the claimant was a
noli-citizen and the Eleventh Amendment was therefore applicable,
the holding had been that a non-consenting state is not suable on
such a claim. 146 The Court added that it would be "anontalous" 147 to
allow such a claim when brought against a non-consenting state by
one of its own citizens.
The academic verdict on Hans has been overwhelmingly nega-
tive.'" It has been contended: (1) that, despite the Court's disclaimer,
the Court did indeed rely on the Eleventh Amendment;149 and (2)
that the Amendment did not apply when a federal claim was asserted
against a state. 150 Regarding the first point, critics have relied heavily
on the Court's statement that it would be "anomalous" 151 to allow a
claim against a state by one of its own citizens, in light of the Amend-
ment's bar of suit by a noncitizen. But the Court also wrote more
broadly, declaring in effect that the broad consensus at the time of
adoption of the Constitution was that a state could not be sued by any
143 134 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1890).
144 Id. at 10.
149 Id. at 21.
146 Id. at 10.
147 Id.
148 But see Currie, supra note 1, at 547 ("I am that lava avis, a law professor who thinks
that Hans n Louisiana was rightly decided.").
149 Arnar, supra note 1, at 1976; Gibbons, supra note I, at 1893-94, 2001; Massey, supra
note 128, at 66; Pfander, State Suability, supra note 1, at 1368; Sherry, supra note 1, at 1260.
15° Burnham, supra note 1, at 995; Fletcher, Reply to Critics, supra note 1, at 1299; Jack-
son, supra note 1, at 49-50.
191 134 U.S. at 10.
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person on any cause of action. Thus, the Court said: "[T]he cogni-
zance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the
law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the
judicial power of the United States. . . . The suability of a State without
its consent was a thing unknown to the law." 152
The Court also said that the "shock of surprise"153 occasioned by
the Chisholm holding, leading as it did to prompt adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment, represented a repudiation of the notion of
federal judicial power "to entertain suits by individuals against the
states ... fa power that) had been expressly disclaimed, and even re-
sented, by the great defenders of the constitution while it was on its
trial before the American people." 154 Adoption of the Amendment,
said the Court, showed that "the highest authority of the country was
in accord rather with the minority than with the majority of the court
in ... Chisholm. "155
With particular reference to a federal-question claim the Court
declared:
Can we suppose that, when the eleventh amendment was
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a
state to sue their own state in the federal courts, while the
idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states,
' 52 kJ. at 15-16.
155 Id. at 11. The Court's "shock of surprise" thesis has been attacked. Thus, Gibbons
remarked that the Federalists agreed to the Amendment reluctantly, in response to '`re-
publican clamor," Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1926, which had won strong support in at least
eight states for a constitutional convention to undo Chisholm. Id. at 1926-39. Whatever the
politics of the time the fact that the Amendment cleared Congress in six months, with
overwhelming majorities in both houses, and was ratified by the states within two years of
the decision, speaks volumes for the surprise and outrage that greeted Chisholm. See
Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 1, at 1058-59 & n.121.
Outh saw no significance in speedy adoption of the Amendment. ORTU, supra note 1,
at 27. He stated, surprisingly in light of the times, that "action by twelve seaboard states
need not be time-consuming." Id. Perhaps more surprisingly, he stated that the "near im-
possibility of amending the Constitution today" is owing to fact that there are now fifty
states and that their legislatures are busier than they used to be. Id.
Justice Souter, dissenting in Seminole Tribe contended that the "shock of surprise" thesis
was "contradicted" by the fact that it took two full year's to get the Amendment ratified. 517
U.S. at 107-08 11.5 (citing Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1926-27). Subsequently, dissenting in
Alden, Justice Sourer advanced a different argument for the same conclusion: namely, that
evidence existed of some contemporaneous public support for Chisholm. 527 U.S. at 794.
But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1143, 1191
(1988) (contending that the reaction to the Chisholm decision "clearly establishes
Chisholm's incompatibility with prevailing political assumptions.").
' 54 Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.
' 55 Id.
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was indignantly repelled? Suppose that congress, when pro-
posing the eleventh amendment, had appended to it a pro-
viso that nothing therein contained should prevent a state
from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the
constitution or laws of the United States, can we imagine
that it would have been adopted by the states? The supposi-
tion that it would is almost an absurdity on its face. 156
As for the argument of critics that the Eleventh Amendment does not
cover the case of a claim against a state based on federal law, this ar-
gument is based on both their narrow reading of the Amendment and
on their rejection of the idea that there was an original understanding
that the sovereign immunity of the states would be preserved. 157 The
writer has already attempted to show that such criticism is without
merit. 158 Hans has commonly been regarded as a major and surprising
turning point in American law—as the first case to suggest, let alone
hold, that state sovereign immunity could be sustained as matter of
constitutional right, independent of the Eleventh Arnendntent. 159
However, Hans was foreshadowed in Cohens v. Virginiam° and in Os-
borne v. Bank of the United States. 161
156 Id. at 15.
Concerning the original understanding, the critics stated that the Court set forth
passages representing the views of Hamilton, Madison and Marshall, while ignoring the
views of their opponents. E.g., Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 527-29 & n.54. Actually, the
Court noted that George Mason anti Patrick Henry espoused these views, but without quo-
tation from their remarks at the Virginia convention on ratification. See Hans, 134 U.S. at
14. In any event, the Court declared that the outlook of the opponents was reflected in the
decision in Chisholm, and that this outlook, and Chishohrz with it, had been resoundingly
rejected by speedy adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, with resulting vindication of the
original understanding. See id. at 11-12. The speed with which the Amendment became
law lends strong support to this conclusion.
155 See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
159 E.g., Engdahl, supra note 1, at 30-31, 60-61 (calling the Court's opinion a "naked
judicial fiat").
10°19 U.S. at 264. See also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
161 22 U.S. at 738.
The holding was that the Eleventh Amendment is not applicable unless the state is a
party of record—a position later modified by the Court in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487
(1887). Osborne, 22 U.S. at 738.
Marshall recognized, however, that even though the state was not a party of record, it
might have an "interest" in the litigation. He said in that situation a court would he
obliged to determine "what degree of interest shall be sufficient to change the parties, and
arrest the proceedings against the individual." Id. at 853. Presumably, a sufficient "degree
of interest" is one that shows the suit to be in effect against the state. cf. United States v.
Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139 (1809).
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D. Cases Following Hans, Culminating in Monaco
The Supreme Court has followed Hans many times in suits by
persons against their own states on constitutional claims. 162 The Court
has also extended the Hans holding to other types of cases that in-
volved federal claims and which were outside the express terms of the
Eleventh Amendment. In Smith v. Reeves, the Court sustained a plea of
sovereign immunity where a state was sued by a federal corporation,
which was not a citizen by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. 163
Also, in Ex pane New York, the Court held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment was inapplicable because the suit originated as an admiralty
proceeding in a federal district court. 164 Although the Eleventh
Amendment spoke only of suits in "law or equity," not admiralty, 165 the
state's plea of sovereign immunity was sustained "because of the fun-
damental rule of which the amendment is but an exemplification." 166
In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 167 in 1934, the Supreme
Court gave the issue of sovereign immunity further explication. The
Principality of Monaco had invoked the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in a suit against the state of Mississippi on defaulted
state bonds. 168 The Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits by a
foreign state. Monaco argued that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
under Article III was clear and that the Article made no reference to
the need for consent by a defending state in the case of a suit by a
foreign state. 169 The Court, however, observed that the Article simi-
lady conferred jurisdiction in cases to which the United States is a
There is additional discussion in the Osborne opinion bearing on this point. The suit
was against Ohio officers for funds of the Bank that had been seized in the collection of a
state tax that was invalid under McCulloch u Maryland, 17 U.S. at 316. The sum involved,
consisting of coin and notes in the amount of $98,000, had been "retained ... carefully in
a trunk separate from the other funds in the state treasury." 22 U.S. at 822. The continu-
ous segregation of the funds from the time of seizure was mentioned no fewer than eight
times. Id. at 833-36, 845, 849, 852, 858. The obvious implication was that there could have
been no recovery in the event of commingling, on the ground of the state's sovereign im-
munity.
162 See the collection of cases listed in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 n.7.
163 178 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1900).
164 256 U.S. 490, 497-98, 500 (1921).
165 See id. at 497-98.
166 Id. at 497.
167 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
168 Id. at 317-18.
169 Id. at 320-21.
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party, and that the consent of the United States to suit against it had
always been required.'" The crux of the opinion was as follows:
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of
the words of section 2 of article 3, or assume that the letter
of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon
suit against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and con-
trol. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as
contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character.
There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still pos-
sessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits,
without their consent, save where there has been "a surren-
der of this immunity in the plan of the convention." ... The
question is whether the plan of the Constitution involves the
surrender of immunity when the suit is brought against a
State, without her consent, by a foreign State.'"
The Court went on to show why, under the "plan of the conven-
tion," a state should not enjoy sovereign immunity when sued by the
United States,'" or when sued by a sister state in the Supreme
Court.'" On the other hand, the Court gave reasons why the constitu-
tional scheme should not be deemed to subject a non-consenting
state to suit by a foreign state. 174
E. Alden Revisited
Although Hans and the cases just discussed made clear that state
sovereign immunity exists independently of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, in recent decades the Court, in what seems to have been care-
less usage, often spoke of the Eleventh Amendment as the source of
the immunity in cases where the Amendment clearly did not apply.'"
This point was clarified by the Court in Alden:
170
	 at 321.
171 id. at 322-23 (citations omitted).
172 Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 329. The Court noted that while jurisdiction in
such a case "is not conferred by the Constitution in express words, it is inherent in the
constitutional plan." Id. (citations omitted).
'77
	 at 328-29.
174 Id. at 330-32.
175 E.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54,68-73; Fla. Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 670,683-700 (1982). Blatehford was a suit by several Alaskan Native villages against
an Alaskan state officer seeking an order requiring payment to them of money allegedly
owed under a state revenue-sharing statute. See 501 U.S. at 775. The suit was deemed one
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[W]e have . . . sometimes referred to the States' immunity as
"Eleventh Amendment Immunity." The phrase is convenient
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives front nor is limited by
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. ... Rather ... the
States' immunity is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Con-
stitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by
virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal foot-
ing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the
Constitution or certain constitutional Amendments. 176
F. Sovereign Immunity Conceived as Common Law
Sovereign immunity is widely understood by judges 177 and aca-
demic critics178 to be a branch of the common law, and subject to ju-
against the State. The Eleventh Amendment was not applicable by its terms, but the Court
sustained a plea of sovereign immunity, stating as follows:
Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans u Louisiana . . . we have un-
derstood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but
for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that
the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the ju-
dicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty .. and that a State
will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to
suit, either expressly or in the "plan of the convention."
Id. at 779 (citations omitted & emphasis supplied). This seems to be an unexceptionable
formulation of the law of sovereign immunity as it affects the states. Certainly, it does not
look like a statement that the Amendment, as such, governs in contexts where by its terms
it does not apply. Yet shortly following the quoted language, the Court declared that it was
the Amendment that had been the basis for sustaining the finding of sovereign immunity in
Principality of Monaco. See id. at 780-81; supra notes 167-174 and accompanying text. Fur-
ther, the holding in Blatchford itself seems to have rested on the Eleventh Amendment. See
501 U.S. at 779-82. It was so understood by the dissenters. Id. at 788-89 (Blacks , J.,
dissenting). This is incomprehensible, for if the states entered the Union with their "sover-
eignty intact," and are subject to suit (absent waiver) only if they gave their consent in the
"plan of the convention," then their immunity does not derive from the subsequently-
adopted Eleventh Amendment. It obviously follows that, as the Court said, the Amend-
meat, within its stated compass, merely "confirms" a prior state of the law.
17° Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. John Nowak has recently stated that the disavowal in Alden of
reliance on the Eleventh Amendment was dishonest. SeeJohn E. Nowak, The Gang of live &
the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091,1094
(2000). He bases this argument mainly on his view that the Alden Court placed substantial
reliance on Hans, which he still regards as an Eleventh Amendment decision. See id.
177 The point has been vigorously maintained in some recent dissenting opinions by
Supreme Court Justices. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 762-98 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Dibe,
517 U.S. at 100-09 (Souter, j., dissenting).
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dicial or legislative modification, like any other branch of the com-
mon law. Professor Martha Field has made the clearest exposition of
this viewpoint. 179 Her reasoning is as follows: (1) Sovereign immunity
was in existence as common-law doctrine immediately prior to adop-
tion of the Constitution, and the Constitution left it untouched; (2)
there was no consensus on the subject at the one time when the his-
torical record shows it to have been considered—namely, during the
debates on ratification; (3) the only constitutional provisions having
any possible bearing on the subject are the jurisdictional clauses of
Article III; and (4) it has been accepted that Article III by itself affords
no basis for overruling sovereign immunity. For these reasons, she
argued, the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity has survived
adoption of the Constitution. 180
Concerning this argument, it may be helpful to distinguish two
questions: (1) whether the sovereign may be sued without its consent
as an aspect of the internal law of the particular jurisdiction, federal
or state; and (2) whether the federal government has authority to
override the sovereign immunity of the states. These questions are
governed by different considerations (a point not noted by the crit-
ics). As will now be argued, the concept of sovereign immunity as
common-law doctrine has little if any pertinence to the first, and no
pertinence at all to the second.
1. Sovereign Immunity as Internal Law
The sovereign immunity law traditionally applied has none of the
significant incidents of common-law doctrine. First, it is doubtful that
even the English law of sovereign immunity at the time of the Ameri-
can Revolution can be meaningfully described as an aspect of the
English common law. The term, common law, is stretched beyond its
generally recognized meaning if it is said to embrace judicial acquies-
cence in Royal prerogatives. It would be much like saying that the ac-
quiescence of the federal judiciary in the exclusive power of the
President and the Senate in the making of treaties is an aspect of the
federal common law.
170 E.g., Burnham, supra note 1, at 933-34; Field, supra note 1, at 522-38; Hovenkanip,
S10117 note 1, at 2244-45; Jackson, supra note 1, at 75-84; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 69. See
also Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1973 ("a narrow and malleable common law doctrine").
179 See Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 522-38.
180 Id.
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Second, if sovereign immunity is nevertheless regarded as com-
mon law, it is a unique kind of common law. The proposition that the
sovereign may not be sued without its consent means-that the consent
must be that of the sovereign. In the American constitutional systems it
is the legislative rather than the judicial branch that speaks for the
sovereign, and it has never seriously been suggested otherwise. Cer-
tainly, it has never been thought that the judiciary can consent for the
sovereign in the particular case. Yet if sovereign immunity is merely
common-law doctrine, the judiciary can in effect consent in all cases,
simply by abolishing the doctrine."'
Third, the notion of sovereign immunity as common law is ill-
suited to a constitutional system that limits the power of government
and confers rights upon people. In such a system, either the assertion
of the immunity should prevail or it should not. The idea that courts
should have power to decide this fundamental question one way or
the other would be surprising to an intelligent person not versed in
the law. For such judicial power to exist, it should be inferable from
the constitution of the particular jurisdiction and success in finding
such a constitution is most unlikely.
. Fourth, traditionally, courts have decided the basic immunity is-
sue in only one way—the government, as distinct from its officers, was
never suable. This tends to show that the law they were applying was
not common law at all, even if they called it that. Fifth, in response,
presumably, to a changed public consensus on the propriety of suit
against the government, American legislatures for the most part have
consented to such suit in all but narrow circumstances. 182 If sovereign
immunity were no more than common law, one would have expected
courts to respond to the same public concerns. But, except as noted
below,183
 they did not. Thus, on the federal level, where legislative
consent to suit has proceeded in stages for over a century, the judici-
ary has never asserted authority to restrict the immunity along similar
lines.
let See supra note 120 (listing commentators who have argued for the use of judicial
power to abolish sovereign immunity because judicial power is co-extensive with legislative
power).
"2 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 71, at 1027-39 (legislation on the federal
level).
183
 See infra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
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Currently courts, especially state courts, have continued to speak
of sovereign hninunity as an aspect of common-law doctrine. 184 For
the reasons given above, the law traditionally applied has none of the
significant incidents of common-law doctrine. On the other hand, it is
evidence of a limitation on judicial authority that can have only a con-
stitutional source. 185
In the mid-twentieth century, there was a break, on the state
level, with what had previously been universal judicial practice in this
regard. Convinced that sovereign immunity was an aspect of the
common law, a number of courts abolished it in whole or in part.
Some of the cases involved states or their instrumentalities. 186 Others
involved political subdivisions, whose claims to sovereign immunity
seemingly did derive from the common law, 187 but the judicial lan-
guage was usually broad enough to encompass states as wel1. 188 It is
worth noting that in many cases the immunity was abolished only as to
tort. 189 There is irony in this, for . the most common ground for a tort
claim is negligence, which, at least on the federal level, furnishes no
basis for a constitutional claim. 190 Those states that have gone no fur-
ther have left intact the immunity regarding constitutional violations,
which is the problem of special concern to the academic critics.
2. Federal Judicial Power to Override State Sovereign Immunity
In the case of sovereign immunity as an aspect of the internal law
of a particular jurisdiction, the governing law rests ultimately on the
04 See, e.g., Ballard v. Ypsilanti Township, 577 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Mich. 1998); Brown v.
State, 674 N.E.2d, 1129, 1133 (N.Y 1996).
188 Cf. Seminole Thibe, 517 U.S. at 69 ("It 	 is noteworthy that the principle of state sov-
ereign immunity stands distinct from other principles of the common law in that only the
former prompted a specific constitutional amendment.").
188 E.g., Stone v. Ariz. Highway Conun'n, 381 P.2d 107, 113 (Ariz. 1963) (concluding
doctrine of sovereign immunity was judicially created and can be changed or abrogated by
same judicial process (this means common-law doctrine)); Colo. Racing Compri' v. Brush
Racing Assoc'n, 316 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Colo. 1957) (citing Boxberger v. State Highway
Dep't, 250 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Colo. 1952) (stating that "[the] doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity originates through the course of unwritten common law") ).
187 Muskopf V. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 463 (Cal. 1961); Molitor v. Kaneland
Cnity. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill. 1959). The immunity of political subdivi-
sions from suit was not originally based on the theory that they were sovereign. See Muskopf,
359 P.2d at 459; see also supra note 186.
188 Cf. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Wis. 1962) (declaring, in this
case against a city, that the abrogation ruling applied to all bodies within the state, includ-
ing the state, counties, cities, etc.).
189 E.g., Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 458; Molitor, 163 N.E.2d at 96; Holytz, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
190 Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986).
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constitution of that jurisdiction. The question of federal judicial
power to override state sovereign immunity is governed exclusively by
the federal Constitution. On this point, the English experience is ir-
relevant, because pertinent only to the problem of English internal
law. The extent of the federal judicial power, if any, to override state
sovereign immunity is subsumed in the more basic issue of a federal
power—legislative or judicial—to set aside state law. To the extent that
provisions of the Constitution are self-executing, their implementa-
tion by the federal judiciary has never been though to constitute an
application of common law. When the Constitution is not self-
executing and its implementation depends on legislative action, the
action may be taken only pursuant to one or more of the enumerated
powers of Congress. It would be anomalous in the extreme if the fed-
eral judiciary, in the administration of what it deems to be federal
common law, should have a power to override 'state law comparable to
that of Congress but exercisable in the absence of the type of constitu-
tional limitations that circumscribe congressional action. 191
G. Congressional Power to Abolish State Sovereign Immunity
The question now to be considered is whether the original un-
derstanding is pertinent to the issue of federal legislative power. The
Court has analyzed the congressional power to abolish state sovereign
immunity under Article I and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. We now turn to an analysis of such powers.
I. Under Article I
In Parden v. Terminal Railway,' 92
 the statute involved, adopted un-
der the Commerce Clause, provided that suit could be brought
against interstate railroads by employees claiming injury by reason of
violation of the statute. The Court held that the state had impliedly
consented to be sued in that it had undertaken operation of the rail-
road subsequent to enactment of the statute. The question of suit
191
 The writer has contended elsewhere that the federal Con/11011 law is best under-
stood as the law applied in areas where state competence has been ousted by the Constitu-
tion or congressional action—areas in which neither the Constitution nor statutes happen
to provide guidelines for the judiciary, with the result that federal courts must make up the
law as best they can as controversies arise. Otherwise, in applying federal law, the federal
courts can be seen as simply implementing the federal Constitution and statutes. See Alfred
Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L.
Rzv. 1024,1080-81 (1967) [hereinafter Hill, Law-Making Pow].
192 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
2001]	 Sovereign hnmunity 	 527
based on a theory of implied consent is an important one, and will be
discussed in a separate section below.'"
Subsequently, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., also involving a
statute based on the Commerce Clause, the Court ruled in effect that
there was no need to find consent on a case-by-case basis. The Court
reasoned that congressional power under that Clause "would be in-
complete without authority to render States liable in damages," 194
and, ftirther, that the States "gave their consent all at once, in ratifying
the Constitution containing the Commerce Clause rather than on a
case-by-case basis." 195 This facile approach to the problem has been
abandoned, presumably in light of the repeated declarations by the
Court that consent to suit must be shown by unequivocal language. 196
Union Gas was subsequently overruled in 1996 by Seminole Tribe.'"
This case invalidated a federal statute providing for suits against states
that had been adopted under the Indian Commerce Clause. The
holding was that Congress lacked such power under Article I. In Alden
v. Maine , 198 where the Court again invalidated an Article I statute pro-
viding for suit against a state, the Court spoke more generally, empha-
sizing the incompatibility of such a statute with the original under-
standing on the place of state sovereign immunity in the
constitutional scheme. It is submitted that the Court had ample basis
for this disposition of the cases. While the ratification debates were
focused on the federal judicial power, the original understanding em-
bodied a conception of the role of the states in our federal system
that, in the view of this writer, limits the power of Congress (putting
aside for the moment Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) in
the same degree that it limits that of the federal judiciary.
Some additional remarks may be ventured here concerning the
Commerce Clause. First, congressional power under that Clause has
expanded enormously, in step with the enormous changes in the
economy. Starting about fifty years ago, successive legislative measures
under the Clause were judicially validated almost as a matter of
course, under the rational basis mode of review. 199 The recent deci-
1 " See infra text accompanying notes 252-261.
19' Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19.
195 Id. at 20 (emphasis supplied).
196 See infra note 252 and accompanying text (discussing state consent to suit).
1" 517 U.S. at 72-73.
1" 527 U.S. at 754,759-60.
1" This began with decisions validating legislation of the New Deal. E.g., NLRB v.
Johns & Lauglin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
528	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:485
sions in United States v. L4pez,2{)° and United States v. Morrison,201 marked
an abrupt halt, but the full implications of these decisions remain to
be seen. Challenges to legislation as exceeding the bounds of the
Commerce Clause have been treated by the Court very much like
challenges based on denial of economic due process. In effect, the
rational basis test has been applied in both contexts, and that is un-
derstandable. But that test is ill-suited to resolving the question of
congressional competence under the Commerce Clause when a com-
peting constitutional principle is invoked to challenge such compe-
tence. The minority Justices do not expressly rely on the rational basis
test to support breach of state sovereign immunity under the Com-
merce Clause, but it seems to this writer that the arguments they em-
ploy are essentially rational basis arguments."2
Second, it is anomalous to require more extensive enforcement
of legislatively-created rights than of rights created by the Constitution
itself. Given the constitutional status of state sovereign immunity, it
would be odd if the Constitution sanctioned judicial enforcement
against non-consenting states of a sub-constitutional right created by
Congress, such as the right to overtime pay involved in Alden. 2°3 Sup-
pose, however, that Congress tries to assure enforcement of a canstitu-
200 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
20 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
"2 Union Gas (since overruled) involved the federal superfund legislation (CERCLA),
under which the federal government was authorized to clean up toxic sites and recover its
costs from those responsible, including states. In that case, the United States sued Union
Gas as a responsible party, and Union Gas in turn filed a third-party complaint against
Pennsylvania, contending that the state was partially responsible. See 491 U.S. at 6. To show
why Congress could override state sovereign immunity pursuant to its "plenary" power
under the Commerce Clause, the Court made an argument based on what it conceived to
be the practicalities of the situation. Id. at 15-16. It reasoned that for the United States to
incur all cleanup costs in the first instance would impose upon it an undue financial bur-
den. This burden would be relieved if private parties would engage in voluntary cleanups,
and they would be encouraged to do so if they were free to sue states for partial reim-
bursement. Id. at 20-22. The writer believes this to be a "rational basis" argument.
College Savings Bank u Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board involved a
federal statute authorizing suit against states for trademark violations. See 527 U.S. 666,
667-68 (1999). The dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer, foregoing reliance on Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, argued that Article I supported the legislation. Justice
Breyer emphasized the desirability of legislative flexibility," id. at 701, to allow "the crea-
tion of incentive-based or decentralized regimes ... assigning roles ... not just to federal
administrators, but to citizens . ." Id. at 702. To withhold such power from Congress, he
said, "threatens the Nation's ability to enact economic legislation needed for the future in
much the way as did] Lochner u New York 1198 U.S. 45 (1905)]." Id. at 701.
203 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 711 (involving Fair Labor Standards Act ("RSA"), 29 U.S.C. §
201 (1994); alleging state probation officers violated the overtime provisions of FLSA and
stied for compensation and liquidated damages).
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tional right. Consider a possible statute in which Congress purports to
find that non-payment of state bonds has harmful consequences for
the national economy, and vests the federal courts with jurisdiction to
make states pay. It is submitted that the Commerce Clause is an un-
likely source of such authority, in view of the constitutional basis for
state sovereign immunity.
More fundamentally, it is submitted that, whatever the scope of
congressional power under Article I, it cannot be employed to set
aside other provisions of the Constitution. In the section immediately
below, it is contended that Congress lacks such power even under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2" If that contention is correct,
the lack of such power under Article I follows a fortiori.
2. Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
The first case to find congressional authority to abolish state sov-
ereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzen2°5 The suit had been instituted in a federal district
court, and the state had relied on the Eleventh Atnendment. 206 The
204 See discussion infra Part 1.0.2.
20 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, the federal statute involved was Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids discrimination on the basis of "race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin" and, by its express terms, applies to the states as employers. Id.
at 447-48. Further, Congress had made clear its reliance on Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 953 n.9 (Rehnquist, J.,
majority opinion) (concluding that Congress exercised its powers under Section 5 in
adopting the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, which extended coverage of Title VII to the
states as employers). Section 5 legislation authorizing suits against states is of recent origin.
For over one hundred years, Congress has exercised its implementation powers under the
Civil War Amendments without breaching state sovereign immunity. See Katzenbach
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643, 658 (1966) (upholding a Section 5 statute that struck down a
New York State literacy test that in effect disenfranchised large numbers of persons literate
only in Spanish; the enforcement Mechanism was embodied in a provision stating that "no
person should be denied the right to vote" by reason of failure to meet the literacy re-
quirement); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315-16, 337 (1966) (concluding
that disputed portions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided for extensive fed-
eral interference with state election machinery with a view to ending practices that disen-
franchised African Americans, were a valid means for carrying out the commands of the
Fifteenth Amendment; the statute did not provide for suits against states and the question
of sovereign immunity was not raised); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879)
(involving a statute that provided for removal to federal court of certain cases involving
civil rights where the problem was exclusion of African Americans from grand juries); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8 (1883) (involving a statute that provided for criminal and civil
penalties against private persons guilty of racial discrimination in denial of access to places
of public accommodation).
200 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-51.
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Court held that, under Section 5, Congress could override state sov-
ereign iimnunity despite the Eleventh Amendment. 207
 Actually the
Eleventh Amendment was not applicable in Fitzpatrick, where the state
was not being sued by a citizen of another state.m The Court, how-
ever, said: "[W]e think 'that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle
of state sovereignty which it embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana . . . are neces-
sarily limited by the enforcement provisions of section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment."209 The Court's reasoning in Fitzpatrick did not
support its holding. The Court relied, as it said, on a "line of cases
[that] sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War
Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States."21° In the same vein, the
Court added:
In [section 5] Congress is expressly granted authority to en-
force "by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody
significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts
pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it
is exercising that authority under one section of a constitu-
tional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms
embody limitations on state authority. 211
A federal statute that provides for unconsented suit against a
state obviously embodies a limitation on state authority. The state,
however, argued that the Eleventh Amendment was a bar to adoption
of the statute. The issue before the Court, which it failed to recognize,
was whether Congress can supersede a constitutional provision (and
"the principle that it embodies") that imposes a limitation on federal
authority. After all, the Eleventh Amendment and its underlying prin-
ciple forbid federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in specified circum-
stances. 212
 The line of cases that the Court thought controlling is rep-
207 See id. at 456. Accordingly, retroactive benefits and attorneys fees were held to be
recoverable from the state. Id. at 456-57.
2°8 427 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring). Subsequently, the Court rendered a simi-
lar ruling in a case where the Eleventh Amendment did apply because the parties were
from different states. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630-31.
209 Id. at 456 (emphasis supplied).
21° Id. at 455.
2" Id. at 456 (emphasis supplied).
212
 The question of sovereign immunity in general, or the Eleventh Amendment in
particular, was not raised in Boerne. The plaintiff had brought suit against the City of
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resented by Ex parte Virginia, 2" where the Court upheld a federal stat-
ute prohibiting exclusion from state juries on the basis of race, and
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 214 upholding a federal statute forbidding use of
state literacy tests for voter qualification. These cases involved limita-
tions on state authority.
In Seminole, the Court, with reference to Fitzpatrick, observed that
"the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted well after adoption of the
Eleventh."215 In the same vein, a distinguished federal judge spoke of
"the familiar premise that the Fourteenth Amendment trumps the
Eleventh Amendment because the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted later in time."216 As a later amendment, the Fourteenth un-
doubtedly supersedes the Eleventh insofar as inconsistent with it. A
finding of inconsistency, however, should not be made lightly. If Con-
gress, under section 5, is free to set aside the Eleventh Amendment, it
is also free—in an indeterminate degree—to set aside other provi-
sions of the Constitution, or at least those previously adopted. Any
assumption that this follows because the Fourteenth was adopted later
in time is unpersuasive, to put it mildly.
After the Fitzpatrick decision, the Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores,
made clear, on the basis of numerous precedents, that congressional
power "to enforce" Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extends
to measures of remedy but not of substance. 217 Further, the Court
concluded that that legislation which "alters the meaning of [a consti-
tutional clause] cannot be said to be enforcing the . Clause."218 If
Congress may not alter the meaning of a constitutional clause with a
view to effectuating the rights afforded by that clause, 219 it decidedly
lacks power to achieve this objective by superseding other provisions
of the Constitution. In Fitzpatrick, the Court was oblivious to limita-
Boerne in a federal district court for denial of a permit. A municipality is not a state in-
strumentality and may not invoke sovereign immunity as a bar to a federal claim. See infra
Part I.I.
215 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
211 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
215 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996).
215 Chaves v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 296 (5th Cir. 1998) (Judge John Minor
Wisdom, dissenting).
217 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
218
 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. Justice O'Connor, joined in dissent by Justice Breyer, agreed
that the "Court's careful and historical analysis" did indeed establish this principle. Id. at
545. The remaining dissenter, Justice Souter, did not dispute the point in his own dissent-
ing opinion. Id. at 566.
219 It was on this ground that relief was denied in Boerne. See id. at 536.
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dons. The power of Congress under Section 5 was said to be "pie-
nary, "22° and the overriding of the Eleventh Amendment seemed to
follow from that. 221
Two years after Fitzpatrick, the Court followed that decision in
upholding an award of costs against a state. 222 But statutes authorizing
suits against states have been struck down in five subsequent cases. 223
These invalidations have followed in part front inattention to the im-
plications of the Due Process Clause and in part from misapplication
of the "congruence and proportionality" test of Boerne.224
In Boerne, the Court observed that Congress may adopt remedial
measures under Section 5 "even if in the process it prohibits conduct
22°
 427 U.S. at 456. Only Justice Stevens was troubled by this aspect of the opinion. In
his concurring opinion, however, he said no more than this: "I question whether § 5 of
that Amendment is an adequate reply to Connecticut's Eleventh Amendment defense. I
believe the defense should be rejected for a different reason." Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 458
(Stevens, J., concurring). He then advanced several reasons, among them his conviction
that Congress possessed ample power to adopt such a statute under Article L Id. In his
separate concurring opinion, Justice Brennan said nothing about the Court's reasoning,
relying on his own understanding, advanced in his earlier dissenting opinions and then for
the Court in Union Gas, that the states had surrendered their immunity with adoption of
the Constitution. Id. at 457-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). Under his views the subsequent
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment was irrelevant.
221 See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1199-1200 (contending that the Fitzpatrick Court's
"conclusion that section five ... authorizes Congress to abrogate the states' constitutional
immunity reflects a judgment about historical intent that is by no means obvious and is
probably mistaken").
2 2 2 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). In Hutto, the Court said that "[clogs have
traditionally been awarded without regard for the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity."
437 U.S. 678, 695 (1978). But the authorities cited for this point all involved suits by one
state against another under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See id. (citing Mis-
souri v. Iowa, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 660, 681 (1849); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 583
(1924) (collecting cases)). Sovereign immunity has never been recognized in such cases,
for otherwise the constitutional creation of this important head of jurisdiction would be
meaningless.
The Hutto Court, however, cited one decision that was relevant: namely, Fairmont
Cream?),
 Co. u Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927). In this case, a criminal conviction was re-
versed, with costs against the state. See Fairmont, 275 U.S. at 71-72. Minnesota contended
that costs could not be imposed upon a state unless consented to by its legislature. But the
Court declared that it had been taxing costs against states routinely using various court
rules and statutes as authority. Id. at 74-77. Further, the Court said that "[t]hough a state is
sovereign in many respects, the state when a party to litigation in this court loses some of
its character as such." Id. at 74. The states seem never to have lost this "character" except as
regards imposition of costs.
2" Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (Feb. 21, 2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); lame v. Ha. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
224 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
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which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.'" 225 On the
other hand, if a Section 5 statute is to be sustained as remedial, the
Court concluded that "[t] here must be a congruence and propor-
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation
may become substantive in operation in effect." 226 As an example of
valid remedial legislation that has intruded on state constitutional
prerogative, the Court noted the problem of state literacy tests. 227
While the Constitution vests states with control over voter
qualifications, the Court has upheld Section 5 legislation striking
down such tests. 228 Thus, the Court upheld a statute setting aside New
York's requirement of literacy in English because its effect was to deny
the right to vote to "large segments" of the State's Puerto Rican popu-
lation.228 Had the number of persons adversely affected by the literacy
requirement been insubstantial, the congressional intrusion on New
York's constitutional prerogative would presumably have failed
Boerne's proportionality test.
Now consider the Boerne test as it was applied in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents. 23° This case involved the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), which prohibits an employer, includ-
ing a state, from failing to or refusing to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual because of such individual's age."' The constitutionality of this
statute under Article I had been already been decided. 282 The ques-
tion in Kiwi was whether Congress, acting under Section 5, could val-
idly subject the states, as employers, to the liability created by the
ADEA.288 The Court noted that age is not a suspect classification, so
that discrimination on the basis of age does not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as the
classification is reasonably related to a. state's legitimate interest (i.e.,
223 Li. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455).
226 Id. at 520.
227 Id. at 518.
222 See id. (listing cases where congressional voting rights provisions were upheld nuclei .
Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
"9 See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 641.
2" 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
"' 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1994).
232 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243-44 (1983) (concluding that the extension of
the AREA to cover state and local government employers was a valid exercise of Congress'
powers tinder the Commerce Clause).
233 Motel, 528 U.S. at 66-67.
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if it meets the rational basis test). 234 Further, the Court found that the
ADEA "prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and
practices than would likely be held to be unconstitutional under the
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard."235 That being so,
the Court concluded that the statutory remedy was excessive under
the proportionality rule of Boerne. 236
Unaccountably, the question whether the state had violated the
Due Process Clause in rejecting a claim under the statute was not an
issue in the case. The ADEA had created a cause of action against vio-
lators. This cause of action was property, protected against state im-
pairment under the Due Process Clause. 237 The Court's determina-
tion of lack of proportionality rested on its conclusion that only a
small number of the rights created by the statute were protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, however, all the rights created by
the statute were protected by the Amendment's Due Process Clause.
A case in all fours with Kimel is Board of Trustees of University of Ala-
bama v. Garrett, where the Court invalidated the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") insofar as the Act authorized suit against
the states. 238 And a comparable case is Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, which involved a suit
against Florida for patent infringement. 235
234 Id. at 83-84.
255 Id. at 86.
no Id. at 82-83, 86.
"7 For a statutory entitlement that was deemed a cause of action, see Logan v. Zirner-
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-32 (1982) (holding that employee's right to use the
State's Fair Employment Practices Act's adjudicatory procedures was property protected by
the Due Process Clause). Cf. Mullane v Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312
(1950) (Invalidating state procedural law that impaired a non-statutory cause of action).
For a collection of cases that have held diverse interests to constitute property, see Logan,
455 U.S. at 430-31.
238 121 S. Ct. at 955.
239 In Florida Prepaid, the Section 5 statute abrogating state sovereign immunity in pat-
ent cases was also invalidated as excessive under the proportionality test. 527 U.S. at 645-
47. The opinion is tortuous, but the Court seems to have had two reasons for this holding.
One was that most cases of state patent infringement are not intentional, and as such do
not rise to the level of unconstitutionality. Id. at 645. To subject the state to liability for all
cases of patent infringement was therefore deemed to be disproportionate. Id. at 645-46.
But the plaintiff had relied on the Due Process Clause. Id. at 641-42. And the Court had
said that patents were property rights protected by the Clause. Further, the Court stated
that "we know of no reason why Congress might not legislate against their deprivation ...
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 642. If all patent violations are redress-
able by virtue of the Due Process Clause, there is seentingly no basis for invoking the pro-
portionality test.
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The foregoing decisions are questionable if Fitzpatrick, which de-
clared that Congress has "plenary" authority under Section 5, repre-
sents the governing law. It does not necessarily follow that they are
wrong in the result.
The Court has decided that Congress cannot abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity under Article I, but that it can do so under Section
5. There is a resulting anomaly in that property rights created under
the Commerce Clause seemingly become enforceable against the
But the Court did invoke it, on an additional ground that was more persuasive. The
legislative record showed that In virtually all instances the states did afford remedies for
their own patent infringements, and that the remedies were almost invariably adequate.
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640-41. The Court determined that congressional concern was
not so much with the adequacy of these remedies but their nonuniformity. Id. at 644. But
this problem, the Court ruled, could be addressed by Congress only under its Article I
power, which did not extend to abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Id. at 645, 647-
648. Construing the statute as having no purpose other than to ensure adequate remedies,
the Court concluded that in the circumstances resort to Section 5 to work such abrogation
was excessive under the proportionality principle. Id. at 645-97.
In College Savings, the Court (lid not deal with Boerne's proportionality test, but took, it
is submitted, a confused view of the scope of the Due Process Clause. See 527 U.S. at 675.
The case involved a Section 5 statute authorizing suit against a state for violation of Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, which outlaws false advertisements by a maker concerning its
own products. The Court said that a competitor could not assert a property interest that
was "impinged upon" by such advertising. Id. While this was true before adoption of the
Act, it was not true afterward, for the Act gives competitors a cause of action for damages
arising out of a violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1122(c) (1994). Further, the Court narrowed the
conception of property, and thereby narrowed the scope of substantive due process. Thus,
the Court said that the claim under the Lanham Act was not property because a "hallmark
of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others." College Savings, 527 U.S. at
673. For this proposition the Court relied on a statement in Kaiser Aetna v. United States to
the effect that "one of the most essential" attributes of property is the right to exclude
others. Id. (citing Kaiser, 944 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). This language in Kaiser was taken out
of context. In Kaiser, the Court was insisting that a right of exclusion could not be de-
stroyed by the government without compensation. 444 U.S. at 180. If the tight to exclude
is an indispensable attribute of property rights generally, then not only choses in action,
but also contractual interests generally do not constitute property. Yet the Court had pre-
viously made clear that a chose in action is "a protected property interest in its own right."
Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996). And it had previously declared that
"contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose pro-
vided that just compensation is paid." United States Trust Co. of N.Y v. New Jersey, 931
U.S. 1,19 n.16 (1977).
Professor Woolhandler read College Savings and Florida Prepaid as precluding action
under Section 5 to compel states to compensate for interference with "new property," by
which she means a "statutorily created cause of action or expectation of compliance with
the law by the state." Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, NM Property, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
919, 935 (2000). But in College Savings the Court said that a chose in action is not property
at all because it carries no right of "exclusion." Whether this announced legal principle
will stand may be doubted. And it may be questioned whether the defeat of an expectation
is actionable unless the expectation constitutes a property interest.
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States under Section 5. The Supreme Court has never come to grips
with this anomaly. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has.
In Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, the plaintiff, invoking several Sec-
tion 5 statutes, 240
 sued a state university for copyright infringement
and violation of the Lanham Act. 241 , The plaintiff's claim that her
rights were protected by the Due Process Clause was clearly presented.
The court confronted the question whether Section 5 legislation may
be relied on to enforce rights created Article I.242 Judge John Minor
Wisdom, in dissent, answered this question in the affirmative: "Con-
gress can combine its authority under Article I and section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to achieve a result that would not be possible
in the absence of that combination."243
 The majority of the judges dis-
agreed. They argued that rights created Article I can easily be dressed
up in due process clothes if that is all it takes to render them enforce-
able under Section 5244
 They said that even the statute involved in
Seminole Tribe itself was amenable to "this style of constitutionaliza-
tion."246 To allow Article I rights to be enforced against states under
Section 5, concluded the court, "would require us to ignore the result
in Seminole [Tribe]."246
This view of the matter would severely limit the scope of Fitz-
patrick. 247
 But that decision, as previously argued, was a dubious
24° 15 U.S.C. § 1122,17 U.S:C. §§ 501,511 (1994).
241 157 F.3d 282,284-85 (5th Cir. 1998).
242 Id. at 287.
2" Id. at 297 ii.53 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
244 See id. at 289-90.
243 Id. at 290; see supra Part l.A.2.b (discussing Seminole Tribe).
2" Chavez, 157 F.3d at 290.
247 Illustrating a possible application is United States v. Morrison. 529 U.S. at 589. This
case involved a Section 5 statute, Violence Against Women Act, based on congressional
findings that battered women suing for damages had suffered "gender-based disparate
treatment by state authorities," id. at 624, through complicity in the use of "erroneous
stereotypes and assumptions" permeating state proceedings in such cases. Id. at 620. The
remedy that Congress had provided was creation of a federal cause of action against the
persons doing the battering, with concurrent jurisdiction in the federal and state courts.
See id. at 605-08. As a practical matter, it is difficult to see how this would have improved
the situation, but Congress evidently thought it would, and the Court did not dispute Con-
gress in this regard. The Court invalidated the statute for two reasons. First, the Court
concluded that the statute was beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 617-18. Second, in regard to congressional power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court concluded that the statute was incompatible with the
Boerne proportionality rule for the reason that the statute was "not aimed at proscribing
discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe
." Id. at 626. For this point, the Court relied on the Civil Rights Cases, where the opinion
stated that proper federal legislation to enforce constitutional rights against delinquent
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one. 248 If the Fitzpatrick result is constitutionally sustainable, it is not
on any ground advanced by the Court.
H. Legislative Consent to Suit
I. Congressional Consent
The Court has shown increasing reluctance to read a federal
statute as a consent to sue the United States. Thus, it recently stated
that such consent must be "unequivocally expressed in statutory text
... and will not be implied."249 It is submitted that the Court's resis-
tance to a finding of consent (arguably excessive in any event) is in-
appropriate in the case of federal statutes. While sovereign immunity
is an aspect of the constitutional scheme, so too is the plenary power
of Congress to waive it for the United States. Construing the exercise
of this power with excessive strictness is to thwart effectuation of the
congressional will without advancing any constitutional purpose. 250
states is "'corrective in its character, adapted to counteract and redress the operation of ...
prohibited [s]tate laws or proceedings or proceedings of (s)tate officers.'" Id. at 635 (quot-
ing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18). But this language was a general description of Sec-
don 5 legislation, and did not purport to be a specification of the remedies that Congress
could properly prescribe in such legislation. The statute involved in the Civil Rights Cases
did no more than outlaw discriminatory conduct by private persons, and prescribe civil
and criminal penalties for violators. The statute was not invalidated because of the nature
of the remedies it provided; it was invalidated because it made no reference to state viola-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment and was not "predicated on any such view." 109 U.S.
at 14. Nothing was said of lack of proportionality. The statute simply did not have a consti-
tutional purpose, inasmuch as it was not addressed to state action.
In Morrison, where there was a claim of state official involvement in the discriminatory
practices complained of, the Section 5 statute had provided a federal forum as a refuge
from such practices. As just noted, the Court held the statute to be fatally defective be-
cause this remedy did not in any way act upon state officers. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.-
26. In effect, this was a holding that the Section 5 remedy did not go far enough. The
writer can find no rational basis for a requirement that, to pass constitutional muster, a
Section 5 statute must substantially discombobulate a state or its officers. A clear precedent
for upholding the statute in Morrison was Strauder a Was/ Virginia, where the Court
sustained a Section 5 statute that did no more than authorize removal from a state court to
a federal court when it was claimed that certain civil rights were unenforceable in the state
court. See 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879). In Morrison, however, it is not clear that the plaintiff's
grievance related to unconstitutional conduct.
245 See supra notes 205-221 and accompanying text.
249 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (internal citations omitted) (citing United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 37 (1992); Irwin v. Dept of Veterans Af-
fairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).
250 Cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 71, at 1041 (questioning whether waivers of im-
munity in federal statutes should '`be construed, if not liberally, at least sensibly—with a
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On another footing is the Court's reluctance to find a congres-
sional purpose to overrule state sovereign immunity. The Court, as it
has said, adopted a "stringent test" in determining whether Congress
intended to abrogate state immunity, because "that abrogation of sov-
ereign immunity upsets 'the fundamental constitutional balance be-
tween the Federal Government and the States,' ... placing a consid-
erable strain on '[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh
Amendment doctrine.'"251 This same consideration does not apply in
the case of congressional waiver of federal sovereign immunity.
2. State Legislative Consent
While constitutional considerations counsel greater reluctance to
find state legislative consent, the Supreme Court is unduly rigid in its
insistence that a state consents to suit only if its legislature has made
that purpose clear "'by the most express language or by such over-
whelming implications from the text as (will) leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.'" 252 If, though such a statement is lack-
ing, the available state materials suggest that the state courts would
probably construe the statute as a waiver, it would be perverse for the
federal courts to conclude otherwise. In Edelman v. Jordan, involving a
joint federal-state welfare program, the Court held that the State's as-
sertion of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
barred a suit against it in a federal court by a recipient for back
benefits withheld in violation of federal law. 255 Applying its clear-
statement rule, the Court rejected an argument that the State had
impliedly consented to suit in federal court by participation in the
program through which the federal government provided assistance
for the operation by the State of a public aid system. 254 Furthermore,
sympathetic assumption of congressional intent to introduce a regime of law infused with a
spirit of equity?").
251
 Dellinuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989) (internal citations omitted); see also
Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1959, 1963, 1969-71 (1994) [hereinafter Clear Statement].
252 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling
Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). Similarly, the Court has required that federal statutes over-
riding state sovereign immunity manifest that purpose by a "clear statement." See Note,
Clear Statement, supra note 251, at 1962-63.
253 415 U.S. at 678.
254 See id. at 673-74. In partial response to this problem, in 1986, Congress provided by
statute that State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of ... any ... Federal
statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-7(a) (1) (1994). The Supreme Court, in dictum, and speaking evidently of accep-
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the Court did so without inquiry into what the state's law on the sub-
ject might be.
In partial response to this problem, Congress in 1986 provided by
statute that "[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh
Amendment .. from suit for a violation of . . . any . . . Federal statute
prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assis-
tance."255 The Supreme Court, in dictum, and speaking evidently of
acceptance of a conditional federal grant, has called this "an unambi-
guous waiver of the . . . immunity."256 The lower federal courts have
imposed liability on states accordingly. 257
It should be noted that congressional power to impose condi-
tions on grants of assistance is not unlimited. 258 One need not accept
the result in New York v. United States, to acknowledge the justice of the
Court's observation that without limits "the spending power could
render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal
authority."259 So far as is here pertinent, conditions must be "reasona-
bly related to the federal interest" in the grant. 269 The Supreme Court
has also recognized that although a state can avoid onerous condi-
tions by declining the federal grant, the circumstances may be such as
tance of a conditional federal grant, has called this "an unambiguous waiver of the .
immunity." Lane, 518 U.S. at 200. The lower federal courts have imposed liability on states
accordingly. E.g., Sandoval v. Hegan, 197 F.3(1 484 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), and rev'd on other grounds No. 99-1908, 2001
WL 408983 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2001).
The authority of Congress to spend for the general welfare is not confined to such ob-
jects as are within the purview of congressional authority under the specifics of Article 1,
Section 8. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936); see also Alberti". Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1111-13 (1987)
(demonstrating that it is exceedingly difficult to find actual instances of spending to
achieve objects beyond the reach of Congress under its specific powers). One need not
accept the result in New York u United States, to acknowledge the justice of the Court's ob-
servation that without limits the spending power could render academic the Constitu-
tion's other grants and limits of federal authority." 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); see also Butler,
297 U.S. at 66-67 (discussing the need for limits). So far as is here pertinent, conditions
imposed on state instrumentalities must be "reasonably related to the federal interest" in
the grant. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978). The Supreme Court
has also recognized that although a state can avoid onerous conditions by declining the
federal grant, the circumstances may be such as to place undue pressure on the state in
making that choice. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). So far as the writer
is aware, the Supreme Court has never found the conditions attached to a grant excessive.
255 42 U.S.0 § 2000d-7(a) (1994).
156 Lane, 518 U.S. at 200.
257 E.g., Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 500.
25B
	 .supra note 254.
259 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). Butler also spoke of the need for limits. 297 U.S. at 66-67.
269 Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. at 461.
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to place undue pressure on the state in making that choice. In South
Dakota v. Dole, the Court said:
Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances
the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which "pressure turns into
compulsion." . . . Here, however, ... all South Dakota would
lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable
minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtain-
able under specified highway grant prograins. 261
I. Local Subdivisions
From our beginnings as a nation, it has been understood that
cities, counties, and other subdivisions or agencies have no entitle-
ment to a claim of sovereign immunity because they do not have the
attributes of sovereignty. 262 This at least is the rule when the suit is
based on asserted violationsof federal law. In many states, local subdi-
visions are not suable for violations of local law, usually but not always
on the theory that sovereign immunity applies as a matter of state
law. 26s
II. THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED STATES
The first holding that sustained the sovereign immunity of the
United States came in United States v. McLemore, 26• and this position is
one from which the Court has never swerved. 265
261
 483 U.S. 203, at 211 (1987). So far as the writer is aware, the Supreme Court has
never found the conditions attached to a grant excessive.
262 JAcons, supra note 111, at 108-09. Fletcher has observed that this was the common
understanding in the 1790s. Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 1, at 1100-01.
t6  E.g., Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); PE-
TER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 206-07 (1983).
264 45 U.S. (9 How.) 286 (1846). For earlier recognition of the immunity, see United
States u Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1934).
The word "all" appears in Article III's provision for jurisdiction in certain types of
cases (for example, "all cases of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction"), but does not ap-
pear in the clause, "controversies to which the United States shall be a party." On this basis,
argument was made in Glidden u Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), that the United States can
be a party only as plaintiff, and that jurisdiction is lacking in any case in a federal court
where it is named as a defendant, even if it consents to suit. The Court rejected the argu-
ment, declaring that what protects the United States front suit is the general principle of
sovereign immunity and that accordingly it is suable with its consent.
265 A recent holding on the point is Dept. of the Array v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 555
(1999).
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The immunity of the federal government seems not to have
drawn attention in the ratification debates nor generally during the
Constitution's formative period. The constitutional and statutory pro-
visions endowing the federal judiciary with jurisdiction in cases to
which the United States was a party did not lead to discussion regard-
ing the suability of the United States. Nor was there litigation raising
that issue, though it is possible that such litigation was headed off by
early adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which reflected a strong
bias in favor of sovereign immunity generally.
The critics of sovereign immunity have focused almost exclusively
on the doctrine in its application, to the states. Some of their basic ar-
guments have equal pertinence on the federal level, namely (1) that
the doctrine was not meant to protect from claims founded on federal
law, and (2) that sovereign immunity is at most an aspect of the com-
mon law. In the foregoing pages the writer has attempted to refute
these arguments.266
III. THE WRONGDOING OFFICER
A. Ex parte Young
1. Trespassory Conduct
Traditionally, the officer acting without valid authority was per-
sonally liable for acts that, if committed by a private person, would
have been deemed trespassory at common law. When damages were
assessed against the officer, it was for the commission of a common-
law tort. When an injunction was granted, it was to restrain the com-
mission of a common-law tort. This was the law in England, and it was
the law on both the federal and state levels before the decision in Ex
parte You ng.267
It has been contended that Ex parte Young represented a depar-
ture from this basic pattern. 268 In that case, the Court concluded that
the Attorney General of Minnesota could be enjoined from instituting
a proceeding in the state courts to enforce the terms of a regulatory
266 See discussion supra Parts 1.A.2-3, I.F.
267 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 9-18 (1891); In re
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 500-02, 507 (1887); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288-91
(1885); see also Young, 209 U.S. at 198-99 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Jaffe, mina note 5, at 9-
29 (discussing in detail suits against officers in England and United States).
26B HART & WECHSLER, supra note 71, at 1065; JAcons, supra note 111, at 130-42.
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statute alleged to be unconstitutional. 269
 Argument has been made
that the Attorney General's readiness "to prosecute for conduct in
violation of state law was probably not tortious under traditional
common law concepts."27° But if the state law was unconstitutional,
enforcement of that law would have been trespassory. Institution of
the enforcement proceeding was an integral part of a process that,
uninterrupted, could have culminated in confiscatory rates or statu-
tory penalties of imprisonment and filIC. 271
 Officers are always subject
to personal liability for such conduct. But the Court dealt with a
larger concern in Ex fiarte Young. As the Court put it, whether the
conduct was trespassory turned on whether the statute was "void be-
cause unconstitutional."272
 Authority under state law is of no avail, the
Court said, when the "officer in proceeding [pursuant to such author-
ity] conies into conflict with the superior authority of the Constitu-
tion."273
 If valid authority is lacking, the officer is liable for the tres-
pass as any private person would be for the same conduct. 274
 But is
liability in tort an essential feature of the Ex parte Young doctrine as it
has evolved? Seemingly not, as will be shown below.
2. Non-Trespassory Conduct
Participation of state officers in maintenance of a segregated
school system is not readily characterized as trespassory. By way of
contrast, consider the government officers who operate a prison un-
der inhumane conditions. Ordinarily, involuntary confinement is
justified under the valid judgment of the sentencing court. But the
justification fails when prison conditions do not meet minimal consti-
tutional standards, and at that point continued confinement can ar-
guably be viewed as trespassory. Educational segregation does not
lend itself to such characterization. Yet the Court has relied on Ex
parte Young in desegregation suits against state officers. 276
269
 See Young, 209 U.S. at 148,159-61,168.
270
 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 71, at 1065.
27r
	 Young, 209 U.S. at 127-28. A similar point is made in Jaffe, supra note 5, at 28.
272 Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
2" Id. at 159-60. If the governing law is valid, suit against the officer who acted without
authority (as when the officer misread the statute) presents a different problem. See discus-
sion infra Part I1.B; see also infra text accompanying note 936 (concerning suits founded on
an officer's misreading of a contract).
274 Young, 209 U.S. at 160.
275 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,289 (1977); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S.
218,228 (1964).
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Other cases of this type are not readily found in the Supreme
Court Reports, but comparable situations exist, though seemingly un-
common. Thus, impairment of voting rights through unconstitution-
ally constituted legislative districts does not necessarily call for trespas-
sory conduct on the part of election officials. Yet these officials—not
the federal and state governments—are the named defendants in
such cases.276 In such cases (and in the desegregation cases) claimants
do not ask to be let alone—as when trespassory conduct takes place or
is threatened—but what they seek is somewhat similar—not to be sin-
gled out for denial of constitutional rights.
Ex parte Young has also been invoked to secure statutory benefits
unlawfully denied by government officers, as in the case of the future
benefits involved in Edelman v. fordan.277 In this instance, too, the
official conduct is not trespassory. 278 Whether or not the official con-
276 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,537 & 11.2 (1964). Sometimes officers are seem-
ingly sued in their official capacities. Cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (bring-
ing action asking that a Georgia voting statute be declared invalid and that the Governor
and Secretary of State of Georgia be enjoined from conducting elections under it). This
practice goes unchallenged. In any event, suit never seems to be brought against the states
themselves or their executive departments.
277 See Edel man, 415 U.S. at 663-72.
"8 In Seminole Vibe, the Court invalidated a federal statute, adopted under the Indian
Commerce Clause, that authorized suit against a state. 517 U.S. at 47. But in that case, the
tribe had sued not only the state but also its governor, and one of the issues was whether
the suit against the latter could be maintained under the Ex parte Youngdoctrine. Id. at 73.
With regard to that aspect of the case, it is necessary to consider provisions of the statute
that were not mentioned in the earlier discussion. Under the statute, a state permitting
gaming activity by others was obliged to permit gaming activity to be conducted by Indian
tribes upon Indian lands, in accordance with the conditions established in a compact en-
tered into by the tribe and the state. Id. at 49 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A) (1994)).
The statute provided that, upon application by a tribe, the State shall negotiate with the
Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact." Id. The statute further provided
that if a state failed in this obligation, the federal district court in which an enforcement
action was brought should try to get the parties to agree. Id. at 49-50 (citing 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d) (7) (B) (ii)—(vii)). That failing, the parties were to negotiate further with the aid
of a court-appointed mediator, in accordance with a detailed procedure set out in the stat-
ute. Seminole Thibe, 517 U.S. at 50. If that also failed, the Secretary of the Interior was to
establish the conditions under which gaming was to be conducted. Id.
A divided Court decided that the Ex parte Young action against the governor
could not be maintained, but neither side suggested that the Ex pane Young remedy was
unavailable to secure a benefit conferred by a federal statute. See id. at 73-76 & 11.17; id. at
169-82 (Souteri., dissenting). The Court held the remedy to be unavailable in this case
because of its view that the special statutory remedy was meant by Congress to be the ex-
clusive one. See id. at 73-76 & 11.17. Preliminarily, it may be observed that, when a constitu-
tional violation is charged, the power of Congress to narrow the scope of the judicial rem-
edy is limited, because the remedy must afford adequate iMplementation of the particular
constitutional provision involved, and as to that the Supreme Court has the last word. See
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generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975). In the case of a federal statute, Congress may limit judicial remedies as it pleases,
barring of course limitations on constitutional rights such as procedural fairness and equal
protection of the law. The Seminole Tibe dissenters did not dispute this notion. They in-
sisted, however, that the special statutory procedure could be followed as readily in an
action against the governor as in an action against the state. 517 U.S. at 180-81 (Sauter, J.,
dissenting). Further, they argued that it was implausible to attribute to Congress an intent
that the Ex parte Young route should be unavailable, since Congress was so intent on effec-
tuating the statutory scheme as to have authorized an action against the state itself. Id. at
180.
These were weighty arguments, but not, in the view of this writer, dispositive. A ques-
tion not considered by the majority or the dissent was whether Seminole Tribe was a case
where the suit against the officer should be deemed one essentially against the state itself.
If, in a suit against an officer, a court may not enter a decree that in effect requires specific
performance of a repudiated state contract, see infra notes 368-377 and accompanying
text, one may wonder whether a decree against the officer may in effect require the state
to enter into a contract in the first place, or to bargain in good faith with a view to entering
into a contract. Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential
Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 510-41 (1997), sees in the decision
grave danger to the Young doctrine generally, as her title suggests. Seminole Tribe does not
warrant such apprehension. In the first place, Jackson takes little if any account of Con-
gress' plenary power, subject only to such constitutional limitations as have been noted, to
limit the remedies for violation of a federal statute. Second, Jackson's fears concerning the
future of the doctrine in relation to constitutional violations stein in part from her blur-
ring of the distinction between constitutional and statutory violations, and in part front the
Seminole Tribe's reliance on Schweiker u Chilicky. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (citing
Schweiker, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988)); see also Jackson, supra, 527-30 (discussing Schweikei).
In Schweiker, the claimant had been improperly denied social security benefits. 487
U.S. at 414. The statute provided for full restoration of benefits through administrative
and judicial proceedings. But the claimant, contending that the statutory violation also
constituted a violation of due process, instituted an Ex parte Young action to recover dam-
ages for "emotional distress [and] other hardships" occasioned by the denial of benefits
but not available under the remedies provided by the statute. Id. at 418-19, 425. The
Court, as it remarked in its opinion, was being asked to create a remedy, originally created
in Bivens u Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, for the alleged due pro-
cess violation. Id. at 421-23; livens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see also infra notes 280-281 and
accompanying text (discussing Givens). Thus, the issue in Schweiker was not whether a statu-
tory remedy provided adequate implementation of a constitutional tight, but concerned
rather the scope of the claimed constitutional right, which is necessarily a preliminary ques-
tion. In deciding against creation of a Bivens remedy, the Court declared that Congress
had provided "meaningful safeguards or remedies" in the Social Security Act, Schweiker,
487 U.S. at 425; and, further, that "'Congress is in a better position to decide whether or
not the public interest would be served'" by providing the additional damages sought by
the claimant. Id. at 427. The holding might have been the same without reference to the
superior position of Congress to determine what was in the public interest. Whether or not
the deference to Congress was appropriate, the Court was not allowing Congress to limit
implementation of a constitutional right that was clearly defined. Thus, the favorable ref-
erence to Schweiker hi Seminole Tribe should not be taken to threaten "evisceration" of Ex
parte Young in its application to constitutional violations. See Jackson, supra, at 495. It is
submitted that Seminole Tribe does not undermine Ex parte Young. Other writers of this view,
include Daniel Meltzer and David Currie. See David P. Currie, Ex parte Young After Semi-
nole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 550 (1997); Meltzer, supra note 1, at 41-46.
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duct at issue in any of these cases is otherwise tortious under the
common law need not detain us. For after Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 279 it is clear that the cause of
action derives directly from the Constitution or governing statute, to
the extent that the Supreme Court is willing to imply a cause of action
from the particular provision.
3. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
Prior to Bivens, 28° persons suing federal or state officers hi the
federal courts to restrain threatened violations of federal law were
granted injunctive relief as a matter of course. In some of these cases
there was no diversity of citizenship, from which it seemed to follow
that federal law created the basic cause of action. If the federal or
state officers were sued for damages arising from their conduct, it was
generally assumed that the cause of action if any arose under state tort
law and could not be litigated in federal district court in the absence
of diversity of citizenship.281 The writer has attempted elsewhere to
account for this anomaly. 282
In Bivens, the Supreme Court confronted the issue for the first
time. The claimant had sued federal narcotics agents for violations
under the Fourth Amendment and had sought damages for this tres-
passory conduct. The suit had been instituted hi a federal district
court, and, there being no diversity of citizenship, it was understood
that federal jurisdiction could be sustained only upon a showing that
the claim arose under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States. 283 The Court held that the right to damages could be implied
directly from the Fourth Amendment itself.284
Earlier holdings in cases involving trespassory conduct can be
rationalized in the same manner, insofar as they have rested on viola-
tions of the Constitution or other federal law. And this is true a forti-
ori in the non-trespassory cases, in which the existence of a common-
law tort of any kind is usually dubious. Therefore, Bivens has been ef-
fectively incorporated into the Ex parte Young doctrine.
m See discussion infra Part II1A.3.
28° 403 U.S. at 388.
wo This practice is describe in Hill, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 65, at 1122-31.
282 Id.
283 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390; id, at 398 (Harlan, J., concurring).
284 Id. at 396-97.
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4. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.: A Preview
In Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Carp., 285 the Court
modified the Ex parte Young doctrine by rejecting tort and substituting
unauthorized conduct as the basis of the officer's liability. Although
this looks like a revolutionary modification of the doctrine, it is sub-
mitted that Larson has worked no substantial change. Larson is best
understood after detailed analysis of a number of the cases decided
under Ex parte Young.286
B. Breach of Duty
In the case of a statute not under attack for invalidity, courts rou-
tinely hold officers to performance of ministerial duties by manda-
mus,287 mandatory injunction, 288 or negative injunction,289 as circum-
stances warrant. Such cases are legion. Sovereign immunity is not a
bar to such relief because the suit is not deemed to be one against the
government. 29° As the Court said in a suit of this kind involving a fed-
eral statute, "[t]he suit rests upon the charge of abuse of power, and
its merits must be determined accordingly; it is not a suit against the
285 337 U.S. 682 (1949)
286 See infra notes 406-436 and accompanying text (discussing Larson in more detail).
287 E.g., Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 473 (1920).
288 E.g., Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 96-97 (1934); Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442, 469
(1934). In the latter case the Court said: "Mlle mandatory injunction here prayed for is in
effect equivalent to a writ of mandamus, and governed by like considerations." Miguel, 291.
U.S. at 452.
289 E.g., Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnntilty, 187 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1902).
290 The suit against the officer can plausibly be seen as one against the government if
the officer's duty under a valid statute is discretionary. Professor Woolhandler, in a vain-
able study, remarked on the similarity in some cases of discretionary immunity and sover-
eign immunity. Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 396, 424-25 n.148 (1987). The Taney Court took a particularly broad view of
discretionary duties—indeed so broad that the Court refused to hear claims of abuse of
what today would be deemed clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 422-30. This may help to
explain the paucity of Supreme Court decisions on sovereign immunity during the Taney
period. In any event, it is unthinkable that the defense of discretionary duty should prevail
against a claim that the governing statute is unconstitutional. The unthinkable neverthe-
less happened in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866) (rejecting an attack on
a Reconstruction statute; the result was perhaps explainable in part by the fact that the
defendant was the President). Immediately thereafter the Court invoked the political ac-
tion doctrine to justify its refusal to entertain such an attack. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 50 (1867).
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United States."291 The officers being sued in such cases are named in
their official capacities.292
Does this mean that in such a case on the federal level the Court
will (1) order payment from the public treasury, or (2) order convey-
ance of title to government land, or (3) hold the government to per-
formance of its contracts? The answer to the first two questions is
clearly yes. Regarding the third question there is considerable confu-
' sion.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly sustained mandamus to re-
quire payment of funds from the public treasury, 293 sometimes declar-
ing that a suit to require an officer to perform a ministerial duty is not
one against the governnlent. 294 When the pertinent statute imposes
the duty of making the payment sought, the mandamus can fairly be
regarded as in aid of the government rather than against it. 295 The
outcome is the same as if the officer had executed the duty in the first
place. 296
291 Phila. Co. v. Stinson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912). To like effect, see, for example,
Payne v. Central Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 228, 238 (1921). Cf. Rolston v. Crittenden, 120 U.S. 390,
411 (1887) ("There the effort was to compel a state officer to do what a statute prohibited
him from doing. Here the suit is to get a state officer to do what a statute requires of him.
The litigation is with the officer, not the state.").
292 In In re Ayers, the Court distinguished between: (1) "suits against individual defen-
dants, who, under color of the authority of unconstitutional legislation by the state are guilty
of personal trespasses and wrongs;" and (2) "suits against officers in their official capacity either
to arrest or direct their official action by injunction or mandamus where such suits are
authorized by law ...." 123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887) (emphasis supplied).
293 E.g., Orates, 252 U.S, at 473; United States ex red. Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U.S. 124,
138 (1909); Roberts v. United States ex ret Valentine, 176 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1900). This has
also been done by mandatory injunction. See Miguel, 291 U.S. at 452, 456.
294 Onnes, 252 U.S. at 472-74; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 386 (1902).
293 The discussion in the text is not pertinent to all cases of mandamus. Thus, if a stat-
ute is held to be unconstitutional and a writ of mandamus is issued for corrective action on
the theory that only a ministerial act is involved, sovereign immunity should not be over-
ridden. It is the existence of a duty created by a valid statute that makes an enforcement
action one in aid of the enacting jurisdiction rather than one against it.
296 In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, the claimants had a contractual claim against
the United States Post Office, which had been disallowed in part; the claim was based on
contracts made between the claimants and the postmaster general of the United States. 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 608 (1838). An act of Congress was then adopted, which provided that
the controversy over the claim should be determined by the solicitor of the treasury, and
that the amount determined by that officer to be due should be entered in the books of
the Post Office department as a credit in the claimant's account. Id. at 608-09. The solici-
tor made the requisite determination, but the postmaster general refused to credit the
complainant with the amount found. Id. at 609. The Supreme Court sustained issuance of
mandamus ordering entry of the credit. Id. at 618, 626. The claim in question, said the
Court, was "of course, upon the United States, through the postmaster general," Id. at 611.
As such, it could not be "enforced against the United States, without their consent ob-
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This explains why the Court has sustained the use of mandamus,
not only to require payment of money from the treasury, but also to
require transfer of title to government lands. 297 Professor (as he then
was) Scalia, in a study of litigation involving public lands, concluded
that the cases constituted a special category, without an articulated
general principle, in which the Court routinely addressed on the mer-
its claims to public lands—except in a number of cases, that he
thought aberrational, in which the Court sustained a plea of sovereign
iminunity. 298
 It is submitted that there is a unifying. principle underly-
ing the cases, namely, the principle that the judiciary holds officers to
performance of their statutory duties. Few of Scalia's sovereign im-
munity cases contravene this principle. Where, in result, some do, this
stems from a summary declaration that overlooks the principle. 299
tattled through an act of congress." Kendall, 37 U.S. at 611. But Congress had "consented"
that the solicitor should determine the amount due. Id. The Court added that no money
could be drawn from the treasury without an appropriation by Congress, but Left no doubt
that refusal to make such payment after au appropriation could also have been countered
by mandamus. Id. at 614-15.
A somewhat comparable view is apparent in In re Ayers. In this case, a state statute
authorizing the issuance of bonds had been followed by another statute substantially im-
pairing the value of those bonds. 123 U.S. at 446-47. The Court said: "Although the state
may, at the inception of the contract, have consented as one of its conditions to subject
itself to suit, it may subsequently withdraw that consent, and resume its original immunity,
without any violation of the obligation of its contract in the constitutional sense." Id. at
505. It is submitted that mandamus cases generally lend themselves to the same rationali-
zation. See David P. Currie, Sovereign hnmunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984
SUP. CT. REV. 149, 159 n.58.
297 Work v. United States ex reL McAlester-Edwards Coal Co., 262 U.S. 200, 208-09
(1923); Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174, 182 (1917); Ballinger v. United States ex reL Frost,
216 U.S. 240, 250-51 (1910); United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 405 (1880).
298 Antonin Scalia, Sovereign hnmunity and Nonstalutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 907-09 (1970).
He mentioned seven such cases. Id. at 894-907, 910 & n.209. They are discussed infra note
299.
299 In Naganab u Hitchcock, the statute that was the source of the asserted duty had
been superseded in pertinent part by a later statute. 202 U.S. 473, 474 (1906). In the cir-
cumstances, the suit was held to be one against the United States. Id. at 476. The situation
was similar in Morrison a Work, as to the first of two sets of claims there involved. 266 U.S.
481, 485-86 (1925). The second set was dismissed because, according to the Court, the
lack of a focus on the asserted entitlement made the claimed right comparable to "the
general right of every citizen to have the Government administered according to law . ..."
Id. at 488. In Oregon u Hitchcock, the Court observed that official action by the Land De-
partment regarding the land in issue was incomplete and "in process of administration."
202 U.S. 60, 70 (1906). The implication was that a suit would lie when the official action
regarding the land was complete. See id. in Kansas u United States, the suit was against the
United States itself, which had not consented to be sued. 204 U.S. 331, 341 (1907). The
opinion noted that "others" had also been named as defendants. Id. at 337. These "others"
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Some precedent exists for holding officers to their statutory du-
ties even though the effect is to compel the government to perform
its obligation under a contract." ) In a later case there was a dictum to
the effect that such relief would' be denied if the contract was execu-
tory.") In this dictum, the Cotirt did not account for earlier cases
where the contracts were in factexecutory, and the officers were sub-
jected to liability for violating their statutory duties in respect to the
contracts."2 It is not immediately apparent why mandamus should be
were not identified; and whether, if officers, the suit might have proceeded against them,
was not considered.
In Louisiana v. Garfield, the Court rejected the state's claim of entitlement to certain
federal lands, except for an unresolved question on whether the state might still prevail on
the basis of a statute of limitations that operated against the United States. 211 U.S. 70,77
(1908). The applicability of this statute turned on certain questions of law and fact, as to
which the United States was said to be a "necessary party," which left the Court with "no
jurisdiction of this suit." Id. at 78. This holding was unexplained, but it is arguable that the
appliCability of the statute of limitations was unrelated to or remote from the question of
the statutory duties of the defendant Garfield in regard to the land. The case of New Mexico
v. Lane, rested on a misunderstanding of' Gaifield, and is in other respects an egregiously
wrong decision. 243 U.S. 52 (1917). Here too the state's claim to public lands raised ques-
tions of law and fact and the Court read Garfield as requiring the presence of the United
States. Lane, 243 U.S. at 58. But in Garfield these questions arose on a collateral issue. The
Court there decided the principal issue on the merits with no mention of sovereign im-
munity. Disputed questions of law or fact,'or both, are almost invariably present in suits to
hold officers to performance of their statutory duties—it is only because of disagreement
with the officers on such points that suits are typically brought.
The case of Hawaii v. Gordon was also an egregiously wrong decision. 373 U.S. 57
(1963). A statute provided that the President should transfer to Hawaii certain federal
lands in that state determined by him to be no longer needed by the United States, Id. at
57-58. The President delegated this function to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
The latter construed the statute as not embracing certain lands and Hawaii stied him for
relief based on its contention that the statute did embrace these lands. Id. at 58. In a per
curium decision, the suit was held to be one against the United States, for the following
reasons: (1) "[R]elief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if
the decree would operate against the latter." Id. at 58. (2) "[T]he order requested would
require the Director's official affirmative . action." id (3) The order would "affect public
administration of government agencies ...." Gordon, 373 U.S. at 58, (4) The order would
"cause as well the disposition of property admittedly belonging to the United States." Id.
The first and third points would virtually abolish the Ex parte Young doctrine. Besides that
doctrine was not pertinent. Hawaii was seeking to hold a federal officer to the duties set
forth in a statute not attacked as invalid. The second and fourth points overlook earlier
decisions in which the Court ordered transfer of title to government lands in such cases.
See supra note 297.
5" See Santa Fe Pm. R.R. v. Payne, 259 U.S. 197,199 (1922) (restraining the Secretary
of the Interior from interfering with claimant's acquisition of federal lands under a con-
tract with the United States); Rolston, 120 U.S. at 411 (granting relief similar to that in
Santa Fe to restrain state officers from violating a state contract).
501 Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82,95-97 (1934).
"2 See Santa Fe, 259 U.S. at 198-99; Rolston, 120 U.S. at 402-03.
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unavailable in such cases. Yet in Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court, in dic-
tum, denounced employment of "the writ of mandamus as a ruse to
avoid the Eleventh Amendment's bar against exercising federal juris-
diction over the State."30 For this proposition, the Court cited Louisi-
ana v. Jume4304 but in fact Jume/ sanctioned use of mandamus (though
not in the circumstances before it). 306 The subject is mired in confu-
sion."6
Of course, far more common than the statutory contracts hereto-
fore discussed are contracts whose terms are set by officers having
general statutory authority to do so. A statute creating this general
authority is not likely to yield a construction that such contracts, made
"3 495 U.S. 33, 56 n.20 (1990).
304 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
1°5 See infra note 306.
306
 Before considering the pertinent cases, it should be remarked that when a statute,
whether or not it imposes a duty:upon an officer, is superseded by a later statute, the ques-
tion arises whether invalidation of the later statute leaves the earlier one in force. This
should depend on the law of the enacting jurisdiction. Unfortunately, this question was
not considered in the cases now to be discussed. In Board of Liquidation u McComb, the
Court invalidated a statute impairing a statutory obligation and enforced the obligation.
The state's officers were said to be under a "plain official duty" and subject to mandamus
to compel discharge of the duty, or injunction to prevent conduct incompatible with the
duty; in this instance an injunction was granted. Id. at 541. Board of Liquidation was dis-
cussed approvingly in Jumel, where the state had impaired its contract with respect to a
bond issue by lowering the interest rate and modifying an accompanying obligation to levy
certain taxes to service the bonds. futnel, 107 U.S. at 725-26. Mandamus was denied for an
insufficient showing of a ministerial act that would benefit the claimant. 107 U.S. at 727.
The remedy sought, declared the opinion, "would require the Court to ... supervise the
conduct of all persons charged with any official duty in respect to the levy, collection, and
disbursement of the tax in question until the bonds, principal and interest, were paid in
full." Id. In In re Ayers, the Court approved the mandamus remedy generally, endorsing
what was said on that subject in Board of Liquidation, but denying relief on the ground that
the plaintiffs were seeking specific performance of a contract. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 504,
506. In both fume! and In re Ayers, the Court assumed sub silentio that duties created by the
first statute were revived when the second statute was invalidated.
Board of Liquidation has not borne fruit in later years, and fume! and In re Ayers have
been misunderstood. Thus, irr Belknap v. Schild, the Court declared that an injunction will •
not be issued "to compel the state to perform its obligations," citing, inter alia, jumel and
In re Ayers. Belknap, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896). As mentioned in the text, Jenkins cited fume! to •
the same effect. Neither Belknap nor Jenkins involved a government contract. In some cases
where the Court sustained mandamus to enforce a statutory obligation after invalidating a
statute abrogating the obligation, the governmental debtors were not states but political
subdivisions, which do not enjoy sovereign immunity under federal law. See discussion su-
pra Part I.I. Among these cases are Wolff n New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880); Hoffman v.
Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (1866).
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by the officer on behalf of the government, are judicially enforceable.
In any event, relief is invariably denied in such cases. 307
If the foregoing analysis is correct, sonic earlier decisions bear
reconsideration. Thus, the denial of relief in Pennhunt State School and
Hospital v. Halderman,308 with pernicious consequences for the admini-
stration of justice," rested on the Court's assumption that a suit to
compel state officers to comply with a concededly valid statute of their
state was a suit against the state. 310 Another such case is Hawaii v.
Gordon.' 11
C. The Government as the Real Party in Interest
I. In General
If the object of the suit is injunctive relief, the officer typically has
no personal interest in the outcome and the government, though not
named, is the only real party in interest. 312 Even when the relief sought
against the officer. is a judgment in damages, frequently the only issue
is the constitutionality. of the statute under which the officer acted.
Further, the officer is often indemnified by the government. 313 In-
deed, a decree that requires the officer to pay large amounts of
money may be essentially pro forma in its application to the officer,
the expectation of the court being that the money will be paid by the
government. A conspicuous example is Milliken v. Bradiey, 314 where
state officers 316 were ordered to end unconstitutional school segrega-
tion and to pay $5,800,000316 "to wipe out continuing conditions of
inequality produced by the inherently unequal dual school system
307
	 Larson, 337 U.S. at 685-86; United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S.
218, 221 (1913). These cases are discussed infra Part N.B.
366
	
U.S. 89 (1984).
309 See discussion infra Part VI.B.
315 See discussion infra Part N.E.
311 For a discussion of Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963), see supra note 299.
312 Even when a court holds an officer to the performance of a duty under a valid stat-
ute, the state may be the real party in interest, as where the case turns on construction of
the statute.
" 3 John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 Va. L.
REV. 47, 49-50 (1998).
M4 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
315 While the Court spoke of its ruling as directed against the state, in au earlier phase
of the same proceeding the Court said that "references to the State must be read as refer-
ences to the public officials ... through whom the State is alleged to have acted." Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 722 (1974).
316 433 U.S. at 293 (Powell, j., concurring).
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long maintained by Detroit." 17 Indeed, the Court said in Milliken that
"state officials [may be ordered] to conform their conduct to re-
quirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial
impact on the state treasury."318
Such impact is not diminished by calling it, as the Court some-
times does, "ancillary."30 Particularly striking are the numerous cases
where, on the basis of an assertion of personal liability on the part of
the officer, the claimant recovers property in which ownership is as-
serted by the government. 32° Indeed, in suits against state officers the
Court has sometimes given a remedy tantamount to specific enforce-
ment of a contract. 321 How then is it to be determined whether the
suit against the officer is or is not barred by sovereign immunity? The
Court's several attempts to answer this question have been notoriously
unhelpful.
2. The Effect-on-the-Government Test
The first test traditionally employed to determine whether an Ex
parte Young suit was against the sovereign focused on the effect a
judgment would have on governmental operations. A typical formula-
tion of this test was as follows:
[A] suit is against the sovereign if the judgment sought
would ... interfere with the public administration ... or if
the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the govern-
ment from acting, or to compel it to act. 322
Under this formulation, virtually every Ex park Young suit would be
one against the government, including, conspicuously, Young itself. 323
317 Id. at 290.
318 Id. at 289.
319 E.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 89 (1989); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
s" See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (involving situation where the prop-
erty was in use as a military cemetery and fort); see also infra notes 380-387 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Lee).
541 See infra notes 359-379 and accompanying text.
322 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted). For a similar statement, see Larson, 337 U.S. at 688. See also Gordon, 373 U.S. at 58
("the order requested would ... affect the public administration of government agen-
cies").
"3 The suit in Ex parte Young would be one against the government because the effect
of the injunction was to restrain a state official and therefore the state from enforcing a
state regulatory statute. Concerning the facts in Ex parte Young, see supra Part M.A.
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3. The Prospective-Retrospective Test
In recent years another test has emerged—the prospective-
retrospective test. It is now invoked whenever the question arises
whether the suit against the officer should be deemed one against the
state. 324 This test originated in Edelman v. fordan. 325 In that case Illinois
officers administering a joint federal-state welfare program had fol-
lowed state regulations that were incompatible with the correspond-
ing federal regulations, with resulting underpayment to the
beneficiaries.326 Invoking Ex parte Young, the claimants sued the
officers to compel future compliance with the federal requirements,
and to recover past benefits wrongfully withheld. 327 Both demands
were granted by the lower courts. Review was sought in the Supreme
Court only with respect to the decree ordering payment of the ar-
rears. In this regard, the decree, though directed only against the
officers, was held to operate essentially against the state. 328 Thus, the
Court said:
[T] he relief awarded in Ex parte Young was prospective only;
the Attorney General of Minnesota was enjoined to conform
his future conduct of that office to the requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment .... The funds to satisfy the award
in this case must inevitably come from the general revenues
of the State of Illinois, and thus the award resembles far
more closely [a] monetary award against the State itself .
than it does the prospective injunctive relief awarded in Ex
parte Young. . . . [This award] is in practical effect indistin-
guishable in many aspects from an award of damages against
the State. 329
The Court recognized that compliance by the officers with the "pro-
spective" features of the decree would also take state money, but said
324 E.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 267, 279 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 68 (1985).
525 415  U.S. 651 (1974).
3211 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 653-55.
327 Id. at 655-56.
55 Id. at 665.
329 Id. at 664, 665, 668. The government cannot be sued directly for damages, and, in
the absence of statute, this is what has prevented recourse against the government for the
torts of its officers. In this and like situations the immunity cannot be avoided by some
stratagem that involves suit against the officer but compels access to the general treasury.
Thus, mandamus to this end is unavailable unless the government in effect consents to be
sued. See supra 287-296.
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that "[Ouch an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible
and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in
Ex parte Young." 3" Apparently, the Court thought that the distin-
guishing feature of the arrears ordered to be paid was that they were
"compensatory."331 The result in Edelman was defensible.992
Furthermore, discussion of the issue as turning on the difference
between prospective and retrospective relief was understandable in
the circumstances of the case. But introduction of this mode of analy-
sis was unnecessary, and has proved troublesome. This problem is il-
lustrated by the several opinions in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe."' In
this case, the Tribe sued Idaho officers for interfering with their as-
serted rights in regard to certain submerged lands." Five of the Jus-
tices voted to deny relief, describing the requested remedy as "the
functional equivalent of a quiet title action."'" The Tribe apparently
conceded that this was a fair characterization of its claim. 536 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated as follows:
[-Me Tribe seeks to eliminate altogether the State's regula-
tory power over the submerged lands at issue—to establish
not only that the State has no right to possess the property,
but also that the property is not within Idaho's sovereign ju-
risdiction at all. 337
In effect, Idaho was asserting its sovereign immunity to bar inquiry
into whether the property it claimed to own was not state property at
all, but rather, federally-owned property in which the state had no
regulatory competence. There was no need to discuss the retroactive-
prospective distinction, yet it was discussed in the three opinions. Yet,
relief was denied even though it was to operate prospectively. None of
350
 Edelman, 915 U.S. at 668 (emphasis supplied).
3" Id. at 666 11.11. Cf. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (denial of remedies
serving only "compensatory and deterrence interests"). It is not clear that the reference to
"deterrence interests" adds anything to the analysis.
332 Again, the constitutional principle that the state may not be sued without its con-
sent would be rendered meaningless if the courts could award remedies against the officer
without regard for this basic principle. This is because of the likelihood that the state
would provide funds to relieve the officer of liability in cases where the officer is essentially
a pawn who stands in for the state.
"3 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
354 Id. at 264.
355 Id. at 281 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("func-
tional equivalent of an action to quiet its title").
336
 Concerning property claims against an officer, see infra Part I.V.B.
339 Idaho, 521 U.S. at 289.
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the majority Justices contended otherwise. hi short, the case was one
in which the retroactive-prospective distinction was ignored, pre-
sumably because it would have produced the wrong answer.
After Edelman, the Court declared that the essence of prospective
relief is that it is addressed to a "continuing violation." 3" Consider in
this connection the decision in Milliken v. Bradley."9 That case in-
volved the Detroit school system, which had long been segregated de
jure as a result of state and local action. This was no longer the situa-
tion, and the issue in the Supreme Court concerned only that aspect
of the district court's decree that ordered institution of remedial pro-
grams, these being thought necessary by reason of past practices. 340 As
the Supreme Court said, the conditions to be remedied resulted from
the "unequal dual school systeni"341 formerly maintained by Detroit.
However, the Court stated that the decree was "wholly prospective"342
because the decree was designed to eliminate "vestiges of state-
imposed segregation" and thus "to wipe out continuing conditions of
inequality. "343
Milliken should not and indeed cannot be confined to desegrega-
tion cases. Relief should be available generally not only for a continu-
ing violation, but also for continuing consequences of a past violation.
It would be an absurdity in contravention of settled law to refrain
from granting such relief. Thus, in Osborne v. Bank of the United States,
the Court held that the Bank of the United States was not barred
from recovering specie unlawfully seized in the past by the state of
Ohio.344 That has been the universal rule governing past seizures. 345
The Court has never deviated from the principle that the continuing
consequences of a past violation may be the subject of a recovery. 346
338 Green, 474 U.S. at 68.
33° 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
34° Id. at 279.
ml Id. at 290.
342 Id. at 290 n.22.
343 Id. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
344 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 870-71 (1824).
343 See discussion infra Part IV.A—B.
. 546 1n Papasan u Attain, which was an Ex parte Young suit, relief was denied. 478 U.S. 265
(1986). It was for past misconduct; and the Court stated at the outset that "Young has been
focused on cases in which a violation of federal law by a state official is ongoing as opposed
to cases in which federal law has been violated at one time or over a period of time in the
past." Id. at 277-78. But the denial of relief was on grounds unrelated to the past character
of the asserted misconduct (if we exclude one item that was essentially for arrears, which
were not recoverable under Edelman). In '1836, the federal government had ceded certain
lands to Mississippi for the use of schools within a designated area. Id. at 271-72. Subse-
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quently, the State sold the lands with the permission of Congress, and invested the pro-
ceeds in railroads. Id. at 272. The value of this investment was destroyed by the Civil War.
Id. The Papasan claimants contended that the lands had been conveyed to the state in
trust, and that the state, as trustee, had a continuing duty to execute the terms of the trust.
Id. at 274. They sought: (1) reconstitution of the corpus of the trust, either by a transfer of
land or its monetary equivalent; (2) the "award of past income not received," id. at 281
n.13; and (3) the award of future income. See id. at 274-81. The first two demands were
understandably rejected. But the third demand was one for prospective relief based on the
continuing effect of a past violation (assuming the validity of the claim). Id. at 279. In de-
nying the third demand, the Court relied entirely on its understanding of the =aim of
trust law. Id. at 279-81. The details do not warrant discussion in this space. (See the excel-
lent analysis in Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Un-
raveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1,
38-40 (1998)). It may be ventured, however, that the claimants might have fared better by
not introducing trust law but rather by simply alleging that the state had not used the
grant for its stated purpose, and that this was a continuing harm for which the claimants
were entitled to future payments.
The most recent Supreme Court decision on the subject is Breard v. Greene. 523 U.S.
371 (1998). A citizen of Paraguay was under sentence of death in Virginia for murder. In
violation of a multilateral treaty, the prisoner had not been advised of his right to consult a
consul of his country. Paraguay instituted a suit to set aside the death sentence, but relief
was denied on the ground that it would be "quintessentially retrospective." Paraguay v.
Allen, 134 F.3d 622,628 (4th Cir. 1998). The court observed that the treaty was not being
violated at the time the action was filed. Id. at 629.
On review, the Supreme Court considered not only Paraguay's claim, but also the
prisoner's petition (in reliance on the treaty violation) for an original writ of habeas cor-
pus and an application for a stay. In the Court's per cupiam opinion, handed down on the
afternoon of the day for which the execution was scheduled, the Court rejected the pris-
oner's demands: first, on the ground of procedural default, resulting from failure to make
timely assertion of his claim; and second, because, even if the claim had been timely
raised, no showing that the violation had affected the trial could "even arguably be made."
Breard, 523 U.S. at 377. In this connection, that the Court stated that the prisoner's attor-
neys were likely far better able to explain the United States legal system to hint than any
consular official would have been." Id. As to Paraguay, the Court said: "Though Paraguay
claims that its suit is [based upon] continuing consequences of past violations of federal
rights ... we do not agree. The failure to notify the Paraguay Consul occurred long ago
and has no continuing effect. The causal link present in Milliken is absent in this case." Id.
at 377-78. It has been argued that the above language, considered in light of the decision
below in the Fourth Circuit and a similar decision in the Ninth Circuit (United Mexican
States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997), casts a cloud on the traditional practice in
habeas corpus cases, and indeed on postconviction review generally. Vazquez, supra, at 51-
77. For in virtually all criminal cases, the asserted violations occurred at the trial or earlier.
To say that one under sentence of death is seeking a retroactive remedy when com-
plaining of past violations, and hence barred from relief, is, to put it mildly, disorienting.
But the Fourth and Ninth Circuits did not say that. To the contrary, they declared in effect
that the violation was an ongoing one as regards the prisoner, though not as regards the
foreign government. Thus, in the Fourth Circuit case, though the prisoner was not a party,
the state itself conceded that "the violation is 'ongoing' or 'continuing' in the sense that its
'consequences' persist in [the prisoner's] continuation in custody under death sentence."
Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 627. The violation was not deemed to be ongoing as to Paraguay
because the treaty was not being violated at the time the action was filed. Similarly, in the
Ninth Circuit case, it was only Mexico that was denied relief (again the prisoner was not a
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But it should be apparent that absent a continuing violation, or
the continuing consequences of a past violation, there is no entitle-
ment to relief of any kind. Thus the prospectivity fork of the test is no
more than the statement of a truism. As for the retrospectivity fork,
this loses much of its utility when it is considered that, as in Milliken,
recovery may be had for past misconduct. The question that remains
is when relief should be denied. What seems to emerge from the deci-
sions is that the forbidden remedy is one that is "compensatory:147
But this formulation is too loose. For one thing, it is broad enough to
encompass possessory relief against officers for unlawful seizures,
which is granted as a matter of course. 348 Further, bearing in mind
that the suit is not one against the government but against the officer,
there should be hesitation in abolishing outright the officer's historic
personal liability.349 If the foregoing analysis is valid, the prospective—
retrospective test is unhelpful, to say the least. It is noteworthy that all
the cases discussed in this subsection could have been decided as they
were without mention of the prospective-retrospective test, which, in-
deed, was deemed irrelevant by all the Justices in Coeur d'Alene Tithe."°
4. Offensive and Defensive Uses of Sovereign Immunity
It is submitted that the problem of a suitable test is solved if we
look, not to the rationalizations attempted by the Court, but rather to
their actual holdings. Indeed, the Court's holdings in this area form a
pattern. In a suit against an officer, a plea of sovereign immunity is
party) on the basis of what the court characterized as past violations. In the case of prison-
ers, said the court, such violations are "examined post hoc in state postconviction proceed-
ings and federal habeas." United Mexican States, 126 F.3d at 1223.
As to the language quoted earlier from the Supreme Court's opinion, what the Court
said as to Paraguay is best understood in light of what the Court said as to the prisoner.
There was no mention of past violations in the rejection of the prisoner's claim. Instead,
the rejection was based on procedural default and lack of causality. hi regard to Paraguay,
the Court seemed to say that the past violation had no "continuing effect" because of lack
of the "causal link present in Milliken." Breard, 523 U.S. at 378. And the causal link in the
latter case was the continuing effect of past de jure segregation.
M7 See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
348 See infra notes 353, 380-387, 420 and accompanying text.
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to which one of the modern privileges does not attach is the type of con-
duct that, prima facie, should continue to be the basis for such liability. In cases subse-
quent to Edelman the Court has condemned "compensatory" decrees unqualifiedly. See
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993);
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278.
w This was largely true as well of Papasan. See supra note 346 (discussing Papasan). For
other views on the prospective-retrospective dichotomy, see Althouse, supra note 1, at
1140-52, and Vazquez, supra note 346, at 1.
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disallowed when the immunity would operate offensively, but not
when it would operate defensively. If the claimant is seeking only to
be left alone and charges that past or prospective conduct of govern-
ment officers is unlawfully intrusive, judicial inquiry into the validity
of such conduct would be precluded if a plea of sovereign immunity is
sustained. 351 This would constitute what is here called offensive use of
the immunity, and such use is disallowed. On the other hand, when
the claimant is seeking some affirmative advantage from the govern-
ment, like payment of outstanding indebtedness, a plea of sovereign
immunity is sustained, in what is here called defensive use of the MI-
munity.352
 The two lines of cases are not distinct if we look to the lan-
guage the Court uses, but they are distinct in the result, with relatively
few exceptions. We now turn to an analysis of the cases.
W. THE PATTERN IN THE DECISIONS
A. Government Contracts
Poindexter tt Green how involved an issue of state bonds backed by a
guarantee that the interest coupons would be accepted in payment of
taxes.353 This guarantee was repudiated by subsequent legislation. Ac-
cordingly, a tax officer had rejected a proffer of interest coupons, and
had seized a desk belonging to the claimant, for nonpayment of
taxes. 354 In an action in detinue against the officer, the Court sus-
tained recovery of the desk. The Court held that since repudiation of
the State's obligation violated the Constitution, the tax collector was a
wrongdoer who had been "stripped of his official character," and li-
3" The category is not stretched unduly if we place in it the desegregation cases. While
plaintiffs in such cases are not asking to be left alone, for our purposes they may be seen as
asking for a reasonably close equivalent—not to be singled out invidiously for denial of
rights enjoyed by others.
352 In Edelman a Jordan, it can plausibly be argued that, in resisting payment of arrears
unlawfully withheld, the state was acting defensively. Even assuming that the welfare
beneficiary had a vested interest in arrears, it should be considered that the owner of a
government bond also has a vested interest. It should be of no avail that the state through
its officers violated federal law; the owner of the bond fails to recover though the state
through its officers has violated the Contract Clause. In such cases the invocation of sover-
eign immunity is defensive. On the other hand, when a person receives something of value
from the government, even as bounty, an unlawful seizure of such property constitutes a
taking, and in a suit against the officer an invocation of sovereign i JJJJJ amity should be
rejected as offensive in effect.
3" 114 U.S. 270 (1885).
354 Id. at 273-74.	 •
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able as such for seizing the claimant's property.355 The obvious effect
was to hold the State to its contract; for if tax coupons were proffered
in payment of taxes, the taxes were not collectible by other means. It
was understandable, therefore, that four dissenters contended that
the suit was "virtually" one against the State for "specific perform-
ance."356 As a matter of fact, the Poindexter majority made it explicit
that it was the contract that was being enforced. Thus, one of the ar-
guments advanced by the State was that the case presented no more
than a question of remedy, since the State contended that under state
law a taxpayer claiming a tax to be invalid could pay under protest
and then sue to recover the amount paid. 357 The Supreme Court did
not challenge the reasonableness of such a remedy. 358 But, said the
Court, the State under its "contract" had "bound herself that it shall
be otherwise,"359 and the contractual obligation was enforced.
The Court also emphasized that the taxpayer, though nominally a
plaintiff, was essentially a "defendant, passively resting on his
rights,"36° and said in the same vein: "[The taxpayer's) object is merely
to resist an attempted wrong and to restore the status in quo as it was
when the right to be vindicated was invaded. In this respect, it is upon
the same footing with the preventive remedy of injunction in eq-
uity."361 This position was elaborated soon afterwards in McGahey v.
Virginia,362 where the Court declared that one tendering tax-
receivable coupons in the circumstances of Poindexter is:
entitled to be free from molestation in person or goods .. .
and may vindicate such right in all lawful modes of redress—
by suit to recover his property, by suit against the officer to
recover damages for taking it, by injunction to prevent such
taking ... or by a defense to a suit brought against him. 363
355 Id. at 288.
356 Id. at 330 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
357 Id. at 298-99.
" Such a remedy, if adequate, is to this day the only remedy a state need furnish when
taxes are under constitutional attack. See infra note 460 and accompanying text.
359 119 U.S. at 300.
340 Id. at 281.
361 Id. at 295.
362 135 U.S. 662 (1890).
363 Id. at 684.
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In McGahey, the Court sustained a defense under this principle. In
other cases, the Court • has approved injunctive relief against state
officers seeking to collect taxes in violation of the contract. 564
As the foregoing cases show, sovereign immunity, as such, does
not render contracts with the state unenforceable, and does not ex-
empt such contracts from the operation of the Contracts Clause; the
doctrine does no more than give the state an immunity from suit
without its consent.565
 The Court's use of the term "defensive" to de-
scribe the taxpayer's posture in Poindexter was another way of saying
that the redress sought was essentially to be left alone. 5  The holding
in Poindexter and like cases shows that sovereign immunity may not be
offensively interposed to defeat such redress.
There is another class of cases in which government contracts are
in effect enforced even in the absence of unconstitutional statutes. In
these cases, the claimant has a vested property interest, the property
having been obtained from the government or from a private source.
A government officer, having statutory authority, enters into a con-
tract relating to such property. Thereafter, the officer (or another
officer) seizes the property, or threatens to do so, contending that the
contract has been breached and that it provides for such seizure in
event of breach. When the claimant sues the officer for an injunction
against the seizure, or for return of the property if it has been taken,
the defense of sovereign immunity is denied. The court makes an in-
dependent determination whether there has been a breach or
whether the contract authorizes a seizure. In this general category, a
crucial issue is whether a seizure of property is lawful. 567
There are several contract cases where sovereign immunity has
been sustained. In Hagood v. Southern,368
 the State had repudiated a
statutory obligation to accept certain scrip in payment of taxes. The
364
 Ga. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Allen v. B. & 0. R.R., 114
U.S. 311 (1885); see also Davis V. Cray, 83 U.S. 203 (1872).
365 See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (sustaining a recovery).
North Carolina had defaulted on certain of its bonds, but South Dakota, which had be-
come the bona fide owner of some of these bonds, was entitled to a full recovery thereon
when it invoked the original jurisdiction in its suit against North Carolina. Sovereign im-
munity cannot be interposed in such a suit.
366
 The same point had been made by Henry Clay, arguing for the bank in Osborn a
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 799 (1824). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 119 for Chieffustice Marshall's pertinent remarks in Cohens v. Virginia.
367 See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States
Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922); see also discussion infra Part
1V.C.
366 117 U.S. 52 (1886).
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Court held that state officers could not he judicially compelled to re-
ceive the scrip, on the ground that this would be tantamount to co-
erced "performance of the alleged contract by the state." 369 But the
only damage claimed by the plaintiffs, most of whom had not prof-
fered the scrip in payment of taxes, was that their holdings of scrip
had been rendered worthless by the State's repudiation.
In In re Ayers, 37° there was a similar statutory obligation involving,
not use of scrip, but use of interest coupons attached to state bonds. A
subsequent statute had directed state officers to recover taxes from
persons who had used tax-receivable coupons in payment. 3" A suit to
enjoin the officers from enforcing this statute failed as essentially an
attempt "to compel the specific performance of the contract."372 Un-
der the Poindexter line of cases, persons who had actually paid their
taxes with the coupons would presumably have been entitled to in-
junctive relief. 373 But the claimants in In re Ayers were British owners of
coupons who had purchased them with a view to resale to Virginia
property owners; the claimants did not contend that they themselves
had paid taxes with such coupons. 374 Both in Hagood and In re Ayers,
the claimants were seeking only to protect their investments; their po-
sition was comparable to that of owners of state bonds suing for pay-
ment.
Wells v. Roper 375 was a case in which the plaintiff had a contract
with the Post Office to supply vehicles for use in the District of Co-
lumbia. The plaintiff asserted that, after adoption of a statute ena-
bling the Post Office to purchase its own vehicles, the Post Office had
repudiated the contract. The plaintiff sought an injunction against
certain named postal officers to restrain them front proceeding in
violation of the contract. The Court held that the injunction was
properly denied since its "effect ... would have been to oblige the
United States to accept continued performance of plaintiff's con-
tract."376 To be sure, the plaintiff had invested funds in reliance on the
565 Id. at 67.
370 123 U.S. at 443.
371 Id. at 493-94.
"2 Id. at 502.
373 The Court distinguished Poindexter and like cases as in effect involving seizures. Id.
at 500-01:
374 Id. at 492.
375 246 U.S. 335 (1918).
37° Id. at 337; cf. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945). In this
case the claimant, attacking as unconstitutional a federal statute requiring elimination of
excess profits on government war contracts, sought to restrain a federal officer from block-
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government's performance; but, again, the purchaser of a govern-
ment bond is in the same position.377
Thus, in the first group of cases the Court in effect enforced state
contracts, and in the second group the Court denied enforcement.
Critics have castigated the Court for such disparate treatment, for
which, they have said, there was no principled basis. 578 But what dis-
tinguishes the cases is that in the first group sovereign immunity, if
allowed, would have operated offensively, while in the second group
its operation was defensive only. In the first group claim was made of
seizures or threatened seizures, and sovereign immunity would have
barred judicial consideration of whether the officers had acted with
legal justification. In the second group the plea of sovereign immu-
nity spoiled an investment entered into voluntarily in anticipation of
the state's performance of its contracts. 379
B. Recovery of Property
A similar pattern is revealed in suits against officers for recovery
of property said by the officers to belong to the government. Thus, in
United States v. Lee, 380
 the Court upheld an ejectment judgment against
Army officers in charge of property that was used in part as a military
cemetery and in part as a fort. 381 The United States had purchased
the property at a tax sale that was defective by reason of the govern-
ment's own misconduct. 382 In the ejectment action, the government
ing payments to the claimant on other government contracts until it settled its dispute with
the government. The Court observed that the allegations "do not make out a threatened
trespass against any property in the possession of or belonging to the appellant," id. at 374,
and held that the suit was "an indirect effort to collect a debt allegedly owed by the gov-
e11111elit in a proceeding to which the government has not consented." Id. at 375.
377 With regard to attempted use of mandamus to compel performance of state con-
tracts, see supra notes 300-306 and accompanying text.
378 Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 1, at 1123 ("virtually impossible to ex-
plain"); Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1989-91 (same; also asserting that Court's fear of nonen-
forceability of judgments against states after the Civil War as a reason for such disparate
treatment); Orth, supra note 1, at 447-50 (asserting Court's fear of nonenforceability).
379
 It has been argued above that in some circumstances the contract might be en-
forceable. See supra note 364-366.
38° 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
381 Id. at 198, 223.
382 Id. at 200-04. The estate of General Robert E. Lee's wife in Arlington, Virginia, had
passed into the possession of the federal government after non-payment of a tax levied
during the Civil War. Under a governing regulation, the tax had to be paid by the owner in
person or a party in interest. The government refused a proffer of the payment on behalf
of the owner, and subsequently acquired the property at a tax sale. The Court held that the
United States did not acquire a valid title. Id.
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conceded that the plaintiff had legal title as heir of the original owner
but resisted the ejectment claim as an unconsented suit against the
United States. 383 Disallowing this defense, the Court declared in effect
that occupation of the land by the officers was tortious. 584 The Court
likened the case to one where "the citizen has been deprived of his
property by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the
government without lawful authority, without process of law, and
without compensation."385 The Court declared that the United States,
not being a party, was not bound by the judgment,386 and the claim-
ant's relief was possessory only. But it is unrealistic to infer from this
that the claimant was getting only half a loaf. In view of the uses to
which the land was being put, the government was subject to an over-
riding necessity of quickly purchasing the property or acquiring it by
condemnation. 387
In Davis v. Gray, the Court sustained a decree prohibiting the
Governor of Texas from alienating land to which the State had title. 588
The claim was founded upon a contract the State had made with a
railroad company whereby certain lands were to be transferred to the
company as it made progress with its construction program. The State
countered that the requirements of the contractual timetable had not
been met. But construction had been frustrated by the onset of the
Civil War and the Court held that the State itself had made perform-
ance within the time limits impossible. 589 In a later case, the Court
spoke of Davis as "rest[ing] on the same principle it would if patents
had been actually issued to the company, and the State, through its
officers, was attempting to place a cloud on the title by granting sub-
sequent patents to others."39° Davis also illustrates the point that a
court will enforce a contract against the state when necessary to afford
redress against trespassory conduct.
Similarly, in Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 391 the Court sustained an
injunction against state officers to restrain them fr.om selling lands in
which the claimant asserted ownership under a contract with the
383 Id. at 204.
384 Lee, 106 U.S. at 219-20.
388 Id. at 221.
388 Id. at 222.
387 I I 1 theory, the United States could hare tried to relitigate its title, but that course
probably would have been futile.
388 83 U.S. 203, 233 (1872).
389 Id. at 230.
399 Louisiana vjurnet, 107 U.S. 711, 725 (1882).
381 140 U.S. 1 (1891).
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State. A statute that in effect terminated the rights of the claimant to
the land was held to violate the Contracts Clause. 392 Cases other than
those previously mentioned in which the Court, rejecting pleas of sov-
ereign immunity, upheld recovery of specific property, have involved
not only land,393 but also stock certificates,394 barges,395 a shipyard,396
specie,327 and (as earlier seen) a desk. 398
On the other hand, an interesting and suggestive case where the
defensive use of sovereign immunity was upheld is Malone v. Bow-
doin.399
 In Malone, an ejectment action against a federal officer was
successfully resisted. The plaintiff asserted title to land under an 1857
will of the then-owner of the land. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed
that under the will a life estate in the land was left to one Martha A.
Sanders, with the remainder to her children, and that in 1873 she had
"devised" the land "in fee" to another."' The United States acquired
title in 1936. 401 The Court observed that there had been no allegation
that government officers had acted in violation of the Constitution or
of any federal statute." Relief was denied by reason of the absence of
any showing that the officers • had acted without authority." The
Court emphasized that there was no claim of a taking." The claimant
had been wronged, it seemed, not by the government, but by Mrs.
Sanders who, having only a life estate, had disposed of the land "in
fee" to strangers. To the claimant's assertion of superior title, the gov-
ernment invoked sovereign immunity defensively."
302 Id. at 25.
3" Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897).
394 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
3" Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926).
396 Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258
U.S. 549 (1922).
397 Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738.
398 Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 270; see also supra notes 353-366 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Poindexter).
399 369 U.S. 643 (1962). An earlier case comparable to Malone on its facts, but with a
different outcome, is Stanley v Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893), where the action was allowed
to proceed against government officers.
488
 Malone, 369 U.S. at 694 & 11.2.
401 Id.
402 Id. at 647-48.
493 Id. at 648. The Court was applying a formula announced in Larson, 337 U.S. at 682
(discussed infra Part PVC).
404 Malone, 369 U.S. at 698.
405 In light of a case decided one year after Malone, namely Armstrong a. United States,
369 U.S. 40 (1960), there is room for argument that the government too had "wronged"
the claimant. Armstrong held that when the United States acquires property subject to an
existing lien, the bare act of acquisition constitutes a taking of the lien. Since liens on gov-
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In sum, the property cases resemble the contract cases. Sovereign
immunity is allowed when employed defensively but not when em-
ployed offensively. To the extent that the dispute over property turns
on the contract from which the right derives, the law pertaining to
contracts is followed, and the contract is enforced when appropriate.
The courts will not award the claimant title, but will award possessory
or monetary relief against the officer if there has been a taking.
C. Larson: Old Wine in a New Bottle
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. is notable for advanc-
ing a new formulation of the law governing specific relief against gov-
ernment officers." The dissenters in the case decried this formula-
tion and viewed the result in the case as a regressive step, expanding
the scope of sovereign inamunity.407 Commentators have also taken
this view." It is submitted, however, that Larson has made no mean-
ingful change in the law.
The case involved a contract for the purchase of coal from the
War Assets Administration, a federal agency." The Administrator,
contending that the terms of the contract had not been fulfilled, was
arranging to sell the coal to others. 410 The buyer, on the other hand,
claimed title to the coal, and maintained that the Administrator's ac-
tion constituted a conversion. 411 The relief sought was an injunction
eminent property are unenforceable by reason of sovereign immunity, the Court declared
that, in acquiring title, "the Government for its own advantage destroyed the value of the
liens." Id. at 48. By the same token, it would seem that if the government, in its acquisition
of title to the property involved in Malone, was subject to notice of the adverse claim of
another, it effected a taking in destroying the value of the adverse claim. That does not
end the matter because, traditionally, there was no remedy against the government, even
for a taking, unless the government consented to be sued. See infra note 473 and accompa-
nying text. But the absence of such a remedy against the government left open a common
law possessory action against the officer in possession of the property, which was precisely
the situation in Lee. In addition, possessory relief was all that the plaintiff sought in Malone.
Today, consideration would also have to be given to the decision in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 {1987) (discussed infra Part
V.C). Further, under a statute now in effect the United States consents to be sued in such a
case. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 71, at 1036-37.
466 337 U.S. 682 (1949),
407 Id. at 705,723-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4" E.g., Roger C. Crandon, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need
for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68
Mot. L. REV. 387,409 {1970); Currie, supra note 296, at 156-59.
4" See Larson, 337 U.S. at 684.
la Id. at 685.
111 Id. at 692.
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restraining sale or delivery of the coal to other persons. 412
 The Ad-
ministration's defense of sovereign immunity was sustained. 415
The Court's new formulation of the law was this: When specific
relief is sought against government officers, the crucial issue is not
whether they acted tortiously but whether they acted in the exercise
of valid authority. When official action is validly authorized, such "ac-
tion is the sovereign's," and if a claimant's demand is that such ac-
tion "be prevented or compelled," then "the demand . . . must fail as a
demand against the sovereign."415 Officers, however, remain liable for
their torts whether the commission of these torts is authorized or
not:" The holding was that the Administrator's action fell within the
range of his authority and that the suit was therefore one against the
United States. 417
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter observed that in previous cases
upholding specific relief, the predicate for such relief was tortious
conduct on the part of the officers. He argued that the claimant, hav-
ing charged a conversion, should therefore not be barred by a plea of
sovereign immunity.418 The Court, however, declared in effect that
every previous case involving "specific relief" in connection with
property "held or injured" by governmental officers had involved a
"taking. "419 It seems to the writer that they did indeed involve takings,
consummated or threatened. 42° It is notable that Justice Frankfurter,
412 Id. at 684.
413 Id. at 703.
414 Larson, 337 U.S. at 693.
415 Id. at 693-94.
415 The Court rejected the argument that officers cannot be authorized to commit
torts. Id. at 694-95.
417 Id. at 703.
415. 1d. at 718.
410 Larson, 337 U.S. at 698. The Court said that, as distinct from "damages" "specific re-
lief" encompasses "the recovery of specific property or monies, ejectment from land, or
injunction either directing or restraining the defendant officer'S actions." Id. at 688.
42° The cases on which justice Frankfurter relied are set forth in two paragraphs of the
opinion. See id. at 732 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The second of these paragraphs listed
cases in which the opinions were said to have "made reference to a situation involving an
unconstitutional taking." Id. The question, therefore, is whether the six cases listed in the
first paragraph are precedents for liability without a taking. These cases follow: Land u
Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736 (1947) (describing plaintiffs claim as one "to recover possession
of specific property wrongfully withheld" and directing district court to proceed to a deci-
sion on the merits); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 96 (1937) (involving a suit "to enjoin [an
officer] from enforcing au order, the wrongful effect of which will be to deprive respon-
dents of vested property rights" and denying relief on the merits); Goltra u Weeks, 271 U.S.
536 (1926) (discussed infra notes 422-435 and accompanying text); Sloan Shipyards Corp. u
United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922) (in all material respects,
2001]	 Sovereign Immunity	 567
despite the seeming thoroughness of his dissenting opinion, made no
attempt to show otherwise.
The nature of the holding in Larson is illuminated if we consider
the Court's treatment of United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels,421 and
Goltra v. Weelts. 422 In Daniels, the plaintiff had contended that he had
submitted the highest bid for a surplus naval vessel; that ownership of
the vessel had vested in him when the bids were opened; and that the
'Secretary of the Navy had refused to deliver the vesse1. 423 The relief
sought was mandamus against the Secretary to compel deliver y.424
The Court held that such relief should be denied, on the ground that
even if title had passed and the Secretary was acting tortiously, the suit
was essentially against the United Stiates. 425 In this case, it should be
noted, the plaintiff was not asking to be left alone. The contract was
executory on the government's part, and what the plaintiff was de-
manding was specific performance. The government was using sover-
eign immunity as a shield. The Larson Court saw Daniels as on all fours
with the case before it.
But consider now a case in which the government sells and deliv-
ers a chattel, and government officers subsequently repossess it or
threaten to do so, claiming a right of repossession by the terms of the
contract. If the buyer resists or attempts to prevent repossession, the
buyer is acting defensively. The government may not justify its trespas-
sory conduct under the contract and at the same time interpose sov-
ereign immunity to bar judicial inquiry into the adequacy of the
justification. That would be attempted use of sovereign immunity not
as a shield but as a sword; and that, under the precedents, the gov-
ernment may not do.
The facts just posited correspond to those alleged in Goltra upon
which Justice Frankfurter relied in his dissent in Larson. The govern-
similar to Goltra); Scranton n Wieder, 179 U.S. 141,152-53,165 (1900) (declaring that the
suit against the officer would lie if there had been a taking and denying relief on the
ground that there had not been a taking); Stanley, 147 U.S. at 519-20 (rejecting plaintiff's
assertion of title; had the plaintiff prevailed on this•oint, the claim against the officers in
possession would have been essentially one for a taking, as in United States to Lee, 106 U.S.
196 (1882)). The fact that the Court did not use the word "taking" in these six cases is
immaterial. Any purposeful interference with a property right constitutes a taking. See infra
notes 482-483 and accompanying text.
421 231 U.S. 218 (1913).
422 271 U.S. 536 (1926).
423 Daniels, 231 U.S. at 221.
424 Id.
425 The plaintiff did not contend that the Administrator was under a statutory duty to
deliver the vessel. Id. at 221-22.
568	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:485
meta had delivered possession of a number of barges to the plaintiff,
under a lease whose validity was not in question.426 Thereafter, com-
plaining of non-compliance with the lease terms, government officers
had seized some of the barges and were threatening to seize others. 427
The plaintiff contended that there had been compliance and sought
return of the barges seized and an injunction against seizure of the
others. The Court held that, inasmuch as the officers were charged
with trespassory conduct, sovereign immunity was not a bar to the ac-
tion.428
Justice Frankfurter argued that Goltra was being overruled in Lar-
son.429 But there was no overruling. The Larson majority made clear
that its only quarrel was with "the theory of the Goltra opinion," 430 not
with the result in that case. The Court added:
Whether the actual decision in the Goltra Case, on the basis
of the facts there presented, was correct or not is not rele-
vant to the disposition of the present case, and we express no
opinion on that question. Goltra, unlike Goldberg, does not
present a parallel to the facts in the case at bar. The action
complained of there was a seizure with a strong hand which
was claimed to be unconstitutional, as an arbitrary taking of
property without due process of law. . . . There is no such claim
in the present case. 431
Thus, pace Justice Frankfurter, Larson did not repudiate Go/tra;432 nor
did it "overrule" United States v. Lee "and the cases which have applied
it."433 There is simply no basis for reading Larson as changing the law
in this regard.
On the other hand, the Court was unhelpful in stating that the
exclusive basis for specific relief against government officers is lack of
valid authority. In this regard, it is instructive to compare Larson with
425 Goltra, 271 U.S. at 539.
427 Id. at 541.
428 Id. at 544.
129 Larson, 337 U.S. at 720 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13° Id. at 701.
43l Id. at. 701 n.25 (emphasis added). Actually, the Larson Court misconceived the deci-
sion in Goltra. The opinion in that case characterized the seizure as tortious if not sup-
ported by the terms of the lease. The Court's conclusion was that the lease did justify the
seizure.
432 Id. at 726.
433 Id. at 724. United Slates v. Lee, 106 U.S. 106 (1882), is the ejectment case involving
what is now Arlington Cemetery. See supra notes 380-387 and accompanying text.
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Goltra. In Larson, there was no challenge to the constitutionality of the
statute under which the Administrator acted, and there was no chal-
lenge to his authority. As the Court observed, the Administrator had
power to make contracts, to determine whether their terms were met,
and to act accordingly. 434 But in these regards, the situation in Golira
was identical. There was no challenge to the underlying statute or to
the authority of the officers to lease the barges in question and pro-
tect the government's interest in accordance with the terms of the
lease. Absent a holding that the governing statute was unconstitu-
tional, the decision has turned on the interpretation of a contract or
statute without challenge to the authority of the officers to act as they
did if their interpretations were proper.455
The appeal of the rationalization founded on lack of valid
authority is that it bolsters the view that the suit is only against the
officer and not in any respect one against the government. Lack of
valid authority can plausibly be found when the officer acted under
an unconstitutional statute, or when the claim of authority under a
valid statute is based on what the court finds to be an unfounded
reading of that statute. But it cannot be said, without a good deal of
strain, that the officer's lack of authority stems from the unfounded
reading of a contract. 456 If the officer is subject to liability on that ac-
count, it is not for action without authority, but for action without le-
gal justification. The same rationalization—lack of legal justification—
could also be employed in all cases where the courts now talk of lack
of authority. But there is no need to employ a single rationalization in
the entire area.
D. Other Parts of the Pattern
As has been seen, in cases where officers are enjoined from un-
lawfully withholding statutory benefits from the intended
beneficiaries, their conduct is not trespassory in the common law
474
	 U.S. at 692.
4!5
	 e.g., Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 111 (1902). In
Sloan Shipyards Corp., it was not clear whether the authority allegedly misconstrued by the
federal agent derived from statute or contract; either way, official action not authorized is
"unlawful" and redress may be had against the agent. See 258 U.S. at 566-68.
456 The reference is to a contract made by an officer made under general statutory
authority, as distinct from a contract embodied in the terms of a statute. In the latter situa-
tion, it is arguable that the officer should be ordered to execute the duty laid out in the
statute, with consequent enforcement of the contract. See supra notes 300-306 and accom-
panyi ►g text.
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sense.437
 However, their conduct can be analogized to a taking insofar
as it prevents the benefits from reaching the intended beneficiaries.
Cases that do not lend themselves to rationalization along this line are
those in which the officers are ordered to desist from denying the
claimant the equal protection of the laws, as in the desegregation de-
cisions.438
 Here, the claimant is asking to be left alone in the sense of
not being singled out invidiously for denial of rights enjoyed by the
general public. In both classes of cases, recognition of a claim of sov-
ereign immunity would mean denial of opportunity to show the illegal
character of the official action. In short, it would constitute the use of
sovereign immunity offensively, and this is not permitted. 439
431 See discussion supra Part IIIA.2.
438
 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
439
 Some cases do not fit this pattern, but they are plainly outside the mainstream.
Thus, in Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896), suit had been brought against federal
officers in a federal district court, alleging infringement of a patent, and seeking damages,
and an injunction against further infringement. Upon a finding that the plaintiff's patent
had indeed been infringed, the Court sustained the award of damages against the officers,
but held that the injunction against them impinged upon the sovereign immunity of the
United States. On this point, the Court, relying on a single English case, held that where
the United States had "both the title and the possession of the property" the United States
was an indispensable party. Belknap, 161 U.S. at 25. An attempted interference with trans-
fer of possession was what was involved in the English case. Id. at 24. But, in light of the
Court's earlier holdings, it is difficult to see why sovereign immunity should have stood in
the way of a decree against the officer enjoining continued infringement and affecting
neither title nor possession.
In Hopkins tt Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), the college, which occu-
pied state-owned land bordering a river, had built a protective dike, with resulting flooding
to plaintiff's land on the other side. The college was held amenable to a decree for dam-
ages, but not to one requiring it to remove the dike. As to the latter point, the state was
held to be an indispensable party. Hopkins, 221 U.S. at 649. But it was not suggested that
the college, which had put up the dike for its own convenience, had been acting in that
regard as an instrumentality of the state. If the state was nevertheless an indispensable
party under the niceties of the law of property and jurisdiction, it is arguable that these
bodies of law, which deal with different universes of societal and legal concern, should not
be assumed to be incorporated wholesale into the law of sovereign him lllll ity.
In other cases the claimant might have succeeded had a different remedy been
sought. In Cunningham u Macon &" Brunswick RR., 109 U.S. 446 (1883), the state had held
a first mortgage on a railroad. The claimants were the owners of a second mortgage. Upon
default under the first mortgage, the governor conducted a sale, by the terms of which,
according to the claimants, they were effectively precluded from bidding. Thereupon the
claimants sued to set aside the sale and to foreclose on their own mortgage. The holding
was that the state, as title owner,' was an indispensable party; the claimants "would get no
title in the absence of the State." Id. at 457. But if the allegations were true, this was a case
of essentially confiscatory behavior by the state, acting through its governor. Since what
was in issue was not money in the state treasury but specific property, a possessory decree
running against the officers occupying the property should have been feasible. In Chandler
u Dix, 194 U.S. 590 (1904), the plaintiff failed to get relief from the consequences of a tax
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E. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman: A Nadir
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 44° the confusion
regarding the Ex parte Young doctrine reached a nadir. The Court ex-
pressed doubt as to whether the doctrine, in its most important appli-
cations, was compatible with the principle of sovereign immunity,
which it called a "constitutional limitation" on the authority of the
federal judiciary.441 The suit was instituted in a federal district court
against Pennhurst—a state institution for the mentally retarded—and
certain of its officers,442 based on allegations of mistreatment of the
patients. 443 While relief was sought on federal and state grounds, it
was granted in the lower courts solely on the state ground. 4+1 Revers-
ing, the Supreme Court declared that the "fiction" of Ex pane Young
"rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights." 445 It
follows, said the Court, that "Young ... Bs] inapplicable in a suit
against state officials on the basis of state law."` 46 This statement was
true, but the Court erred regarding its implications.
First, it may be noted that the Court doubted the validity of the
Ex parte Young doctrine even in its application to rights claimed under
federal law."' Calling the doctrine "a narrow and questionable excep-
tion" to sovereign immunity, 448 the Court had no trouble with it inso-
far as it was used to impose on the officer personal liability in dam-
ages. But the Court was apparently dubious about any relief against
the officer that as a practical matter placed a financial burden on the
sale. There was no assertion of irregulatory in the conduct of the sale itself. The claim,
rather, was that the statute that levied the tax was unconstitutional. More importantly, the
Court understood the plaintiff to be seeking "primal* ... to remove a cloud upon the
plaintiff's title." Id. at 590. The state was therefore deemed to be an indispensable party. Id.
at 591. Conceivably, a demand for possessory relief, not impugning the state's title, would
have fared better.
44° 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
441 Id. at 98.
40 Pennhurst itself was a state instrumentality, and some other state instrumentalities
were also named, but it is clear from the opinion that the result would have been the same
if only the officers had been named. See id. at 108 n.16
445
 Id. at 92.
444 Id. at 95-96.
445 Pennhurst, 965 U.S. at 105.
446 Id. at 106.
497 Id. at 112 11.25:
448 Id. at 116.
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government:149 Observing that injunctive relief against the officer
might impose such a burden,45° the Court said:
In this light, it may well be wondered what principled basis
there is to the [Young] doctrine as it was set forth in Lar-
son. . . . For present purposes, however, we do no more than
question the continued vitality of the . . . doctrine in the
Eleventh Amendment context. 451
The Court relied in part on the Larson decision, in the belief that
Larson represented an earlier restriction on the scope of the Ex parte
Young doctrine. Thus the Court said that the numerous cases involv-
ing takings, upon which Justice Frankfurter had relied in his dissent
in Larson, were now "moribund."452 As has been seen, however, the
Larson majority had disapproved of those cases only insofar as they
rested on a theory of tort.
As to where this leaves us, consideration must be given to some of
the Pennhurst Court's additional remarks. The Court said: "[A]n in-
junction based on federal law stands on very different footing, par-
ticularly in light of the Civil War Amendments. . . . [I]n such cases this
Court is vested with the constitutional duty to vindicate 'the supreme
authority of the United. States."453 Since the Court had earlier said
that a decree against a state officer was in effect one against the state
if it could not be satisfied without funding by the state, it may be that
the Court's conception of a proper injunction was one that cast no
financial burden on the government, as was seemingly the case in Ex
parte Young itself. But the Court also suggested that if, upon remand,
consideration was given to the Fourteenth Amendment claims of the
Pennhurst plaintiffs, account should be taken of the then recent deci-
sion in Youngberg u Romeo. 454 This was a case in which the Court de-
clared a state to be under a duty to meet certain standards in the insti-
tutional care of mentally retarded persons.455 But this is precisely the
kind of case in which additional state funding may be necessary.
449 &WAWA 465 U.S. at 114 n.25.
450
451 Id.
452 Id. at 115.
455 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 109 u.17. The quoted phrase is from Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
at 160. The Court was responding to an argument of the Pennhurst dissenters in favor of
federal injunctive relief for both federal and state claims.
454 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
455 Id. at 324. As it happened, the only relief sought in Youngberg by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court was a damage award against certain officers. See id. at 311. It is
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The most plausible view of Pennhurst is that the Court did not
contemplate an actual change in the law applicable to federal claims.
It opposed what it considered to be any extension of Ex park Young
and believed that federal enforcement of claims founded on state law
would be such an extension. Its views of Ex park Young, however, if
taken up by the Court, would severely limit the application of that
doctrine to claims founded on federal law. 456
V. GETTING MONEY FROM THE GOVERNMENT
A. Mandamus and Mandatory Injunction
This subject is discussed in the earlier section on breach of
du ty.457
B. Reich v. Collins: Suing the State in Tax Cases
Reich v. Collins is notable for a dictum to the effect that a state
may not interpose sovereign immunity to bar a suit in its courts for
recovery of illegally-exacted taxes. 458 Some preliminary comments
may help place Reich in perspective. When sovereign immunity is not
in issue, it is established doctrine that state courts, when called upon
to implement federal rights, must provide a remedy that is adequate
by federal standards.459 The typical case has involved state taxation.
When state taxes are attacked on federal grounds, the Supreme Court
has held that the states must provide either an adequate pre-
deprivation remedy or an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 46° The
states typically prefer the latter, which amounts to consent to suit.
difficult to believe, however, that the Court would have disapproved of injunctive relief to
require that the standards be met.
456 Pennhurst's treatment of pendant jurisdiction is discussed infra Part VI.B.
4" See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
456 513 U.S. 106,109-10 (1994).
459 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 71, at 850-53; Hill, Constitutional Remedies, supra note
65, at 1113-16.
460 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
Professors Fallon and Meltzer read McKesson and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), as constituting exceptions to the rule
that the states are not required to pay damages for unconstitutional takings. Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Ret ►oactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104
Mum L. REV. 1731, 1825-26 (1991); see also infra Part V.0 (discussing First English). The
cases they cite as exemplifying the general rule all involved unconsented suits. Id. at 1781
n.253, 1784-85 11.283. But in both McKesson and First English the states had consented to be
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In Reich, the state had provided a postdeprivation remedy in the
state courts for illegally-exacted taxes, and the Court concluded that
plaintiff's reliance on this remedy was justified. 461 However, relief had
been denied in the state courts on the ground that the plaintiff
should have resorted to a pre-deprivation remedy. The Supreme Court
held this to be error, because the plaintiff, under then state law, was
not on adequate notice that the pre-deprivatio ► remedy was the ex-
clusive one 462 That was all the Court needed to say.
But the Court remarked, summarily, that there was an obligation
to grant "recovery of taxes [illegally) exacted ... the sovereign im-
munity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstand-
ing."463
 The remark was doubly gratuitous, in that (I) the issue of sov-
ereign immunity had not been raised and (2) the state had waived its
immunity in allowing itself to be sued. The Supreme Court's only
holding was that a limitation on the remedy that prevented recovery
in the particular case was violative of due process; its requirement that
any remedies provided must be constitutionally adequate had of
course been amply set forth in earlier cases. 464 The Court cautioned
that a state waiver allowing suit in a state court could not be the basis
for overriding a defense of sovereign immunity in a federal district
court; this too accorded with settled doctrine. 4  But in Reich the
Court was reviewing the judgment of a state court, in a suit consented
to by the state. There was no need to discuss sovereign immunity at
all.
C. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles: Compensation for Takings
However, Reich's dictum regarding sovereign immunity may now
be controlling law by virtue of the decision now to be discussed. In
First English, the Court ruled in effect that the constitutional require-
ment of compensation for takings cannot be avoided by the defense
of sovereign immunity. 466 Of course, the immunity is not a problem in
formal condemnation proceedings, which are instituted by the gov-
sued. The issue of sovereign immunity is irrelevant to the question whether the Supreme
Court may consider the adequacy of the remedy in a consented suit.
451 See 513 U.S. at 111.
462 Id.
463 Id. at 109-10.
464 See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 489 and accompanying text.
466 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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eminent, not against it. First English is pertinent in cases of inverse
condemnation, where the owner of property, alleging intrusion
amounting to a taking, sues the government for compensation, typi-
cally under a consent-to-suit statute. 467 But the decision has broader
ramifications as well.
First English arose as an inverse condemnation proceeding in a
California state court, as permitted by statute.468 The Supreme Court
understood California law to deny compensation for temporary tak-
ings in a particular class of such cases:169 That, apparently, was the ba-
sis for denial of redress below. The validity of such denial was the only
issue on review.
Sovereign immunity was injected into the case by the United
States, which in an amicus brief took the position that the Takings
Clause, standing alone, was no ground for invalidating the California
law.47° The argument was that the Clause operates only as a limitation
on government power: a taking without compensation could be pre-
vented, or, if consummated, could be invalidated, but the compensa-
tion feature of the Clause did not operate of its own force. 471 The ar-
gument was based in part on the language of the Clause. But it was
also based in part on the contention that, as a practical matter, the
Clause could have no other meaning, inasmuch as sovereign immu-
nity barred an unconsented suit for conipensation. 472 A number of
decisions were cited that supported this contention.473
This view of the Takings Clause was rejected in First English. The
Court did not challenge the cases cited in the amicus brief. Instead, it
relied on cases that contained language indicating that the compensa-
tion requirement was an integral aspect of the Takings Clause. 474 Sov-
ereign immunity, however, was not mentioned, and was not remotely
in issue, in any of those cases. Most of them involved suits against the
467 Prior to the advent of such statutes, the claimant's only recourse was to pursue a
common-law remedy against the officer.
41111 Id. at 308.
909 Id.
47° Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, First English, 482
U.S. 304 (1987) (No. 85-1199).
471 See id.; First English, 482 U.S. at 316 n.9.
472 See Brief for the United States, First English (No. 85-1199).
473 See id.; United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 809-10, 814 (1984); United
States v. Lynch, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934); Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168
(1894); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883).
474 First English, 482 U.S. at 314-15.
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United States under statutes consenting to suit:176 Others involved
formal condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States:476
Another involved construction of a federal statute. 477 The cases relied
on by the Court were simply unresponsive to the argument made in
the amicus brief. But the Court insisted that these cases "refute the
argument of the United States that 'the Constitution does not, of its
own force, furnish a basis for a court to award money damages against
the government.'"478
The approach that the Court took to sovereign immunity was an
oblique one. To repeat,. the immunity was not directly in issue because
the suit was consented to and because the suit was against local subdi-
visions not enjoying the immunity in any event. The United States in-
terjected the immunity issue into the case in support of its argument
that the Takings Clause was not self-executing. The Court's response
was that the Clause itself is a command for compensation. But that
should not have been deemed conclusive. After all, the Court has re-
peatedly held that the assertion of a constitutional right is not itself
sufficient basis for overriding sovereign immunity. 479 Still, it should
always be appropriate to inquire whether the Constitution itself, in
one of its particulars, requires that the federal and state governments
be amenable to suit whether they consent or not. The analysis in Prin-
cipality of Monaco v. Mississippi4'30 is illustrative. There the Court said
that the question should be considered in light of "the plan of the
Convention"; and observed that, under the "plan," a state may be
sued without its consent when another state or the United States
makes a claim against it under the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion, and also when sued by the United States. 481 The tenor of the
opinion in First English suggests that the Court, faced with the precise
475
 United States v. Dickerson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (Tucker Act); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (Tucker Act); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933)
(Tucker Act); Seabord Air Line R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (Lever Act). The Court
also cited San Diego Gas & Electric Co. u San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), an inverse con-
demnation proceeding that was consented to, presumably under the same California stat-
ute that was involved in First English.
476 Kirby Forest Industs., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984). Monongahela Naviga-
tion Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
477
 United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980).
47B 482 U.S. at 316 n.9.
479 An illustration would be state breaches of the Contract Clause. See supra text ac-
companying notes 365-366.
480 292 U.S. 313 (1934); see also supra notes 167-174 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Principality of Monaco).
481
 Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 327-29.
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question, might well have deemed the Takings Clause to be a provi-
sion contemplating suit irrespective of state consent. Again, however,
the case was one in which the state had in fact consented.
First English is of particular interest for what it may portend. As
the Court said in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., a leading case under
the Takings Clause, "Nile hallmark of property is an individual enti-
tlement grounded in ... law, which cannot be removed except 'for
cause."482 Seemingly, any purposeful impairment of the value of
property can amount to a taking; the property interest need not be
one in land. 483
With the immunity of the government to unconsented suit hith-
erto taken as axiomatic, the only remedy available has been the Ex
parte Youngsuit against the officer. For a variety of reasons that remedy
may be inadequate. Property repossessed may have been damaged, or
there may have been substantial pecuniary harm from deprivation of
its use. In theory, the officer remains liable for such losses, especially
for conduct that can be classified as tortious; but the officer may be
protected by a privilege, or may lack sufficient resources to satisfy a
judgment. The implication of First English is that the government itself
must make good such losses, and indeed that it may be sued in the
first instance.
It is of course doubtful that the Court had in mind these
ramifications of its position in First English. Against such a sweeping
change in the law, it can be argued that First English, like Reich before
it, involved suits against consenting states, and that these two, cases
should be taken as controlling only in that context. But, having said
time and again, in regard to challenged taxes, that the state must af-
ford an adequate pre-deprivation remedy or an adequate post-
deprivation remedy, is the Court likely to say that this obligation ap-
plies only if the state consents to be sued? And having held in First
English that the Constitution requires compensation to be made for a
taking, is the Court likely to say that compensation can be avoided by
a plea of sovereign immunity?
182 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).
433 E.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) CU] ontract
rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that
just compensation is paid"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension of public
school student without opportunity to be heard is deprivation of property interest in edu-
cation); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (repeated low flights by military
planes with disruptive effects on operation of chicken farm constituted a taking of
beneficial use of the property); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
312 (1950) (chose in action).
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An affirmative answer to both questions is possible. The constitu-
tional basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been sustained
for two centuries. The anomalies that would be presented by
confining First English and Reich to their own facts would be more
theoretical than real. After all, consent-to-suit statutes are now rela-
tively universal. Thus, so far as the writer is aware, no state shuts the
doors of its courts to a suit for inverse condemnation. The Court
could take the position that Congress and the state legislatures, in the
exercise of their exclusive constitutional roles in regard to waivers of
sovereign immunity, have reflected popular sentiment on holding
governments financially responsible for their wrongs; that it is not to
be supposed that this process has been completed; and that there is
no pressing reason for the courts to usurp the role of the legislatures
in this regard.
Yet another possibility remains. The Court could take the posi-
tion that the near-universality of consent-to-suit statutes is warrant for
abrogating the sovereign immunity of the nation and the states. This
would present problems already discussed. 484
It is submitted that the problem of enforcing a money judgment
against the government, if it comes to that, should not be one of prac-
tical concern. In general, the Court does not allow uncertainties rela-
tive to enforceability of judgments to interfere with its disposition of
controversies—as shown when it ordered President Richard Nixon to
surrender the Watergate tapes,485and when it in effect ordered the
House of Representatives to reinstate Representative Adam Clayton
Powell.486 It may be added that collecting money in a suit directly
against the government should not encounter greater obstacles than
achieving the identical result indirectly in a suit against the officer.
Indeed, the Court has routinely authorized judgments against
states as such, including judgments for the payment of money, when
its original jurisdiction is invoked in controversies between states. 07
Further, in the Ex parte Young line of cases, the Court has recognized,
as has been shown, that a judgment casting a heavy financial burden
on an officer will in many cases almost certainly be borne by the goy-
04 See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
485 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
488 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
487 E.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290 (1907); see also PAUL M. BATOL ET AL.,
HART & WECSHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 322-33 (3d ed. 1988)
(providing a subsequent history of the Virginia case).
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ernment.488 In all these cases, the expectation, justified in the result, is
that, at least eventually, the political branches of the government will
implement the decisions of the judicial branch.
VI. THE PROPER FORUM
A. FederalJurisdiction Founded on State's Consent to Suit in Its Own Courts
In Smith v. Reeves, the Court held that a state's consent to be sued
in its own courts cannot be deemed a consent to be sued in a federal
trial court.489 The Court added that this was "subject always to the
condition . . . that the final judgment of the highest court of the State
in any action brought against it with its consent may be reviewed .. .
as prescribed by the Act of Congress, if it denies to the plaintiff any
[federal] right."49° Professor Jackson interprets the quoted passage
from Smith v. Reeves as making the state's consent to suit in its own
courts suffice as consent to suit in the Supreme Court. 491 She there-
fore sees a discrepancy in the effect accorded to state consent on the
appellate and trial levels of the federal courts. 492
It is submitted that there is a sound constitutional basis for the
discrepancy, if that is what it is. Apart from the Eleventh Amendment,
it should be clear that the constitutional scheme contemplates that
the Supreme Court, as ultimate arbiter of federal law, can review state
decisions of federal questions. Chief Justice Marshall made this point
strongly in Cohens v. Virginia. 493 The question is whether the Amend-
ment makes a difference.
The Amendment covers the Supreme Court, since it is a limita-
tion on the 'judicial power of the United States." 494 In Gohens v. Vir-
ginia the Court held that the Amendment does not apply when the
m See supra notes 312-318 and accompanying text.
489 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900).
4" /d, at 445.
491 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 29. It is submitted that the Court's language is suscepti-
ble to another interpretation---a recognition that if the state does not consent to suit in
the first place there is nothing for the Supreme Court to review. If the state court bars the
suit on the basis of sovereign immunity, its judgment rests on an independent state
ground, thereby depriving the Supreme Court, as it has said, of jurisdiction to consider
any federal questions in the case. E.g., Herb v. Pictairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945). The sub-
ject is discussed in Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1965).
492 Jackson, supra note 1, at 35-39.
4" 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
494 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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state is plaintiff. 495 The apparent implication was that the Amendment
would bar review in the case where an individual sues the state. How-
ever, as the Court declared more recently, "it is inherent in the consti-
tutional plan that when a state takes cognizance of a case, the state
assents to appellate review of federal issues raised by the case." 496 It
could hardly be otherwise, for absent such review, the states would
have the last word on question of federal law. As for the Eleventh
Amendment, assuming it to be other than declaratory of the original
understanding, it is waivable,497 as of course is the innnunity inherent
in the states under the original understanding. Considering the
Amendment in light of the constitutional plan, it can strongly be ar-
gued that there has been a waiver, for purposes of Supreme Court re-
view, when the state "takes cognizance" of a case presenting a federal
question.
On the other hand, such an argument is unavailable to support
federal district court jurisdiction on the basis of a state's consent to
suit in its own courts. Imputing consent to the Supreme Court's juris-
diction on that basis rests in the final analysis on the constitutional
role of that Court as having the final say on federal law. The federal
district courts have no such role.
B. Pennhurst: Pendent Jurisdiction
In Pennhurst, the Court rejected a claim of pendent jurisdic-
tion. 498 Such rejection was based on the bewildering assumption that
the "principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions"
would not apply in cases.adjudicated on the basis of pendent jurisdic-
tion. 499
 The Court remarked that the Eleventh Amendment barred
even federally-based suits aimed at securing "damages against the state
495 Cohens was such a case, having been instituted as a criminal proceeding in a state
court. Virginia contended that the defendant's application to the Supreme Court for a writ
of error constituted a suit against the state. The Court rejected this contention, declaring
that, the proceeding, having commenced as a suit by the state against au individual," it
retained this character "Mhatever the state of its progress." 19 U.S. at 409.
496
 McKesson Corp. v. Division of ABT, 469 U.S. 18, 28 (1990).
4" E.g., Clark v. Bernard, 108 U.S. 436, 437 (1883).
4" Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 117-19. The rule of pendent jurisdiction, now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1367, is generally to the effect that a federal court having jurisdiction over one
claim may adjudicate a second claim so closely related as to form part of the same case or
controversy, even though the court does not have independent jurisdiction with respect to
the latter claim. Other aspects of Pen nhursi are discussed supra Part IV.E.
499 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 119.
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treasury,"500 or "brought directly against a state."5°1 It added that the
"Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force" 502 to
suits founded on state law, through invocation of pendent jurisdic-
tion. Otherwise, said the Court, "a federal court could award damages
against a state on the basis of a pendent claim." 505 No one argued for
such a view of pendent jurisdiction, and there was no basis for it.
Since the claim was founded on state law, and in the absence of any
questions of federal substantive 'law, state law, whatever it might be,
would have governed in all respects.
More fundamentally, the Court was also in error in assuming that
the suit was against the state. To repeat, it was one against state
officers to compel them to perform their duties under a concededly
valid statute. For reasons developed earlier in this Article, such a suit
is not one against the state but rather one in aid of the state. 504 Such a
case is governed entirely by state law; the Eleventh Amendment and
the Ex parte Young doctrine are irrelevant. 5°5
Giving stare decisis effect to this holding would be most unfortu-
nate. Litigants claiming, as they commonly do, that the conduct of
state officers violates both federal and state law, are confronted with
two unpalatable choices: (I) to bring the federal claims in a federal
court and the state claims in a state court, with the resulting inconven-
ience, expense, and uncertainty; 5°6 or (2) to bring both claims in a
state court, with only the remotest prospect of federal consideration
of the federal claim, considering the unlikelihood of Supreme Court
review. It is difficult to perceive any public reliance on the pendent
jurisdiction ruling that would mitigate in favor of stare decisis.
5°° Id. at 120.
501 Id.
502 Id.
"3 Id.
5°4 See supra notes 287-296 and accompanying text; see also Currie, supra note 296, at
165 (asserting that the majority's conclusion in Pennhurst was "unconvincing" given the
Court's prior precedent).
505 It does not follow that the exercise of federal jurisdiction in such a case is desirable.
As the Court emphasized, the state officers were doing the best they could with the inade-
quate funds provided by the state legislature. Absent a federal issue, it is arguable that such
a case is a proper one for abstention. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 71, at 1246-56;
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 79 & 11.109. But federal issues are commonly present in such law-
suits, and the advantages of pendent jurisdiction should not be foregone without good
reason. The problem is with the traditional rule that prevents decision on federal constitu-
tional questions if the case can he decided on any other basis. Perhaps it is time to con-
sider whether this rule should be followed without exception.
506 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81.
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C. Nevada v. Hall: Suit in a Sister State
The case of Nevada v. Hall involved an accident in California re-
sulting from the negligent operation of a Nevada-owned vehicle on
official Nevada business.507
 An injured person sued the State of Ne-
vada in a California state court, with service based on California's
long-arm statute. 508 Nevada's plea of sovereign immunity was rejected..
The Supreme Court held that California was under no constitu-
tional obligation to respect Nevada's claim of immunity. 509 The Court
explained that, on the international level, the question whether one
sovereign is bound to respect the immunity of another is governed
entirely by considerations of comity. 510 The Court explained that
when the Constitution Was being drafted and ratified, the states,
"heavily indebted"511 as they were, "presumably" assumed that they
had "adequate protection" against suit in the courts of sister states by
virtue of "prevailing notions of comity," but that they neglected to
write this into the Constitution, which accordingly gave them no pro-
tection on this point. 512 A dissenting opinion argued that there were
arguments for implying such protection from the Constitution that
were more persuasive than the Court's "literalism." 513
It is submitted that the Court was beguiled by "notions of comity,"
and inattentive to the implications of our constitutional arrange-
ments. On the international level, if nation A has suffered injury in
consequence of action by nation B that constitutes a violation of in-
ternational law, nation A's opportunity for redress is sharply limited.
An international tribunal could not exercise jurisdiction over the case
absent consent by nation B, unless nation B has in effect given a gen-
eral consent under the terms of a treaty. Absent nation B's consent on
either basis, nation A might resort to retaliation, or even to war if it
deemed itself sufficiently aggrieved:
507 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
308 Id. at 411-12.
309 Id. at 426.
mo Id. at 416-17. On this point the Court quoted from ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion
in The Schooner Exchange a McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
511 Hall, 440 U.S. at 418.
512 Id. at 419.
313 Id. at 439 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenters relied, inter alia, on the right-
to-travel precedents. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Avoidance of such confrontations between the states was of
course a major reason for creation of the Supreme Court. 514 The Su-
preme Court is a tribunal to which one state can summon another
without the latter's consent. Absent any indication in the Constitution
of the law to be applied in these controversies between states, the Su-
preme Court applies rules that it deems appropriate to the occasion,
drawing heavily on rules of customary international law. 515 Clearly,
Nevada, if wronged, would have had a sound basis for redress against
California in an original proceeding in the Supreme Court.
To return to the situation in Hall, suppose that Nevada had ar-
gued in the California courts for an outcome the same as that which
could be achieved if Nevada sued California in the Supreme Court.
Our jurisprudence would be wasteful and formalistic if Nevada could
have this claim recognized only by such a suit in the Supreme Court.
In fact, there is precedent indicating that the California courts were
bound to apply the law that the Supreme Court would apply if adjudi-
cating the controversy itself; that law is binding on all courts as federal
common law.516 It is not suggested that one state should be allowed to
5" See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 22, at 214 (James Madison) ("Some such
tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the com-
pact ....").
515 Hill, Law-Making Power, supra note 191, at 1030-32.
mu In Illinois u City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), Illinois petitioned the Supreme
Court for leave to sue a number of Wisconsin political subdivisions under the Court's
original jurisdiction. The claim was founded on the alleged pollution of Lake Michigan by
the defendants. The case was held to be governed by federal common law, and one that
could be adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Noting, however, that its jurisdiction in a
controversy between a state and non-state parties was not exclusive, the Court remitted the
parties to an appropriate district court." Id. at 108.
In Hinderlider Ts La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., the Court, on review of a judg-
ment rendered by a state court, in a suit between a private corporation and a state officer,
held that the federal CO111111011 law governing the use of interstate waters was binding
where appropriate to the issues. 304 U.S. 92,110 (1938). This rule was developed by the
Court in controversies between states. Id. at 102-03.
In an earlier article, this writer expressed the view that federal common law applicable
in controversies between states does not come into existence until established by authorita-
tive decisions. Hill, Law-Making Power, supra note 191, at 1032 /1.47 (1965). It now seems to
the writer that this conclusion was unsupportable in principle. Thus, after the decision in
Erie R.R. u Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a number of inferior federal courts, mindful of
Erie's comtnand to apply state law, rejected the proffer of what was claimed to be state law
unless such law had been authoritatively established by the highest state courts. It should
have been obvious that the inferior state courts themselves could not have functioned
under such a rule and that in adhering to this rule the federal courts were not really apply-
ing state law. This development was arrested in Bemthatdt v. Polygraph Co. of America, 350
U.S. 198 (1956). This lesson applies to the federal common law as well. When law of a
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sue another state in a federal district court, but only that, in a suit to
which a state is a party or in which it has a substantial interest, account
should be taken of the law that the Supreme Court would apply in a
comparable case between the two interested states.
However, it does not follow that the wrong result was reached in
Nevada v. Hall. Since Nevada had, in effect, entered California and
affected that state's interests adversely, Nevada should not be able to
avoid such consequences by a plea of sovereign immunity. To a sub-
stantial extent the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exer-
cised in suits by one state against another for relief from harmful con-
sequences caused by the second state within the borders of the first, as
in cases of pollution of water and air, or impairment of water rights. 517
The Supreme Court touched upon this point in an ambiguous foot-
note in Nevada u Hal1.518 The problem is that the thrust of the opin-
ion would allow one state to override the sovereign immunity of an-
other even when the latter's conduct has not produced harmful
consequences within the borders of the first.
CONCLUSION
It has been argued in this Article that there was an understanding
at the time of adoption of the Constitution that the nation and the
states were not suable without their consent, except in special particu-
lars like a suit by a state against a sister state. Modern critics and a mi-
nority of the Justices have challenged the existence of such an under-
standing. They have maintained that the historical record shows that
the proponents of sovereign immunity were concerned with protect-
ing the states only from claims founded on state law, as distinct from
federal law. This is implausible, and incompatible with the historical
record. The same fallacy has engendered confusion about the mean-
ing of the Eleventh Amendment. Read in light Of the original under-
standing the Amendment loses its mystery. The original understand-
ing also illuminates the problem of congressional power to set aside
the sovereign immunity of the states.
particular jurisdiction is controlling, decision should be made in light of the probable
outcome in the highest court of that jurisdiction,
5!7 See the discussion of representative cases in Illinois u City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at
104-08.
Sid
 The Supreme Court seemed to recognize this in an ambiguous footnote in Hall,
440 U.S. at 42411.24.
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The Supreme Court's seeming zigzagging in decisions under the
Ex parte Young doctrine assumes a rational and defensible pattern
when it is recognized that the Court has permitted the use of sover-
eign immunity for defensive but not offensive purposes. In these deci-
sions, the Court has gone far in recognition of constitutional and
statutory claims. The result can be seen as a defensible accommoda-
tion of the requirements of sovereign immunity to the requirements
of the rule of law.
Consent-to-suit statutes aside, the relief that can be afforded
through the suit against the officer is imperfect. Property may be re-
stored, but damages assessed against an officer may not be collectible.
Hardship may be incurred by reason of inability to compel a transfer
of title by the government. It has been suggested, however, that, as the
law is tending, governmental interference with a property right may
in all cases be tantamount to a taking, with relief allowable on that
basis. Contracts with the government are not enforceable when sover-
eign immunity is asserted defensively, although this rule may not be
applicable where the government's obligation is spelled out in a stat-
ute which also specifies clearly the duties of the officer in regard to
the obligation. If an inability to hold the government to its executory
contracts, as in the case of defaulted bonds, presents a rule-of-law
problem, it is one a good deal less serious than government intrusion
on persons who ask only to be left alone, or to be free from govern-
mental denial of rights enjoyed by others. The government's ability to
escape liability in tort, at least when the tort consists of negligence, as
is usually the case, arguably presents even less of a rule-of-law prob-
lem.
These are the principal costs of sovereign immunity, absent con-
sent-to-suit statutes. But these statutes are now so widespread, on the
federal and state levels, that these costs have in greater part been
eliminated. Paradoxically, the prevalence of such statutes offers a pos-
sible basis for a principled judicial modification or elimination of sov-
ereign immunity, at least as applied to governmental commercial ac-
tivity, if there is merit in a thesis advanced by this writer eleven years
ago. 519
519 This point is developed supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
